The DOGE solution? 'No thanks' says Japan, with reason

Japan Times

02-04-2025

The Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, the Elon Musk-Donald Trump project to reform the U.S. government bureaucracy, has been described as a sledgehammer, bulldozer, meat cleaver, wrecking ball — you get the picture. Whatever the metaphor, it is a uniquely American approach to institutional reform, reflective of the larger culture within which it operates: brash, impulsive, self-confident, expansive. Again, you get the picture.
While I'm fond of the saying, 'whenever I hear the word 'culture,' I reach for my gun,' it's important to take seriously arguments about culture when thinking about ways societies change — or don't. That understanding is more critical than ever at a time of wrenching transition throughout the world. Failure to grasp the essential characteristics of each country will ensure that outsiders misread the moment and fail to appreciate what is going on and why.
German sociologist Max Weber first explained the link between culture and economic outcomes over a century ago. He argued that the values of reformist Christians — hard work, discipline and frugality — provided the foundation of successful capitalism and explained the West's pre-eminence.
In the intervening years, capitalism became ubiquitous. National variations are then explained as the product of broader cultural forces. So, for example, the ferocious and voracious Western variant which celebrates the individual and his or her independence is the product of a frontier ethic where lonely individuals combat the forces of nature on their own. By contrast, Asian versions are more 'group-oriented,' hierarchical and respectful of norms, traditions and precedent. This stems, we are told, from the agricultural roots of these societies that demanded cooperation to harvest the crops upon which they depended.
These crude stereotypes often comport with lived experience, but generalizations are invariably general. This can get squishy — and that is when that trigger finger gets itchy. When Singapore's former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, was asked what were the 'Asian values' he credited for his country's extraordinary success he replied: 'hard work, drive for education and respect for one's parents — you know, all the things that made the United States great!'
Sociologists and social psychologists have done their best to provide more precision and scientific rigor to this analysis. Canadian business professor Rosalie L. Tung distinguished between 'dry' and 'wet' cultures in her 1984 study, 'Business Negotiations with the Japanese.' She argued that non-Japanese have 'dry' business relationships that are based on legal documents and the economic dimensions of the deal.
By contrast, the Japanese develop 'wet' relationships that are more personal and transcend the four corners of the agreement. These are long-term arrangements that bind the parties even when conditions change. Paperwork is important, to be sure, but it's not necessarily determinative. Deals are adjusted to allow relationships to continue.
Perhaps the most famous assessment of national cultures was that of Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede. A massive study of over 100,000 IBM employees yielded a six-dimensional analysis that identified the following key characteristics: power distance (acceptance of inequality), individualism, uncertainty avoidance (tolerance of unpredictability), masculinity, short versus long-term orientation and indulgence versus restraint.
His results confirmed many preconceptions about Asians. Conclusions about Japan offer no surprises. The country is mid-range between a collectivist and an individualistic culture, with a long-term focus, a preference for certainty, little tolerance for large inequalities in power and disdain for indulgence; restraint is preferred. It's also quite masculine.
That first finding — that the country teeters between individualism and collectivism — is a bit of a surprise, but other researchers argue that the country is in transition, with younger generations more inclined to 'selfishness' than their predecessors. That seems like an unremarkable conclusion.
While Hofstede has ruled the academic roost, a new analysis has gained prominence in recent years. In 2019, University of Maryland psychology professor Michele J. Gelfand published 'Rule Makers, Rule Breakers,' which argued that a distinction between 'tight' and 'loose' cultures was the key to understanding national behaviors.
Gelfand wants us to focus on social norms, 'the glue that keep(s) us together, (that) gives us our identity and help(s) us to coordinate and cooperate at such a remarkable level.' She adds that 'social norms are the key that unlocks societal order, and even the possibility of constructing a human society.'
Some groups have stronger norms than others. Gelfand calls these 'tight' cultures. Those with weaker norms are 'loose.' Of course, none are pure and there is invariably a mix of both types, but she concludes that 'cultures vary in the degree to which they emphasize norms and compliance with them.'
I take Gelfand seriously because Ulrike Schaede, professor of Japanese business at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California, San Diego, does. She adopted the 'tight-loose' framework in 'The Business Reinvention of Japan,' her Ohira Memorial Prize winning book.
As Schaede explained, 'Tight cultures, such as Japan's are characterized by strong norms for what constitutes the 'right' behavior as well as strong mechanisms for ostracizing deviants. In contrast, loose cultures, such as that in the United States, have a much wider definition of what is acceptable and do not sanction noncompliance to nearly the same degree.'
Schaede identified three norms that dominate Japanese culture: Be polite and considerate, behave appropriately and don't make trouble (or make disruptive decisions). Implicit in this reasoning is consideration of a much wider range of interests when decisions are made. This means that would-be reformers must maneuver delicately or their actions could trigger resentment and rejection. 'Being noisy, pushy or brazen will rarely yield success in Japan.'
While the glacial pace of change here can infuriate non-Japanese, Schaede adds that this 'has distinct advantages for managing change. The most important is that once a decision has been made and everybody is on board, change can happen swiftly. Preparation may seem to take forever, but the execution can be expeditious.'
That is the key point as I ponder the havoc unleashed by DOGE.
I can't imagine a DOGE-like beast in Japan. No one can. It is utterly alien to every tradition, precedent or cultural inclination in this country. The only possible condition under which such a mechanism could exist would be foreign imposition — occupation or the fear of one (i.e., the Meiji Restoration.) My book 'Peak Japan' was intended to answer the question of whether the triple catastrophe of March 11 would catalyze change in Japan. Yet even that horrific cascade of disasters proved insufficient.
The point that Schaede makes, and about which I am ambivalent, is that Japan doesn't need that change. She argues that critical reforms are occurring within businesses to prepare them for the new global competition. She urges us to forget world-beating conglomerates and instead focus on occupying vital nodes in global supply chains. By that metric, Japan is succeeding. (Slowly, but without doubt.)
In contrast, there is DOGE. It may be better suited to American culture but there is no mistaking its impact on the larger society: The U.S. is literally tearing itself apart — and this is in the best performing Group of Seven economy in the world post COVID-19. Meanwhile in Japan, after three decades of stagnation, there is none of the angst, unhappiness, anger and division. The change that is taking place, despite being elemental on some levels, is far less disruptive than that occurring in other countries.
For sure, it's not as fast as Western observers — critics — would like. But the culture of slow, steady, incremental transformation that accounts for all stakeholder interests appears to be far more successful in navigating vital change than one that acts by fiat from the top.
To those who counter that the U.S. has produced a 'superior' economy — there are plenty of metrics to validate that adjective — I point to the larger social upheaval that has accompanied not only DOGE but the process of the Schumpeterian "creative destruction" that got us here.
Neither Tung, Hofstede nor Gelfand would argue that one set of norms is 'better' than another. Instead, each is merely better suited to or reflective of the society that produced them. From this vantage point at this moment in history, however, a verdict is pretty clear.
Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. His new book on the geopolitics of high-tech is expected to come out from Hurst Publishers this fall.