
Ford-SK On EV battery venture begins production in Kentucky
PAK YIU
August 20, 2025 03:35 JST
NEW YORK -- Ford Motor's electric vehicle battery joint venture with South Korea's SK On started production at a plant in the U.S. state of Kentucky on Tuesday as major headwinds hamper the country's EV transition.
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Asahi Shimbun
9 minutes ago
- Asahi Shimbun
Trump administration vying to own a big stake in Intel after SoftBank's $2 billion bet on company
SAN FRANCISCO--U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick on Tuesday confirmed the U.S. government is vying for a 10% stake in Silicon Valley pioneer Intel in an unusual deal that would deepen the Trump administration's financial ties with major computer chip manufacturers and punctuate a dramatic about-face from the president's recent push to oust the company's CEO. The ambitions that Lutnick confirmed in a televised interview with CNBC came the day after various news outlets reported on the negotiations between the Trump administration and Intel. The investment would be made by converting federal government grants previously pledged under President Joe Biden's administration into a bushel of Intel stock that would turn the U.S. government into one of the company's largest shareholders. 'We think America should get the benefit of the bargain,' Lutnick told CNBC as he explained why President Donald Trump is pushing for the deal. 'It's obvious that it's the right move to make.' Intel declined to comment on the negotiations with the Trump administration. The notion of the U.S. government holding a huge stake in Intel would have seemed inconceivable back in the company's heyday when its processors were powering a personal computer boom that began in the mid-1970s. But Intel has been mired in tough times after missing mobile computing era unleashed by the iPhone's 2007 debut. Intel has fall even farther behind in recent years during an artificial intelligence craze that has been a boon for two of its once-smaller rivals, Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices. The Trump administration is hitching a ride on their success by imposing a 15% commission on their sales of their chip sales in China in exchange for their export licenses. Those fees are expected to translate into billions of dollars in additional government revenue. The U.S. government's negotiations to become a major Intel shareholder are coming on a heels of a $2 billion investment Japanese technology giant SoftBank Group disclosed late Monday that it plans to make in the Santa Clara, California, company. Softbank is accumulating its 2% stake in Intel at $23 per share — a slight discount from the stock's price when its investment was announced. Intel's shares surged nearly 7% to close at $25.31 on the news of Softbank's big bet on Intel, coupled with Trump's designs on the company. SoftBank invests in an array of companies that it sees as holding long-term potential. It has been stepping up investments in the United States since Trump returned to the White House. In February, its chairman Masayoshi Son joined Trump, Sam Altman of OpenAI and Larry Ellison of Oracle in announcing a major investment of up to $500 billion in a project to develop artificial intelligence called Stargate. 'Semiconductors are the foundation of every industry, Son said in a statement. 'This strategic investment reflects our belief that advanced semiconductor manufacturing and supply will further expand in the United States, with Intel playing a critical role.' Trump's interest in Intel is also being driven by his desire to boost chip production in the U.S., which has been a focal point of the trade war that he has been waging throughout the world since he returned to the White House earlier this year for his second term in office. 'We want Intel to be successful in America,' Lutnick said during his CNBC interview. Boosting domestic production of computer chips also ranked high on the Biden administration's agenda, which resulted in the 2022 passage of the CHIPS and Science Act. Intel was among the biggest beneficiaries of the program, but it hasn't been able to revive its fortunes while falling behind on construction projects spawned by the CHIPS program. The company has received about $2.2 billion of the $7.8 billion pledged under the incentives program — money that Lutnick derided as a 'giveaway' that would better serve U.S. taxpayers if it's turned into Intel stock, which he said would be in the form of non-voting shares so the government wouldn't be able to use the stake to sway how the company is managed. But Intel's ongoing struggles also means the U.S. government is taking on a risky investment. The company is in the midst of its latest turnaround attempt under CEO Lip-Bu Tan, who was hired in March to shake things up. Tan's turnaround effort so far has been focused on a cost-cutting spree that is gutting the company's workforce and further delaying construction on a chip plant in Ohio that has been in the works since 2022. Intel's market value is hovering around $110 billion, only a slight uptick from where it was when Tan arrived and leaving it more than 60% below its peak reached about a quarter-century ago during the early phase of the internet boom. In another strange twist to the new alliance, President Donald Trump had demanded that Tan resign in an August 7 post spurred by concerns about investments that Tan had made in China chipmakers while he was working as a venture capitalist. But Trump backed off after the Malyasia-born Tan professed his allegiance to the U.S. in a public letter to Intel employees and went to the White House to meet with the president, who applauded the Intel CEO for having an 'amazing story.' That truce apparently sparked the negotiations that may culminate in the U.S. government owning a chunk of Intel. Although rare, it's not unprecedented for the U.S. government to become a significant shareholder in a prominent company. One of the most notable instances occurred during the Great Recession in 2008 when the government injected nearly $50 billion into General Motors in return for a roughly 60% stake in the automaker at a time it was on the verge of bankruptcy. The government ended up with a roughly $10 billion loss after it sold its stock in GM.


