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Astell&Kern to unveil the A&Ultima SP4000 digital audio player

Astell&Kern to unveil the A&Ultima SP4000 digital audio player

Digital Trends09-05-2025
Astell&Kern (A&K) have announced that it will be debut its new flagship digital audio player, the A&Ultima SP4000, at High End Munich in Germany on May 15. The iRiver subsidiary also announced it will release two new in-ear monitors (IEM) in Q3 2025.
In a press release published on Thursday, A&K said the A&Ultima SP4000 will be the first digital audio player in the lineup to have full Android support. This means users will be able to download any app from Google Play Store, including Spotify, Soundcloud Pandora, and experience lossless playback while streaming their favorite music.
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Under the hood, the SP4000 has a new Octa audio circuit architecture that pairs the AK4191 processor with only one AK4499EX analog DAC instead of two in order to reduce noise when delivering digital signals; carries a new LDO regulator that reduces noise by up to 97% compared to its predecessors, including the A&Ultima SP3000 and SP3000M; and employs A&K's second-gen digital audio remaster (DAR) technology to deliver more natural and refined sound to the user. And, for the first time ever, the SP4000 has a 99.9% pure copper Shield Can that is precision-engineered to block out various types of noise and electromagnetic interference, leaving the audio quality intact.
As for the new IEMs, A&K collaborated with 64 Audio to develop the 10-driver Universal Fit In-Ear Monitor. This headset houses an advanced isobaric cone-to-magnet driver configuration that helps deliver high sound fidelity. Then there's its in-house IEM, Luna, which has a full range single transducer unipolar micro planar magnetic driver that delivers a frequency response of 20Hz to 30KHz.
High End Munich attendees will be able to demo the SP4000 and the new IEMs from May 15 through May 18. Pricing information for the devices has not been disclosed, but A&K will share it closer to the release date.
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