Singapore's Catholic Church rejoices at election of Pope Leo XIV
Robert Francis Prevost is the first pope from the US. He was elected on Thursday after cardinals chose him to lead the 1.4 billion Catholics worldwide.
"The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Singapore gives thanks to almighty God for blessing us with a new Vicar of Christ," the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Singapore said in a statement on Friday.
It added: "We rejoice at the election of Pope Leo XIV as the successor of Saint Peter and Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church.
"The Roman Catholic Archdiocese unites with the universal church in praying for the Holy Father as he begins his Apostolic ministry."
Aged 69, Prevost has spent most of his career as a missionary in Peru. He served as a bishop in Chiclayo in northwest Peru from 2015 to 2023, and became a Peruvian citizen in 2015, so he has dual nationality.
In 2023, he became a cardinal.
Pope Leo is a member of the global Augustinian religious order, which operates in 50 countries and has a focus on a life of community and equality among its members.
The papal inauguration usually takes place less than a week after the election, with a mass celebrated before political and religious leaders from around the world.
Ahead of that, Pope Leo will lead a mass on Friday for cardinals in the Sistine Chapel and recite the Regina Caeli prayer in St Peter's Square on Sunday.
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Straits Times
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Thailand's ex-PM Thaksin faces verdict in royal insult case
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CNA
an hour ago
- CNA
Stronger showing of Southeast Asian leaders expected at China's Sep 3 WWII parade. Why so?
BEIJING: Armoured columns. Aerial flyovers. Troop march-pasts. But as China gears up for a grand military parade on Sep 3 to mark 80 years since the end of World War II, analysts say the audience may speak louder than the display, especially with Southeast Asian leaders expected to turn up in force. Top leaders from Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam are among several Southeast Asian states set to attend, according to reports, marking a first time three of Southeast Asia's largest economies will be simultaneously represented at the highest levels at a People's Liberation Army-led (PLA) parade on Tiananmen Square. Leaders from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are likewise expected to appear after first attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin just days earlier, the South China Morning Post reported. For China, the sight of regional leaders attending the parade signals solidarity and legitimacy. For Southeast Asian economies, it offers a chance to court Chinese trade and investment without paying too heavy a political price at home, analysts say. 'Participation signals goodwill toward China, with the intention to promote regional stability, but risks only minor repercussions from pro-democracy, human rights and nationalist opposition parties, or wary public opinion concerned about sovereignty and militarisation,' Jonathan Ping, an associate professor at Bond University, told CNA. Observers note that the turnout reflects more than wartime remembrance. For China, the anniversary is a dual showcase - flexing military might at home while projecting diplomatic reach across Asia and beyond. They add that Beijing is keen to prove its convening power, rallying regional and international partners even as ties with the West fray and the United States under President Donald Trump unsettles the global order. SOUTHEAST ASIA'S PARADE PRESENCE The upcoming Victory Day parade will be China's second full-scale procession since 2015 to mark Japan's formal surrender in September 1945. Domestically, World War II is officially known as the 'Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War'. Staged in the heart of Beijing, the event will bring together tens of thousands of participants and showcase China's latest military hardware. President Xi Jinping will survey the spectacle at Tiananmen Square as foreign leaders and dignitaries look on, their presence scrutinised as closely as the firepower on display. Authorities have said that invitations to foreign leaders would be extended, but have yet to disclose a formal guest list. At a routine press briefing on Wednesday (Aug 20), Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said 'information will be released in due time'. Still, media reports point to a stronger Southeast Asian turnout than in 2015. Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim are likely to attend the parade, SCMP reported on Aug 15, citing multiple sources. Vietnam is also expected to send its president, Luong Cuong, according to the report. In comparison, Southeast Asian attendance at the 2015 parade was marked by the heads of state from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, while Thailand was represented by then-Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia sent special envoys, including former officials or cabinet representatives. Brunei did not feature on published lists of high-level attendees. Amid strained ties over territorial disputes, the Philippines did not send a formal representative - instead, former President Joseph Estrada, then serving as Manila's mayor, attended the parade in a personal capacity, citing the sister‑city ties between Manila and Beijing For Beijing, the sight of Southeast Asian leaders attending the parade is meant to underscore solidarity and show that China's neighbours are prepared to be seen alongside its military, said Bond University's Ping. 