Japan Today
36 minutes ago
- Japan Today
How to buy a home in Japan as a foreigner
Learn how to buy a home in Japan, including the purchase process, financing options and currently available properties. The webinar will be held from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. (Japan Standard Time) on September 9. Host: Dovetail Inc Date: September 9 Time: 6 p.m. - 7 p.m. (Japan Standard Time) Admission: Free This webinar is intended for people interested in buying residential real estate in Japan and those interested in seeing examples of properties currently available for purchase. There has been a huge surge in interest in Japanese residential real estate in the last few years and remarkable headline numbers to support continued demand. For example, the average price of a new condominium in central Tokyo has now exceeded ¥100 million for the second consecutive year. The average price of land in Japan also rose 2.7% in 2025, the fourth straight year it has climbed and the fastest ever pace of increase. Demand has been driven by the booming tourist sector, incredibly low mortgage rates (with variable rates below 1.0%) and the continuing value of Tokyo residential property compared to other global markets. Yet, Tokyo's real estate remains exceptionally affordable compared to other major global markets like New York, Hong Kong and London. What about the practical considerations and actual processes behind the numbers? If you are interested in learning more about buying a home in Japan as a foreigner, we invite you to the next installment in this popular series of webinars hosted by Dovetail Inc, a Tokyo-based bilingual real estate brokerage. Topics Home buying procedure in Japan Interest rates Financing options based on your visa status Latest recommended property information from Daiwa House Q&A, time permitting LINC Inc LINC is a specialized real estate brokerage firm that has been exclusively serving foreigners living in Japan and overseas investors since its establishment in 2018. With a wide-reaching network of international residents and foreign investors, LINC bridges the gap between global clients and the Japanese real estate market. Backed by the expertise of its founder — formerly with Japan's largest housing company and an experienced consultant to major real estate firms — LINC has built strong, trusted relationships with real estate and housing companies across the country. This unique position allows LINC to serve as a vital link between foreign clients and high-quality opportunities in the Japanese real estate market. LINC's real estate seminars, held consistently for over five years, have become highly regarded among international residents and overseas investors. They invite you to join them and discover valuable insights into Japan's property market. Dovetail Inc Dovetail is a new and fast-growing brokerage located in central Tokyo. Their team includes a bilingual agent with five years experience in brokerage as well as staff experienced in housing support services for foreigners. Their staff can guide foreign buyers through the purchase journey, from initial fact-finding and needs analysis to explaining cultural nuances, tax rules and all the minutiae involved in purchasing a property as a foreigner. As their name suggests, the Dovetail team prides itself on streamlining and harmonizing the purchase process, with the goal of making your home buying journey as seamless as possible. Join them for this installment of their popular series of webinars on how to buy a home in Japan as a foreigner! Speakers CEO(Founder)/Licensed Real Estate Agent After years of managerial experience at one of the world's leading homebuilders in Japan, Shinichi received an MBA while working overseas. He specializes in providing consultation services in the real estate industry by partnering with professionals such lawyers, accountants, architects, and designers, etc. to find optimal solutions for clients. CEO / Dovetail Inc Yasuhiro leads Dovetail offering bilingual real estate brokerage services enhanced by technology and Gakken Group. Through Dovetail, he aims to help people build structure in their lives, unlocking greater possibilities. With a focus on innovation and connection, he strives to make real estate transitions seamless and impactful. Marika Smith Real Estate Consulting Marika has experience in both sales and administrative roles, including a position in the rental office industry. Currently, she supports clients in the residential and investment property sectors as a consultant and coordinator. Drawing on her background in marketing, she is comfortable with researching property information and staying informed about market trends. She assists clients with their property search and helps facilitate smooth communication throughout the process. Licensed Real Estate Agent Yukihiro is a licensed real estate agent with over five years of experience in both property sales and rentals. In his current role, he specializes in assisting clients — especially international residents — with finding their dream home in the Tokyo area. Before joining Dovetail, Yukihiro held a team leader position at a leading real estate company, where he developed a strong foundation in property consultation and customer service. Register Attendance is free but you must register in order to attend. Please click the link above then fill in the registration form. Zoom will send you an email with a link to the webinar, so please be sure to fill in your email address correctly. © Japan Today


