Europe highlights plastic pollution at OOC Korea
Under the theme 'Our Ocean, Our Action,' the conference brought together more than 2,600 ocean leaders from over 100 countries, resulting in 277 global pledges totaling $9.1 billion, according to Korea's Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries.
Speaking at the conference, Charlina Vitcheva, director-general for maritime affairs and fisheries at the European Commission, underscored the European Union's commitment to combat plastic pollution.
'The EU will remain firmly committed to finding a global solution to address plastic pollution,' Vitcheva said.
'A global plastics treaty is needed more than ever. If business as usual continues, plastic production will triple by 2060,' said Vitcheva, echoing warnings by the OECD that increasing plastic use — particularly in short-lived products — could drive a sharp rise in pollution unless urgent action is taken on reducing demand, improving durability and enhancing recycling.
The UN Environment Program estimates that 19 to 23 million metric tons of plastic waste currently enter aquatic ecosystems annually, threatening ecosystems, biodiversity and human livelihoods.
South Korea has pledged 3.7 trillion won ($2.7 billion) to advance its Korea Blue Action Plan, part of a broader international effort to promote ocean sustainability. The plan outlines 76 national commitments to preserve marine ecosystems and promote sustainable development, said the ministry.
This year's conference welcomed a delegation of 11 representatives from Germany, Greece, Ireland and other EU Member States to facilitate the maritime agenda and outreach activities for marine environmental protection.
According to the EU delegation in Korea, Busan City forged meaningful and tangible cooperation with the EU, recognizing its role and identity as a global ocean city.
Notably, a used fishing net recycling campaign was also held on April 28 as part of these efforts.
Despite the mounting global crisis, there are signs of progress, Vitcheva said, highlighting that marine litter on EU coastlines has dropped by nearly one-third, attributing the success to concerted efforts by governments, civil society and citizens, driven by the EU's Marine Strategy Framework Directive.
The EU delegation in Korea also stressed growing partnership with Korea under the EU-Korea Green Partnership, launched in 2023.
As part of the partnership, the EU delegation hosted a side event titled 'How the Circular Economy Will End Marine Plastic Pollution: A Joint Effort of Ambitious Policies and Innovative Businesses.'
The seminar convened global policymakers, industry leaders and civil society representatives to explore innovative solutions rooted in circular economy principles aimed at ending marine plastic pollution.
'We have the Green Partnership with Korea since 2023, and its key elements embrace cooperation towards developing new circular economy models, which are strategic in tackling global marine plastic pollution issues,' said EU Ambassador to Korea Maria Castillo Fernandez.
'We need to align our approaches to create a supportive framework for transformative innovation,' she said.
Meanwhile, Netherlands Ambassador to Korea Peter van der Vliet called for upstream solutions.
'It starts with smarter design, reuse systems and business models that reduce the burden on nature,' van der Vliet said, urging bold international policy to nurture innovation.
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