'Inviting ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) leaders underscores Beijing's ambition for diplomatic alignment and regional stability under its leadership, while the military display reinforces its expanding interests and offensive posture,' he said. Analysts see two main factors driving stronger Southeast Asian representation at the upcoming parade. For one, the political cost of attending is relatively low. In 2015, analysts noted a higher political cost for Southeast Asian leaders to be seen at a PLA-led showcase. It was China's first full-scale Victory Day parade, held amid active island building and land reclamation in the disputed South China Sea alongside the then-pending arbitration case brought by the Philippines. As Western leaders mostly stayed away, most ASEAN states opted for lower-level representation to avoid the perception of endorsing China's military posture while disputes simmered, analysts said. This year, the optics are still weighty - the Sino-US rivalry is sharper and the PLA faces heightened scrutiny - but analysts say the commemorative framing of the Sep 3 event makes it a less politically sensitive choice for Southeast Asian leaders. Unlike in 2015, when tensions in the South China Sea were relatively higher and the optics of marching alongside Chinese troops risked being read as tacit alignment with Beijing's military posture, today's climate carries relatively lower risk of such perceptions, noted analysts. 'Attendance at PLA-centred commemorations is a diplomatic benefit with lesser domestic sensitivities,' noted Ping, who's also the director of Bond University's East Asia Security Centre as well as editor of the Journal of East Asia Security. But the calculus is double-edged, said Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington DC. Leaders want to nurture ties with China, yet they must also consider long-standing ties with Japan, he told CNA. Japan figures prominently in this equation because Beijing's Victory Day parade is framed around its defeat in World War II - placing regional leaders in the delicate position of honouring China's wartime narrative without straining present-day ties with Tokyo. 'Japan has been a long trusted partner, and is a key foreign investor and trading partner of every country in the region,' Abuza said, pointing out that Southeast Asia has broadly welcomed Tokyo's expanded security role and defence cooperation. In 2023, ASEAN-Japan trade amounted to US$241 billion, about 7 per cent of the bloc's merchandise trade, while Japanese investment of US$14.5 billion placed it among ASEAN's top foreign investors. On the security front, Tokyo has also deepened defence ties - most notably through a Reciprocal Access Agreement with the Philippines signed in mid-2024, and its Official Security Assistance programme, which supplies patrol boats and coastal radars to partners, the majority of them in Southeast Asia. Still, China's economic pull is hard to ignore, particularly as it cements its role as a vital trade and investment partner for Southeast Asian economies navigating uneven post-pandemic recoveries and the bite of US tariffs. 'At a time when exports to the United States will slow due to tariffs, and the International Monetary Fund has downgraded GDP growth in every country in the region, the leaders will be looking to China for more trade and investment,' Abuza said. Since overtaking the European Union in 2020, ASEAN has remained China's largest trading partner. In 2024, bilateral trade reached US$962.98 billion, accounting for 15.9 per cent of China's total foreign trade, according to official data. At the same time, China is the largest trading partner for most ASEAN countries, reflecting deep supply chain linkages and growing economic interdependence across the region. 'While leaders may come for the pomp and circumstance of the parade, it's the sidebar meetings and one-on-ones with Xi and his team that are the most important,' Abuza said. In other words, the parade is less about symbolism and more about access, say observers. 'The parade serves as a gateway,' said Ping from Bond University. 'Attendees obtain short-term diplomatic access, including bilateral meetings, promises of investment, and potential defence cooperation - but most importantly, networking for the future.' At the same time, sustained engagement beyond 'symbolic participation' is required to build outcomes, Ping said. INDIA'S WILDCARD AND EUROPE'S OUTLIERS While the guest list has yet to be disclosed, it is already clear that China's Sep 3 parade will draw leaders from well beyond its neighbourhood. Russian President Vladimir Putin has confirmed his attendance, while several European leaders, including those from Serbia and Slovakia, have also signalled plans to attend. For the 2015 parade, Chinese officials said representatives of 49 countries and 30 foreign leaders attended. This included Putin, then-South Korean President Park Geun-hye, various Central Asian leaders and then-United Nations chief Ban Ki-moon. But it is the possible presence of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that would draw the most scrutiny, given the pivotal yet strained state of China-India relations, analysts say. Ties between Beijing and New Delhi remain uneasy after a deadly border clash in 2020, though both sides have recently signalled interest in stabilising relations, agreeing to resume direct flights and expand trade and investment. Against this backdrop, the SCO summit in Tianjin - held between Aug 31 and Sep 1, just days before the parade - is set to draw particular attention. Modi has confirmed his attendance, marking his first trip to China in seven years. Yet whether he will stay on for the military parade is far from certain, analysts note. While Modi's SCO attendance is confirmed, the prospect of him attending the Victory Day parade is 'unlikely', Aparna Divya, a PhD candidate at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University, told CNA, noting that New Delhi has not issued any official schedule regarding parade participation. She added that appearing at the parade would carry much heavier weight, as being seen at a PLA-centred commemoration is far more sensitive than attending a regional summit. Modi was not present at China's 2015 Victory Day parade, with India instead represented by then-Minister of State for External Affairs VK Singh. Still, the speculation underscores the high stakes attached to Modi's possible presence at the upcoming parade. Divya