Yoroku: Putting in two cents on nuclear weapons suggestions after Japan election
Onishi tweeted on July 21, the day after the House of Councillors election, "An era has been ushered in where someone claiming 'Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons' has been elected to the Diet. But let me clearly say this: Japan cannot possess nuclear arms either in legal, practical or humanitarian terms." He also explained the basis for his arguments.
Saya, who won in the upper house poll as a newcomer backed by the minor opposition party Sanseito, spoke on Japan's security policy during the campaign period, arguing, "Nuclear armament is one of the most inexpensive and effective measures to strengthen security." Mayor Onishi is inherently conservative. When U.S. President Donald Trump justified the atomic bombings of Japanese cities during World War II, Onishi called on the Japanese government to take a resolute action as the world's only country to have suffered nuclear attacks.
The mayor has since continued to post his comments by responding to criticism and questions regarding his July 21 post. He explained why nuclear armament is not "inexpensive" and refuted claims that Ukraine was invaded because it renounced nuclear armament. He also touched on security initiatives for non-nuclear nations.
While Saya's remarks sparked a widespread backlash and repercussions, there appears to be a tendency online and elsewhere for people's sense of insecurity about the global situation and the Japan-U.S. alliance to boost nuclear armament theories.
Onishi's posts display his attempts to deepen discussions, not just shun others' opinions. He also urged, "Please do not hesitate to express your complaints and demands about (the city's) politics." Social media is prone to emotional arguments and rejection of dialogue. His posts can be regarded as challenging this reality.
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The Diplomat
5 hours ago
- The Diplomat
How Prabowo is Rewriting Indonesia's Diplomatic Playbook
With 26 overseas visits in nine months, the president is betting big on face-to-face diplomacy. His approach has won visibility, but critics warn of unintended regional consequences. Under President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesian diplomacy has taken a distinctive turn. Rather than relying solely on his foreign ministry, Prabowo has been personally performing diplomatic roles on the international stage. In the nine months since his inauguration on October 21, 2024, he has visited 26 countries for bilateral and multilateral meetings. This practice of diplomacy at the highest level is known as summit diplomacy. It involves heads of state or government engaging directly with their counterparts to negotiate, build trust or assert national interests. Summit diplomacy is not new or uncommon in international relations. Many political leaders have, from time to time, taken direct control over aspects of foreign policy. Historically, summit diplomacy reflected the urgency or gravity of the issues at hand — topics such as war and peace, nuclear disarmament or the founding of new global institutions. These were seen as matters too consequential to be delegated entirely to professional diplomats. Examples include the meetings between British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and German Chancellor Adolf Hitler before World War II; the wartime conferences between Prime Minister Winston Churchill representing the U.K., President Franklin D. Roosevelt representing the United States, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin in 1945; U.S. President John F. Kennedy's 1961 summit with the USSR's Nikita Khrushchev; and U.S. President Ronald Reagan's meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. In more recent decades, however, summit diplomacy has broadened in scope. It is no longer confined to issues of high politics. Instead, it is increasingly used to advance economic, technological and regional agendas. Prabowo's approach fits within this trend, though his intensity and frequency of engagement mark a significant shift in Indonesia's diplomatic posture His preference for summit diplomacy may also reflect a key pledge, made during his presidential campaign, to raise Indonesia's global stature and expand its influence. Summit diplomacy supports this goal not only by enhancing visibility but also by signaling Indonesia's readiness to take on a more active role in global affairs. A president's personal involvement often attracts media attention and international recognition. More importantly, direct dialogue can build stronger bilateral ties and demonstrate Indonesia's commitment to multilateral frameworks. Mixed Results Prabowo, who was earlier defense minister, began his engagement with foreign affairs even before his inauguration as president by visiting 15 countries. At the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, he sparked controversy with his proposal to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. Prabowo floated the idea of a demilitarized zone between Russia and Ukraine and a United Nations referendum in what he called disputed territory without consulting or informing his colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the president. His summit diplomacy as president has drawn praise from some quarters. His state visits to Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and various European countries have been described as highly productive. Indonesia's recent accession to the BRICS grouping of countries and his attendance at the 2025 BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro signalled Indonesia's deeper alignment with emerging global powers. A tangible outcome of Prabowo's summit diplomacy was the political agreement with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, which advanced the stalled Indonesia–European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. The agreement has since moved into its final negotiation stage. Similarly, Prabowo's direct phone diplomacy with U.S. President Donald Trump led to a breakthrough trade deal: the reduction of U.S. import tariffs on Indonesian goods from 32 percent to 19 percent. As a result, Indonesia now enjoys the lowest tariff rate of any Southeast Asian country trading with the United States. But summit diplomacy is not without its detractors. While it can help build partnerships or resolve crises, there are also instances where it has produced limited or even counterproductive outcomes. One such example is the 2018 meeting between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore. Hailed initially as a diplomatic