Dark clouds gather over Australia's red earth riches
Spearing out of the deep-red Hammersley Range in Western Australia's Pilbara region is an 18-kilometre conveyer belt. It rumbles day and night on rollers transporting a steady flow of iron ore from a monster four-storey crusher at the area's newest open-cut mine.
Rio Tinto's $2.4 billion Western Range iron ore mine – officially opened this month – is the latest in a long line of mega-projects that have carved up the desert here for the past 60 years, sending mountains of crushed rock to the port and onto huge bulk carriers bound for steel mills in Asia.
China's voracious appetite for iron ore, the reddish dirt that's turned into steel inside giant blast furnaces, has kept the Australian economy prosperous for decades, bringing in hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue and creating the world's two most valuable miners, BHP and Rio Tinto, along the way.
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To this day, the commodity still ranks as Australia's single biggest export earner, fetching $138 billion in the past financial year alone, accounting for up to 5 per cent of the country's gross domestic product.
But demand in China is starting to cool, which is a cause of considerable concern because Chinese steelmakers are the biggest buyers of our iron ore by far. Deteriorating conditions in the Chinese property sector, which accounts for 30 per cent of its steel demand, is crunching building activity, just as US President Donald Trump's tariffs loom as another economic threat that could hinder the effectiveness of Beijing's stimulus measures.
At the same time, a wave of additional iron ore from the next generation of mines in Africa and Australia is raising the risk of an oversupply, while the declining quality of Australia's iron ore output means it will be unsuitable for less-polluting steel-making practices becoming more popular in the push to avert catastrophic global warming.
All of these headwinds are leading to one important question: could Australia's iron ore earnings powerhouse be finally facing the beginning of long and gradual structural decline?
The risk, analysts warn, is real. The fundamentals are certainly 'less constructive' than they have been in the past, says Lachlan Shaw, a mining analyst at UBS.
'The downside case for iron ore rests on a combination of supply growth from new projects including Simandou in Guinea, Onslow and Iron Bridge in WA and recovering production in Brazil,' he says.
'This, coupled with expectations for China's steel production to ease lower over coming years, results in an outlook that would, if it comes to pass, put downward pressure on iron ore prices.'
However, it's also worth remembering that the iron ore price has long defied repeated predictions it is overdue for a fall, he adds.
China's steel output has probably peaked, but this is unlikely to spell disaster. Production in China is likely to plateau at 'relatively high levels' for some time, UBS says, and demand growth in the emerging steel sectors of South-East Asia, India and the Middle East could help offset weakening conditions in China.
The development of projects to unleash new iron ore supplies may also come under pressure from higher costs and more costly and complicated approvals and heritage management processes.
'The collective market has a long history of over-confidence in forecasting iron ore's demise,' Shaw says. 'There are important offsets that may see iron ore trade stronger than the more bearish forecasts on the street.'
The slowdown in China presents the most immediate threat to demand. But a debate has also begun intensifying among the Pilbara iron ore giants about a longer-term question: could the shift to less-polluting steel-making methods which require higher grades of iron ore than Australian mines are producing hasten their demise?
'We're going to be in the Pilbara for decades. It has got a strong future if we do the work.'
Rio's head of iron ore, Simon Trott
Chinese steel mills' shift from traditional blast furnaces to cleaner processes, which use electricity instead of coal and require iron ore with fewer impurities, could turn the Pilbara into a wasteland, Andrew Forrest, the billionaire chairman of Western Australia's third-largest iron ore shipper, Fortescue Metals Group, said recently.
'They are going to shut down the old-fashioned, two-century-old technology of burning sticks and logs, putting in coal, putting in iron ore, burning it all and sending up masses of pollution into the atmosphere and producing steel,' Forrest told a mining summit in Perth. 'They're looking straight into a future that may or may not include WA.'
Analysts agree that the momentum in the industry towards cleaner steel-making processes makes the outlook for lower grade iron ore 'more challenged' relative to higher-grade products. To maintain demand for the Pilbara's mid- to low-grade iron ore, technical innovation would be required to secure their use as feedstocks for lower-carbon steel-making processes, they say.
BHP and Rio Tinto have partnered with BlueScope Steel to build an electric iron-making furnace as part of a demonstration project at Kwinana near Perth. Forrest's Fortescue is investing heavily in a push to diversify into green hydrogen as a substitute for coal in the steel-making process, and has plans to build a commercial-scale green iron plant in the Pilbara.
'Australian industry is starting to do the work here,' says Shaw. The opportunity for Australia to shift to a green iron producer and away from an iron ore miner and shipper is 'real', he adds, but will face technical and economic challenges. 'Innovation, commitment and supportive policy settings will likely be needed in combination to realise such an enormous transition,' he says.
'They are going to shut down the old-fashioned, two-century-old technology of burning sticks and logs, putting in coal, putting in iron ore, burning it all and sending up masses of pollution into the atmosphere and producing steel.'