said his parade attendance would signal 'a culmination of robust diplomatic engagements' between Beijing and New Delhi over the past year, while his absence would reflect the enduring caution that continues to shape India's calculus toward China. With Modi's visit to China raising expectations of a meeting with Xi, Divya said one aspect to watch closely is what practical gains, if any, emerge. Recent discussions between the two sides have touched on de-escalation along the contested border, easing trade restrictions on rare earths, cooperation on hydrological data linked to China's construction of a mega dam in Tibet and India's push for stronger consensus on cross-border terrorism. Any breakthroughs in these areas - through bilateral talks around Modi's visit - would help determine whether ties are merely stabilising or inching toward a substantive reset, Divya said. At the same time, China is also casting its gaze further west, with Serbia and Slovakia among the expected European attendees - a presence analysts say is not accidental. Both states are seeking economic opportunities through China's Belt and Road Initiative, said Bond University's Ping. He noted that Serbia has already reaped significant Chinese investment, while Slovakia's attendance 'is more significant, given it has been less engaging' towards China. The possible inclusion of Serbia and Slovakia is 'diplomatically very calculated', said Abuza from the National War College. 'Serbia is a country that has been traditionally close to Russia, and fought against the United States and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) … Slovakia is a NATO member, but whose government is currently more aligned with Moscow, vis a vis Kiev and its allies in Brussels,' he said. The mix of Southeast Asian partners, Russia's Putin and select European outliers gives the parade a carefully curated symbolism, analysts say. It projects Beijing's claim that it can still marshal international support across political systems and historical fault lines - a deliberate contrast, observers say, to the likely no-shows from Western capitals as tensions with them deepen. AMPLIFYING ITS CONVENING POWER The near back-to-back timing of the SCO summit and the Sep 3 military parade is no coincidence, but a calculated bid by Beijing to amplify its convening power, analysts suggest. They add that the dual events also create two layers of engagement - the SCO summit for substantive security and economic coordination, and the parade for symbolic alignment. Some states may attend just the SCO while giving the parade a miss, noted Ping from Bond University. 'Participation in formal frameworks like the SCO reflects strategic engagement on security and economic issues, while skipping ceremonial events avoids domestic backlash or perceptions of endorsing China's military posture,' he said. But the sequencing ensures that even leaders who would not normally travel solely for a parade may still be in China. 'It maximises diplomatic momentum, blending multilateral cooperation with great power military capacity,' Ping said. 'The dual staging reinforces China's leadership role; it has enormous diplomatic capacity well beyond almost all other states.' Analysts say the overlap of attendees across both events will be telling, offering a glimpse into how some governments are already within China's orbit, particularly through security and political cooperation, making them less constrained by the domestic sensitivities that deter other Southeast Asian leaders. So far, the leaders of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos are reportedly expected at both gatherings. 'These authoritarian regimes are already very much tied to China's security architecture,' said Abuza from the National War College. The three nations are all dialogue partners of the SCO, the grouping founded in 2001. Unlike the nine full members such as China, Russia, India and Pakistan, being a dialogue partner carries fewer obligations. China likes to use the SCO, which the US is not part of, as 'the centrepiece of an alternative world order led by Beijing', Abuza said. As for the Sep 3 parade, analysts say Beijing's objectives extend beyond the guest list to the messages it wants to project. One is to showcase its rising military might, using the PLA's display of modern hardware and formations to underscore both technological progress and strategic resolve. At a press conference on Aug 20, military officials highlighted that the display will include "never-before-seen" weaponry, covering hypersonic precision-strike missiles, anti-ship systems, drone-interception gear, and unmanned platforms. China's military showcases are often scrutinised as a barometer of its growing prowess, with observers already poring over recent rehearsals to decode signals of technological progress and strategic intent. At the same time, analysts say Beijing's other goal is to assert a carefully curated historical narrative. The parade is to commemorate the victory over Japan, and by foregrounding its wartime role, Beijing is tying its current posture to a story of resistance and victory, said Abuza from the National War College. This framing, analysts note, helps China legitimise its leadership claims today and draw contrasts with the US as the global order shifts. 'Through the parade … Beijing wants to convey that it is maintaining the international order at a time when the US is upending it, and that it has broad international support when America is isolating itself,' said Abuza. 'China wants to show that, in fact, Southeast Asian states are starting to choose.' Other analysts agree that Beijing is using memory politics to reinforce its present ambitions. Ping from Bond University said the parade not only accentuates regional wartime solidarity but also signals 'China's intent to deepen regional involvement, to counterbalance the US in trade, geopolitical authority, and governance model'. Divya from Fudan University said Beijing is also framing the commemoration as a signal that it 'upholds peace and will firmly defend international fairness and justice'.
