Su-35s Once Expected To Arm Iran Are Now In Algeria
Firm evidence of the Su-35 in Algerian Air Force service appears in commercially available satellite imagery, including from Google Earth, as seen at the top of this page, dated March 10. Previously, similar imagery had been published recently by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), U.K.-based think tank. One of the jets, with an Algerian Air Force roundel on its left wing, is seen at Ain Beida/Oum el Bouaghi Air Base in eastern Algeria. The camouflage scheme is the same as that applied to Su-35s originally built for Egypt, but which remained in Russia.
Interesting report indicating Algeria has purchased at least some of the Russian Su-35s originally built for Egypt and later reported to be sought by Iran.https://t.co/0soV9aOopn
— John Hardie (@JohnH105) April 9, 2025
1/ A Su-35 at Oum el Bouaghi Air Base, Algeria. https://t.co/zWgjsDIoBU pic.twitter.com/1yrMsEVimW
— Guy Plopsky (@GuyPlopsky) April 9, 2025
Earlier satellite imagery, dated March 2, shows a disassembled Su-35 being loaded into an An-124 Condor transport aircraft in Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the Russian Far East, where the fighters are built. On March 5, an An-124 — assumed to be the same example — appeared at Ain Beida/Oum el Bouaghi Air Base. A Su-35 was first noted in satellite imagery at the same base on March 10.
While it is unconfirmed if this is the first and only Su-35 delivered to date, more are on the way. Recent imagery from Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Russia indicates Algerian roundels have now been applied at least four other aircraft from the Egyptian order pic.twitter.com/fSY0WMLLGq
— Joseph Dempsey (@JosephHDempsey) April 9, 2025
Unverified videos purportedly showing Su-35s flying in Algeria have been circulating on social media for several weeks.
– Possible Su-35 Delivery to Algeria?Over the past week, there have been unusual Ilyushin flights carrying military cargo to Oum El Bouaghi Airbase in Algeria. These flights have sparked speculation, and now, new footage from the base suggests that Su-35s may have finally… pic.twitter.com/VPGiGs9iPj
— Uncensored News (@Uncensorednewsw) March 14, 2025
At this point, it's unclear how many Su-35s have been delivered to Algeria, although IISS reports that at least four other examples of the jets at Komsomolsk-on-Amur have also received Algerian Air Force markings.
The Su-35 is a somewhat surprising addition to the Algerian Air Force, the combat fleet of which is dominated by Russian products, including another Flanker variant, the two-seat Su-30MKA Flanker-H.
Currently, the Algerian Air Force operates 63 Su-30MKA and 40 MiG-29S/M/M2 multirole fighters, 42 Su-24MK2 strike/reconnaissance aircraft, and 16 Yak-130 combat trainers. It also operates 33 Russian-made Mi-24 Mk III and 42 Mi-28NE attack helicopters. All those figures are for 2024 and are published by FlightGlobal.
These acquisitions have been enabled by the highest level of defense spending in Africa, supported by one of the continent's largest economies in Africa, due mostly to its large oil and gas reserves.
Algeria's status as a leading buyer of Russian combat aircraft was apparently further underlined in February of this year, when the country's state-run media announced that Algeria was the first export customer for the Su-57. That development follows a statement earlier the same week from Russia that an undisclosed foreign customer will start to receive Su-57s this year.
Algeria receiving the Su-35 doesn't rule out the purchase of the Su-57 as well, especially bearing in mind unconfirmed accounts suggesting that Algeria may initially be acquiring just six Su-57s. If true, that could suggest that an initial batch will be used for evaluation, or it might be that Russia is able to supply an initial batch of six, with more to follow.
Perhaps Algeria is being impacted by the very slow rate of Su-57 production. Russia placed orders for 76 Su-57s to be delivered by 2028. As of the first quarter of 2025, however, IISS records that only 19 had been delivered. In 2023–24, just seven Felons were delivered.
At the same time, transfer of the Su-35s to Algeria looks like it could be bad news for Iranian plans to modernize its aging air force.
Back in March 2023, Iranian state-run media reported that the country had come to an agreement with Russia on the purchase of Su-35s for the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF).
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN announced on Friday that Iran has finalized buying #Sukhoi fighter jets from Russia. Here is what Iran has purchased: pic.twitter.com/aw7EVkc18N
— IRNA News Agency (@IrnaEnglish) March 11, 2023
Ever since the October 2020 expiration of Iran's conventional arms embargo, a transfer of Su-35s had been expected, with any such deal likely to involve the 24 Su-35s once destined for Egypt before the threat of U.S. sanctions and a teased offer of F-15s put an end to that sale. In particular, Washington had said it would put sanctions on Cairo under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Despite this, production of the Su-35s continued at Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
Not mentioned here is that Egypt's deal for 24 Russian Su-35 fighters, which are currently sitting at two airfields in Russia due to CAATSA concerns, is even less likely to be executed at this point.https://t.co/xbTnuUQPCq pic.twitter.com/PF7dQ5jcfC
— Rob Lee (@RALee85) March 17, 2022
Senior U.S. officials revealed in December that Russia had trained Iranian pilots on the Su-35 in the spring of 2022, with the training and eventual transfers tied to continued support for Russia's war in Ukraine.
Iran has supported the Russian war effort in Ukraine in multiple ways, including by delivering kamikaze drones for Russia's continued air attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, and by transferring short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
As we have reported in the past, Iranian Su-35s, even only two dozen of them, would represent a huge leap in air combat capability over the aging and oft-cannibalized American, Chinese, and Soviet-era fighters in its inventory.
Of course, such a transfer remains a possibility, although it's puzzling as to why the deal has been stalled for so long. In the meantime, Algeria has apparently jumped the queue and taken at least some of the Su-35s once destined for Egypt. On the other hand, some kind of split deal could also happen, with Algeria taking, for example, 12 of the jets, with a similar number heading to Iran.
Otherwise, with the demands of the war in Ukraine, the bulk of the production output of the Su-35 at Komsomolsk-on-Amur is very likely to be absorbed by the Russian Aerospace Forces, which have reportedly received 'a small number' of these jets last month.
For Algeria, the Su-35 provides yet another multirole Russian fighter to its air force's inventory, and it will be the most modern that the country operates, at least until any Su-57 deliveries materialize. For Iran, however, it looks like its wait for new fighter equipment might continue, at least for a while longer, or otherwise the country may end up with a smaller batch of Su-35s than was previously anticipated.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
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