The Diplomat
38 minutes ago
- The Diplomat
A Strategic Turning Point for Australia-South Korea Defense Cooperation
As of 2025, the Indo-Pacific region stands at the heart of a strategic turning point, where the reconfiguration of the international order is accelerating. Strategic rivalry between the United States and China has expanded beyond geopolitical disputes to technology, economics, military capabilities, and values. The protracted Russia-Ukraine War and the heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait are also testing regional security networks. In this context, recent changes in U.S. strategy demand careful scrutiny. With the slogan 'America First,' the Trump administration placed U.S. national interests above all else, pressing allies to boost defense budgets up to 5 percent of GDP. At the same time, Washington is reassessing its overseas military presence and wants to secure critical defense technologies at home, developments that directly affected allied deterrence frameworks. These changes make clear the necessity of new frameworks for allied cooperation to manage emerging security gaps in the Indo-Pacific. South Korea is a representative middle power facing these complex challenges: it is exposed to China's strategic expansion and pressure while maintaining a traditional alliance with the United States. With the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration, Seoul has declared 'pragmatic diplomacy' as its new foreign policy principle. This approach seeks to secure diplomatic space and strategic autonomy through flexible, multilayered engagement based on national interest. It also represents an attempt to redesign South Korea's national security architecture beyond a U.S.-dependent framework. Australia could become one of the principal partners in advancing Seoul's pragmatic diplomacy. Canberra was engaged together with South Korea under the United Nations Command (UNC) during the Korean War and has, as a fellow U.S. ally, has participated with South Korea in multiple operations abroad, including Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. More recently, Vice Admiral Stuart Mayer of the Royal Australian Navy served as Deputy Commander of the UNC, reinforcing the institutional framework for potential support in a Korean Peninsula contingency. On the basis of this historical and institutional foundation, the scope for bilateral cooperation is expected to expand further. In mid-August, the Ministry of National Defense of South Korea convened the second ROK-Australia Defense Conference in Canberra, marking a transition from historic camaraderie to a more strategic partnership. Participants emphasized that the complex regional environment compels middle powers to combine traditional alliances with innovative frameworks of cooperation, making closer coordination between Seoul and Canberra increasingly important. 'Australia is our partner for cooperation, which shares understanding in various fields based on a comprehensive strategic partnership,' a South Korean Defense Ministry official told Yonhap News after the conference. Australia's Strategic Shift and Implications for South Korea Australia has set a path toward a proactive and self-reliant posture, as outlined in the 2020 Defense Strategic Update, the 2023 Defense Strategic Review, and the 2024 National Defense Strategy (NDS). In particular, the 2024 NDS defines the Strategy of Denial as its core concept. With that goal, Australia has moved forward with major initiatives: acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, expanding long-range precision strike capabilities, reinforcing the defense industrial base, and reorganizing the armed force into a more integrated joint structure. Australia's strategic shift offers distinct lessons for South Korea's own defense strategy. Geopolitically, South Korea is adjacent to continental powers, but its core national interests are generated through maritime domains. In this sense, Australia's approach – maritime-centered self-reliance, technology-driven force structure, and value-based diplomacy – offers highly practical insights and opportunities for strategic partnership with Seoul. First, Seoul