Barisan targets 1,000 fence sitters in last push
The calm before the polls: Two boys cycling past flags of various political parties in Kampung Batu Masjid, Tapah, ahead of the Ayer Kuning by-election. — Bernama
TAPAH: Barisan Nasional has identified about 1,000 voters who are still on the fence and will use the last day of the Ayer Kuning by-election campaign to win them over, says Datuk Seri M. Saravanan.
'We have identified about 2,600 Indian voters whom we consider to be 100% 'undi putih' (white voters) or our supporters,' the MIC deputy president told reporters yesterday.
'There are another 1,000 grey voters who haven't stated their stance yet,' he said, adding that the coalition will use various methods to persuade them ahead of polling day tomorrow.
'We are also working to urge those who are outstation to come back and vote,' he said at a press conference during a luncheon with the Indian community in Ayer Kuning here yesterday.
Also present was MCA vice-president Datuk Seri Dr Wee Jeck Seng.
The by-election will see a three-cornered fight between Barisan's Dr Mohamad Yusri Bakir, Perikatan Nasional's Abd Muhaimin Malek and KS Bawani of Parti Sosialis Malaysia.
The by-election was called following the death of its incumbent Ishsam Shahruddin, of Barisan, in February.
Saravanan also expressed confidence in Barisan's chances, saying that the only variable is the voter turnout.
'I want to assure Tapah residents that Barisan will win. It's just a matter of the majority,' said the Tapah MP.
'Even if not everyone shows up to vote, I believe the existing support base is already enough to win.'
He said the Indian community's support for Barisan will not waver over minor local issues.
'There's no serious local issue here. Maybe one or two clogged drains, but honestly, where in Malaysia do you not find that?
'The Indian community knows who has supported and defended their interests all this while. They remain firm in their support.
'There are, however, certain individuals who are trying to stir up sentiments by bringing up non-issues like illegal temples,' he added.
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