breakthrough, the summit ended without a formal agreement and failed to halt North Korea's weapons program. Within months, tensions between the two countries had returned. The appeal of summit diplomacy lies in personal contact. When leaders meet face to face, they can cut through bureaucratic inertia and establish rapport that formal channels may struggle to achieve. However, the highly personalized nature of summit diplomacy also brings risk. Diplomacy conducted without sufficient institutional backing or consultation can lead to missteps. In Prabowo's case, his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in November 2024 has generated controversy. The joint development agreement signed between the two leaders in disputed maritime areas was criticized for overlooking the sensitivities of Indonesia's ASEAN neighbors. Analysts warned that the move could heighten tensions in the already volatile South China Sea. Prabowo was also seen as making another blunder with his plan to evacuate 1,000 Palestinians from Gaza. To support his plan, Prabowo travelled to the five key countries on the Palestinian issue: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and Jordan. However, the plan did not resonate positively at home. At the same time, the major Arab countries have made it very clear that they reject any relocation plans for Palestinians out of their territories in Gaza and the occupied West Bank. Role of Institutions These two policies illustrate a broader concern: summit diplomacy, while useful for signaling intent and building momentum, often lacks the institutional depth needed for durable policy outcomes. Many high-profile summits conclude with joint declarations but no clear mechanisms for follow-up implementation. To be effective, summit diplomacy needs to be integrated into a broader institutional framework. Institutionalization helps ensure that agreements are not only negotiated but also monitored, executed and evaluated. This is especially true in multilateral settings, where complex coordination is required. Indonesia's hosting of the G20 Summit in 2022 offers a model of institutionalized summit diplomacy. Despite deep global divisions at the time over the war in Ukraine, rising inflation and economic instability, the G20 produced a joint communiqué. Much of the credit went to the preparatory work done by sherpas, the senior government officials who engaged in months of negotiations to craft language acceptable to all sides. Without this groundwork, the summit might have ended in deadlock. As Indonesia under Prabowo pursues a more assertive foreign policy, summit diplomacy will likely remain a key instrument. However, to avoid the pitfalls of over-personalization, it must be supported by sustained institutional engagement, regional coordination and clear implementation strategies. Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.
6 hours ago
New Legislation Signals Japan's Shift to 'Active' Cyber Defense
In the spring of 2025 Japan entered a new era in digital security with the passage of new active cyber defense legislation. A look at what it means for the government to try to get ahead of threats before they arise, rather than sticking to its previous passive, reactive approach. Guerrilla Warfare in the Cyber Domain On May 16, the Diet passed legislation enabling Japanese authorities to adopt 'active' defense measures to preempt and prevent serious cyberattacks. The Active Cyber Defense Act will come into effect in 2026 and will structure Japan's cyber defense strategy around four pillars: Strengthened collaboration between the public and private sectors Monitoring of communications data for threat detection Counter-access to sources of cyber attacks and neutralization by authorities Strengthened cyber security institutions Japan's cyber security approach up until now has been 'passive' in that it relied on defense based on firewalls and antivirus measures confined to the networks of the parties targeted. This resembled 'siege warfare,' where the authorities had to wait until they were attacked before responding with countermeasures. Active defense, however, is more like 'guerrilla warfare.' The successful conduct of such combat involves identifying the patterns of enemy attacks and understanding their movements, ambushing them at chokepoints where they are vulnerable, and disrupting their supply lines. Active cyber defense exploits enemy vulnerabilities to disrupt attackers' operations and employs technical measures to increase the cost of their attacks, hopefully deterring them in the first place. Centralized Coordination by the Government Let's take a closer look at the pillars of the new approach and how they will be implemented in practice. To enhance public-private collaboration, operators of Japan's critical infrastructure will now be legally required to inform the government when they suffer a cyberattack or when they introduce new, important IT systems to operate this infrastructure. To this end, a 'Cyber Threat Information Sharing Council' will be established to strengthen cooperation on cyber incident response and regularize information and intelligence sharing between the government and the private sector. This new platform will also enable the government to better supervise critical infrastructure that could be targets of cyberattacks and promptly request operators to address zero-day vulnerabilities. By mandating private-sector reporting, the government will also gain a more comprehensive understanding of Japan's cyber security situation at any given time for improved strategic planning. In terms of 'monitoring communications data for threat detection,' the new law legally empowers the government to collect domestic communications-related data to identify and analyze cyber threats. The focus will be on so-called 'communication data' related to cyber incidents, such as IP addresses, character strings to execute commands, dates and times of transmissions, and communication logs that could be used to identify the type of malware used and the attack source. However, the government will not be able to collect and analyze the 'substantive content' of personal and private communications of citizens. To this end, an independent cyber communications supervisory board will be established to monitor government operations and ensure respect for the secrecy of communication guaranteed by Article 21 of Japan's Constitution. The third pillar enables the police and Japan's Self-Defense Forces to directly counter access and neutralize computers and infrastructure used for cyberattacks and remove malicious software. Legally, such actions will only be undertaken in a restricted