US deports criminals to African nation where political parties banned
The South Sudanese government has declined to say where those men, also described as violent criminals, are after it took custody of them nearly two weeks ago.
In a late-night post on X, homeland security assistant secretary Tricia McLaughlin said the men sent to Eswatini, who are citizens of Vietnam, Jamaica, Cuba, Yemen and Laos, had arrived on a plane but did not say when or where.
She said they were all convicted criminals and 'individuals so uniquely barbaric that their home countries refused to take them back'.
The men 'have been terrorising American communities' but were now 'off of American soil', McLaughlin claimed.
She said they had been convicted of crimes including murder and child rape and one was a 'confirmed' gang member. Her social media posts included mug shots of the men and what she said were their criminal records. They were not named.
Like in South Sudan, there was no immediate comment from Eswatini authorities over any deal to accept third-country deportees or what would happen to them in that country.
Civic groups there raised concerns over the secrecy from a government long accused of clamping down on human rights.
'There has been a notable lack of official communication from the Eswatini government regarding any agreement or understanding with the US to accept these deportees,' Ingiphile Dlamini, a spokesperson for the pro-democracy group SWALIMO, said in a statement sent to The Associated Press.
'This opacity makes it difficult for civic society to understand the implications.'
It was not clear if they were being held in a detention centre, what their legal status was or what Eswatini's plans were for the deported men, he said.
Eswatini, previously called Swaziland, is a country of about 1.2 million people between South Africa and Mozambique. It is one of the world's last remaining absolute monarchies and the last in Africa. King Mswati III has ruled by decree since 1986.
Political parties are effectively banned and pro-democracy groups have said for years that Mswati III has crushed political dissent, sometimes violently. Groups like SWALIMO have called for democratic reforms.
Pro-democracy protests erupted in Eswatini in 2021, when dozens were killed, allegedly by security forces. Eswatini authorities have been accused of conducting political assassinations of pro-democracy activists and imprisoning others.
Because Eswatini is a poor country with a relative lack of resources, it 'may face significant strain in accommodating and managing individuals with complex backgrounds, particularly those with serious criminal convictions', Mr Dlamini said.
While the US administration has hailed deportations as a victory for the safety and security of the American people, Mr Dlamini said his organization wanted to know the plans for the five men sent to Eswatini and 'any potential risks to the local population'.
The Trump administration has said it is seeking more deals with African nations to take deportees from the US.
Leaders from some of the five West African nations who met President Donald Trump at the White House last week said the issue of migration and their countries possibly taking deportees from the US was discussed.
Some nations have pushed back. Nigeria, which was not part of that White House summit, said it has rejected pressure from the US to take deportees who are citizens of other countries.
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