needs to move toward a dual-layered deterrence posture that extends beyond the current 'three-axis' system, which focuses exclusively on North Korea's nuclear threats. To achieve this, Seoul has to prepare for a wider range of Indo-Pacific contingencies by building strategic deterrence structures. A crucial element of this process will be enhancing interoperability and joint operational readiness with regional partners. Second, Seoul should accelerate its transition toward maritime power. The 2022 Defense White Paper notes that the ROK Navy is strong in anti-submarine warfare and coastal operations, but limited in long-range precision strike, blue-water maneuverability, and strategic projection platforms. Australia is enhancing its distant deterrence through nuclear-powered submarines and long-range missile systems to secure independent capability as well as complement U.S. forces, and South Korea should similarly strengthen its strategic presence in the region. Third, in addition to the South Korea-U.S. bilateral alliance framework, Seoul should construct a multilayered deterrence network through minilateral security groupings such as the Quad, AUKUS Pillar II, and the existing UNC framework – all of which include Australia as a member. The fact that both South Korea and Australia have experienced Chinese economic coercion provides a basis for developing an integrated strategic partnership encompassing political, economic, and security dimensions. Core Areas for Future Cooperation Australia-South Korea defense cooperation should move beyond symbolic ties toward practical capability integration and shared strategic goals in four key areas. First, maritime security should be the most urgent priority. China's increasingly assertive activities in disputed waters have elevated this issue into a central challenge for the Indo-Pacific. South Korea and Australia have already accumulated experience through U.S.-led maritime exercises. Moreover, the ROK Navy's anti-submarine warfare capabilities and the Royal Australian Navy's strength in long-range patrols are highly complementary. Building on that foundation, they could conduct regular joint drills, connect them with Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), and expand information-sharing for maritime domain awareness. Second, cooperation in cyber warfare is indispensable. Both countries face recurring cyber intrusions from China and North Korea, which makes coordinated responses essential. Australia responded to major breaches by enacting the Cyber Security Act and strengthening its Cyber Security Strategy. South Korea experiences similar attacks, particularly against its defense sector and critical infrastructure. Joint measures could involve a bilateral cyber threat response framework, bilateral cyber exercises, and exchanges of technical personnel. Third, advanced technology cooperation presents opportunities for innovation in defense. AUKUS Pillar II provides channels for collaboration in artificial intelligence, hypersonics, quantum sensing, and autonomous systems. South Korean firms could participate in Australia's Ghost Bat and Ghost Shark programs by co-developing AI controllers, radar technologies, and satellite communications. Such collaboration would accelerate 'integrated innovation,' thereby ensuring the continuity of future cooperation. Finally, institutionalizing defense cooperation is vital for long-term effectiveness. Formal agreements are needed to sustain and deepen bilateral defense cooperation. Upgrading existing dialogues into agreements – such as a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) or Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) – would facilitate joint training, logistics, and deployments. A Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement (DTCA), a joint R&D fund, and expanded personnel exchanges would strengthen cooperation. Conclusion Australia could be an effective partner for advancing the Lee Jae-myung administration's pragmatic diplomacy. The two countries share valuable assets: institutional ties through the UNC, collaboration within AUKUS Pillar II, and complementary strengths in maritime, cyber, and advanced technologies. As the United States recalibrates its alliance system, South Korea must redesign layered deterrence and cooperation structures. The goal is not to replace the U.S. alliance, but to reshape the regional security architecture, reinforce middle-power collaboration, and enhance South Korea's role as a strategic actor in the Indo-Pacific. Partnership with Australia can offer both near-term diplomatic agility and long-term strategic autonomy, but challenges remain. Effective cooperation will require balancing interoperability with technological sovereignty, reconciling strategic aims with domestic constraints, and sustaining stability while adapting to shifting environments.