Fortescue's Andrew Forrest
While the industry is responding to growing efforts to decarbonise the steel sector, which accounts for at least 8 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, Forrest's suggestion that the Pilbara is at risk of becoming a wasteland is one that Rio Tinto's head of iron ore, Simon Trott, rejects.
'We're going to be in the Pilbara for decades,' he says. 'It has got a strong future if we do the work.'
Asked to explain the progressive decline in ore quality coming out of the region, Trott says: 'You tend to start with the best bits first. That's what happened when the Pilbara got developed through the '60s, and since then, as a whole, the Pilbara has gradually declined.'
Rio Tinto says its new mines, such as Western Range, will shore up growth. The Anglo-Australian mining giant also believes it has an ace up its sleeve at its Rhodes Ridge development, which is expected to be ready by the end of this decade and contains more than 6 billion tonnes of higher grade ore.
'The good news for us is that it's in front of us rather than behind us,' says Trott.
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Rod Sims, the long-serving former chair of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, paints a more optimistic picture of the Pilbara's future. Where the industry sees a threat, he sees lucrative potential to create a green iron manufacturing hub for which, he says, Australia is 'superbly well positioned'.
Now chair of the Superpower Institute, a think tank he co-founded with energy expert and economist Ross Garnaut, Sims says Australia's abundant iron ore, when coupled with world-class wind and solar resources, could power a green steel export industry potentially worth $386 billion a year by 2060.
'Green iron is the next great chapter in Australia's export story,' he says. 'As the world decarbonises, our fossil fuel exports will inevitably decline – but by using our unparalleled renewable energy resources to make green iron, we can replace those exports with high value, zero carbon products that the world will need.'
One way to fulfil that vision is to use green hydrogen to replace coal in the steelmaking process, creating an emission-free product, a technology Forrest is placing big bets on. The hydrogen is sourced by splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen using electrolysis powered by fields of solar panels or wind turbines. However, the technology remains far more expensive than basic furnaces, and is not widely used yet.
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With big challenges ahead, how Australia's mining giants position themselves for the next decade will be critical. BHP and Rio Tinto are searching for new leadership talent to steer them through.
Both companies are heading into capital-intensive, construction-heavy periods with a focus on projects aimed at boosting their supplies of commodities that stand to benefit from growing global efforts to tackle global warming, such as electric battery raw material lithium, and copper, a key ingredient in electric wiring. BHP is focusing on several new and expanded copper mines, while Rio Tinto is concentrating on copper and lithium.
'Both businesses will need to pivot to a more technical, execution-driven capability within senior leadership ranks,' says Shaw. 'It will come down to the right balance of senior leaders being able to surround themselves with the technical skills and talent they need and can trust, versus potential new leadership with stronger technical experience.'
Rio Tinto chair Dominic Barton surprised investors with his disclosure three weeks ago that chief executive Jakob Stausholm will leave later this year. The miner didn't name a successor, prompting speculation the transition was hasty and a result of friction between Stausholm and Barton.
Stausholm has rejected talk of a rift. There is 'no disalignment', he told reporters at Western Range last week. 'We have completely agreed between ourselves that it is the right time to look for succession, and I will be stepping down. I am very happy and proud about my what will be five years as CEO of this company,' he said.
Any incoming boss at Rio Tinto will need to 'double down to deliver greater operational performance', Barton said, intimating the company is focusing on candidates for the top job with deep mining experience.
Change at the top of resource giant BHP has been smoother.
Former National Australia Bank chief executive Ross McEwan seamlessly took over as company chair from eight-year veteran Ken MacKenzie in March, although there are now suggestions the Big Australian is looking to replace CEO Mike Henry but no official acknowledgement.
For Shanghai-based Baowu, Rio Tinto's partner in Western Range, there is no equivocation on the Pilbara's future.
The world's largest steel producer, wholly owned by the Chinese government, is firmly rooted in the region's red earth, owning 46 per cent of the joint venture since 2002. Its chairman, Hu Wangming, describes it almost poetically as a place 'where partnership and friendship flourish, like the ore veins of the Western Range: strong, deep and everlasting'.

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The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. 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An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours. Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours. Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours. Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours.


Canberra Times
3 hours ago
- Canberra Times
Do you have $3 million in super? Me neither. These changes will actually help you
Do you have $3 million in super? Me neither. It is estimated that the changes will only impact a tiny fraction of the Australian population, around 80,000 people. That's fewer people than can fit in the MCG. In fact, 99.5 per cent of Australians currently do not have more than $3 million in super. According to ATO data, the average super balance is a mere $182,000 for men and $146,000 for women. Greg Jericho, chief economist at the Australia Institute, crunched the numbers and found that around 97 per cent of people currently in the labour force will never have $3 million in superannuation, no matter how hard they work for their entire lives. Even if a young person works their entire life on the full-time average wage, with no time out of the workforce for kids or illness, they will never accumulate $3 million in super. Not surprising when you consider the median super balance for women aged 60-64 is less than $160,000, meaning half of Australian women have less super than that (half of Australian men the same age have just $211,996 or less).