Bassil: We insist on limiting illegal weapons to the hands of the state through a practical plan... It must be utilized to achieve political benefits for Lebanon

Tayyar.org

2 days ago

Press Conference by MP Gebran Bassil, Leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, on the Exclusivity of Arms in the State's Hands
I – Fundamental Position 1. Legal and Constitutional Basis.Based on the legal definition of a state as the sole authority entitled to use force to defend the country and ensure the safety of its citizens, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) affirms that any weapon outside the state's authority is illegal—whether it belongs to Lebanese or non-Lebanese groups—except in cases of legitimate self-defense or the liberation of occupied territory, and only when expressly authorized by the state in accordance with its constitution and laws.This framework was in place from 1990 until 2025, when the Lebanese government received parliamentary confidence based on a ministerial statement affirming that arms should be exclusively under the authority of the state. Implementing this decision is the government's responsibility, and steps toward that goal have already begun. Accordingly, parliament retains the authority to decide whether to withdraw confidence from the government. Since it has not done so, this government—despite our vote of no-confidence—continues to enjoy parliamentary trust. 2. Clear and Consistent PositionThe FPM maintains a firm stance: weapons must remain solely under the authority of the state, with no sharing or joint control. This position rests on the following principles:A. State sovereignty and unified decision-making on security: The possession and use of regulated arms must remain exclusively within legitimate state institutions.B. The Taif Agreement: This agreement called for the dissolution of all militias—a clause never fully implemented, leaving both the arms of the resistance and other provisions unaddressed. Successive governments effectively legitimized these armed groups. It is now time to fully implement this clause, along with others such as administrative decentralization, the abolition of political sectarianism, and the establishment of a senate.C. International resolutions: Particularly UN Security Council Resolution 1701, alongside other resolutions addressing the Palestinian refugee issue, ensuring that any solution does not come at Lebanon's expense.
II – Practical and Realistic Position
Recent developments require a reassessment of how the FPM addresses the issue of arms: 1. Hezbollah's Deterrent RoleHezbollah's deterrent role has eroded due to its unilateral involvement in the 'support war,' weakening its capacity after the latest conflict. While it may still retain limited defensive capability against a potential Israeli invasion, these arms have become a source of threat and a pretext for aggression against Lebanon.As for Palestinian arms, both inside and outside the camps, they are already rendered null by the cancellation of the Cairo Agreement. This makes the arms issue urgent, as it directly threatens Lebanon's sovereignty and national stability. 2. Regional and International InvolvementThe involvement of these arms in regional and international power struggles—beyond Lebanon's capacity to manage—has stripped them of their distinctly Lebanese character. This is precisely what the 2006 Agreement sought to prevent: 'Lebanonizing' the arms by limiting their role to defending Lebanon under a state-led defensive strategy.Since these weapons have been drawn into regional, supportive, and even offensive roles; given field realities showing a decline in their actual capabilities; and considering the FPM's long-standing position that Lebanon must remain neutral in regional conflicts—these arms must be placed exclusively under state authority. They must not serve any regional axis, in line with neutrality and preventing Lebanon from being shifted from one axis to another.We reaffirm our commitment to the Arab and international framework for a two-state solution, to restoring all of Lebanon's territorial and resource rights, and to facilitating the return of both Palestinian refugees and Syrian displaced persons to their homelands. 3. Failure to Build the StateHezbollah's failure to actively engage in state-building constitutes a breach of the 2006 Agreement, wasting the opportunity during President Michel Aoun's term to construct a strong state and reinforce it politically and economically by complementing military strength with other pillars of power.In light of this failure and current realities, it is essential to preserve Lebanon's military capacity to address threats from the south and east—but exclusively under the authority of the state, its army, and its decision-making institutions. This will strengthen state authority, enhance capabilities, and ensure effective responses to challenges.