range of situations when a rapid response is necessary to prevent or mitigate serious cyber incidents. Japan's cyber authorities will be able to remotely track watermarked electronic files stolen by attackers and neutralize relay servers used by attackers. It will also be legally permissible for government agencies to counter access and take down computers used by attackers. For example, Japanese authorities could launch a distributed denial of service attack against an imminent threat—flooding a server with a massive number of requests to overload and essentially prevent the server from functioning. The above pillars represent an overall strengthening of Japan's cyber defense institutions and allow Japanese authorities to proactively gather and centrally coordinate threat information related to advanced cyberattacks, including those perpetrated by state actors. This in turn will enable improved information exchange with allied and like-minded countries. When other countries make requests of Japan, such as to neutralize attacks by a state-sponsored actor or highly organized criminal organization, Japan will be better positioned to facilitate effective international cooperation. Human Resources a Major Challenge The biggest obstacle to implementing this active cyber defense approach is human resources. There is a shortage of cyber security experts, but current training for Japanese professionals is inadequate, especially as it applies to national security matters. Japan's cyber security experts require greater knowledge of diplomacy, military affairs and intelligence to facilitate an 'active' approach. A recent significant step forward in this vein was the introduction of national security clearances in May 2025. This clearance system allows government officials and private sector employees who have been vetted by higher-level authorities to access classified government information that could threaten Japan's national security if leaked. However, this is only the first step—it is essential to develop other institutional frameworks for training personnel. While it is difficult to precisely identify the extent of the shortage of cyber security personnel, a useful reference is a 2016 survey conducted by ISC2 (the International Information System Security Certification Consortium), a nonprofit organization that certifies professional cyber security qualifications. This survey predicted that Japan would face a shortage of approximately 170,000 cyber security personnel by 2024. Similarly, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry in 2020 also estimated that there was a shortage of approximately 190,000 people. Even the shortage of personnel needed for national security-related cyber security is estimated to be in the tens of thousands. As the new ACD legislation made its way through the Diet in May 2025, METI announced that it would double the number of registered information security specialists who possess advanced information security capabilities by 2030, raising their number to 50,000. This human resource issue also has international dimensions. One government plan involves the sharing of information on threats and undisclosed zero-day vulnerabilities obtained from foreign governments with the private sector based on the observation of certain confidentiality restrictions. Therefore, Japan's critical infrastructure operators and companies operating in the cyber domain must also secure personnel capable of dealing with the national and international security implications of the new legislative and strategic regime. The new legislation is only a starting point. Threats in cyberspace are evolving daily and transcend national borders. In the future, national security-focused cyber actors need to be prepared to continuously prevail in a 24/7 battle against cyber adversaries, including against state-based actors. This is the concept of 'persistent engagement' promoted by the United States in its active defense strategy. Persistent engagement is characterized by maintaining continuous contact with adversaries while detecting cyberattacks in advance and blocking them in the adversary's domain. Since the focus of defense is on disrupting the adversary's operations, the defense side requires advanced technical capabilities and enhanced judgment and analytical capabilities. Furthermore, comprehensive national security capabilities in the cyber domain will not only include being able to operate within cyberspace. To enhance Japan's capabilities in this arena, the government must also be able to engage in information collection, intelligence analysis, diplomacy, and economic pressure beyond cyberspace. In particular, when attacks are perpetrated or enabled by state-sponsored actors, Japan must be willing to take decisive measures in collaboration with the international community. The introduction of active cyber defense represents a significant evolution in Japan's cyber security strategy. It also marks the beginning of endless cyber warfare. (Originally published in Japanese. Banner photo © Pixta.)
Japan Today
6 hours ago
- Japan Today
80 years after the Pacific War: Japan's reckoning with history
By Jeff W. Richards This month marks 80 years since Japan surrendered in World War II, ending the Pacific War. In this episode of Japan Today Spotlight, we look at how the country is commemorating the anniversary — and what unresolved questions remain. From memorials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to continued demands for wartime apologies, Japan's war legacy remains a source of both reflection and controversy. The emperor's visits to former battle sites, renewed debate over the pacifist Constitution, and political pressure from South Korea and China all raise the question: how should Japan remember its wartime past? And what does the future hold? Watch the full episode here: How should Japan approach its wartime history 80 years later? And what responsibility — if any — does the U.S. still bear for the atomic bombings? Chapters 0:00 Intro 0:56 Hiroshima and Nagasaki ceremonies 1:58 Has the world learned anything? 4:39 The question of apologies 6:00 The emperor's role 7:22 The sex slave issue 9:32 Yasukuni Shrine 10:37 The firebombing of Tokyo 11:37 Peace prize winners speak out 12:50 Outro Japan Today sources: See the Japan Today Spotlight series: Don't forget to like, subscribe and turn on notifications so you never miss an update on Japan's biggest news stories on our YouTube channel: Follow us for more updates: The views and opinions expressed in this video are those of the host and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of GPlusMedia, Inc. © Japan Today