CNA
an hour ago
- CNA
Commentary: Online spaces should be built with children, not for them
SINGAPORE: At this year's National Day Rally, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong highlighted the growing concern of excessive screen time for children. Mr Wong emphasised the need to strike a balance between protecting youth and empowering them to leverage technology, noting that Singapore is observing the experience of countries that have restricted children's access to social media platforms. Australia's recent decision to block YouTube for users aged 16 years and younger has reignited debate over age-based social media bans. Exempted originally because of its educational value, the platform will now be grouped with TikTok, Instagram and other platforms that, according to the Australian government, need tighter controls to keep children safe. What prompted the reversal? A survey by Australia's internet regulator, in which four in 10 children reported seeing harmful content on YouTube. NOT JUST CONTENT, BUT SYSTEMS However, harmful content is only one part of the problem. What shapes a child's digital experience is the underlying infrastructure: autoplay, algorithmic recommendation and infinite scroll. These systems are designed to keep users engaged, nudge behaviours and maximise screen time. They trap users into doing things they didn't mean to: spend longer on an app, consume harmful content from autoplay or make purchases. When 'risky-by-design' features undermine online safety, age-based bans begin to look less convincing. A hard stop at age 16 might simplify enforcement, but it obscures the more complex reality. Current design does not care whether a user is 15 or 16; the algorithms work the same. Tech companies must be held to higher standards of safety especially when their platforms shape how children learn, socialise and play. LEARNING HOW TO SWIM SAFELY In Singapore, researchers from the National Institute of Education recently weighed in on a related question: Should schools ban digital devices? The researchers argued that denying students access to digital devices out of fear is akin to refusing to teach them to swim for fear of drowning. This echoes what Mr Wong said at the National Day Rally – that Singapore must help children build digital resilience, not shelter them indefinitely. Instead of denying access, we should be equipping young people with skills to self-regulate their digital use and to swim safely. Regulatory momentum is growing in the Asia-Pacific region. Governments are trialling technology that keeps underaged children out of restricted sites, and requiring greater transparency in the form of safety audits. Platforms like YouTube are rolling out AI-driven tools to verify user age and reduce exposure to certain content. These are steps in the right direction. But the pattern remains familiar: a reactive cycle of restrictions, appeals and patchwork solutions. When one platform is regulated, another emerges. Rules are drawn up in response to high-profile incidents, not guided by long-term strategy. There is no denying the need for safeguards. But if bans and age restrictions are all we have, we are playing a game of catch-up that cannot be won. We need a different approach. We should not treat children as victims requiring protection, but as participants in policy design. PLANNING WITH, NOT ONLY FOR, CHILDREN AND YOUTH Children and youth are the largest group of online users. But when UNICEF engaged adolescents around the world on AI, one noted that 'most of the technologies that exist are not made with children in mind'. The message from the teens was clear: They want to be engaged in AI's development and future. Consulting with youth will help us better anticipate and shape a fast-changing digital environment. For instance, UNICEF is currently engaging children from Spain to Sierra Leone on how governments, tech companies, and caregivers can better uphold their best interests online. Through a series of hands-on workshops, children are being invited to explore how digital systems influence their lives, and how they want those systems to function. Closer to home, the National Youth Council is collaborating with youth through the #TechHacks youth panel to examine how online harm can be mitigated and digital well-being, enhanced. Of course, co-designing with children and young people is not without challenges. Power asymmetries, varying cognitive development stages and implementation complexity must be managed with extra care. But these are not reasons to avoid participation. With the right support and structure, young people can meaningfully participate in shaping systems that will shape them in return. CHANGING THE FRAME If we are to match the pace of digital change, we must update not just our policies, but our posture – from gatekeeping to partnering youth. We will need to rethink what digital maturity looks like. Instead of asking, 'How do we keep children off these platforms?', we could ask: 'What would these platforms look like if children had a say in how they worked?' Instead of measuring safety by access restrictions, we could consider: What skills, values and supports help young people flourish in a world shaped by intelligent systems? Instead of building around children, we could try building with them. Regulation is an important start, but it's not enough. What is needed now is a longer view – one that begins with the recognition that children will not just live in the digital future. They will build it. As Mr Wong reminded us, every generation faces anxiety over new technologies and some of those fears, like those levelled at comics and rock and roll, have faded with time. The goal is not to dismiss concerns, but to respond with insight rather than instinct.