III – The FPM's Core Principles 1. Rejecting internal strife and the isolation of any Lebanese group; ensuring reassurance and protection for any community that feels threatened, whether from internal or external sources; and rejecting both foreign interference and domestic incitement based on sectarian or political motives. These risks can be mitigated through dialogue and goodwill. 2. Rejecting any form of blackmail or threats of civil war by any group seeking to prevent the unification of arms under state control. Accepting such threats would set a precedent allowing factions to secure gains outside the framework of the national pact and consensus. 3. Adopting a decisive yet gradual and comprehensive approach to transition Lebanon toward exclusive state control over weapons. This should be implemented through a phased plan aligned with the Lebanese army's capabilities—making use of Hezbollah's weapons without destroying them—and securing genuine, tangible international support from states sponsoring and guaranteeing the arms solution.This falls under what the FPM calls a 'defensive strategy' and the government terms a 'national defense system,' in all cases under the state's exclusive command, with the Shiite community as an essential pillar of the state and its army.The handover of these weapons must be accompanied by political returns for Lebanon, including: Israeli withdrawal from newly occupied territories; the return of prisoners; an end to aggression; full liberation of the land; reconstruction; the immediate return of Syrian displaced people; resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue; Lebanon's right to exploit its natural resources (water, oil, gas); and international guarantees for Lebanon's protection (including a formal international decision), alongside Lebanon's neutrality in regional conflicts.This opportunity should also be used to push for necessary economic and financial reforms, codified into Lebanese laws, and paired with an international economic conference dedicated to Lebanon.
All these principles affirm that weapons must be exclusive to legitimate security institutions—especially the Lebanese army, the guarantor of all Lebanese and defender of the nation's borders and sovereignty. They also affirm that Lebanon's territory is not a battlefield for regional or international conflicts, but the homeland of the Lebanese people, whose diversity is safeguarded by democracy and whose stability is built on constant dialogue.
IV – Holding the Authorities Accountable
The ruling authority must translate its positions into concrete action on the following issues: 1. Syrian Displacement Crisis: Achieve the immediate return of displaced persons, urging Western nations to adopt a practical plan with immediate incentives to enable this return, and prioritize it in any proposed solution. 2. Palestinian Arms Inside and Outside Camps: Immediate implementation of decisions to ensure their complete removal. 3. Relations with Syria: Define relations based on equality and full respect for sovereignty and independence; complete land and sea border demarcation; establish proper diplomatic relations, including appointing a Syrian ambassador to Lebanon; and reform economic agreements so they genuinely benefit both nations. 4. Lebanese Army: Implement a clear plan to strengthen and equip the army to face external threats. 5. Foreign Policy and Neutrality: Adopt a clear foreign policy guaranteeing Lebanon's neutrality in regional conflicts, ensuring the government serves as the primary center of national decision-making, not as a tool for foreign agendas.In this context, the FPM affirms support for maintaining the best possible relations with the United States, leveraging its international standing and President Trump's policy of promoting peace in the region and the world. President Aoun and the FPM successfully used this relationship to secure a sovereign oil and gas agreement for Lebanon through maritime border demarcation with Israel. We remain convinced that President Trump's influence on Israel should be leveraged to guarantee Lebanon's rights, alongside Lebanon's readiness to engage in a just and comprehensive regional peace process.
V – Political Reality and Conclusion
Exclusive state control over arms is a settled matter; achieving it is only a question of time. It must secure national gains for all of Lebanon—not for Hezbollah, the Shiite community alone, or any single group. 1. Protecting and defending Lebanon is the responsibility of the state, representing all citizens—not any single faction. 2. The objective is to safeguard Lebanon's strengths, with the ultimate goal being peace, not surrender. 3. Weapons outside state authority are a sovereignty, political, regional, and strategic issue. Sovereignty is not negotiable; it is an obligation to restore Lebanon's role and ensure stability. 4. The ultimate goals are:A) A strong state with one legitimate armed force;B) Lebanon's neutrality in regional conflicts;C) Guaranteed sovereignty;D) A decentralized system within one unified state covering 10,452 km²;E) A productive economy in a society at peace with itself and its surroundings.