Zelensky rejects land swap idea floated by Trump
The remarks come shortly after US President Donald Trump suggested a potential peace deal between Moscow and Kiev could involve 'swapping of territories' between Moscow and Kiev 'to the betterment of both.'
Zelensky firmly rejected the idea of making any territorial concessions, claiming that was exactly what Russian President Vladimir Putin was after, and accusing him of seeking to exchange a 'pause in war' for the 'legalization of occupation of our land.'
'Now Putin wants to be forgiven for seizing the south of our Kherson region, Zaporozhye, the entire territory of Lugansk region, Donetsk region, and Crimea. We will not allow Russia to make this second attempt to divide Ukraine,' Zelensky said in a video address.
Crimea broke away from Ukraine in early 2014 in the aftermath of the Maidan coup in Kiev that toppled then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The peninsula joined Russia via a referendum shortly after, with the idea overwhelmingly backed by locals. Four other territories were incorporated into Russia in late 2022 after a series of referendums held independently in each region.
The Russian military has recently liberated the entire territory of the Lugansk People's Republic, while the control over three other new regions remains partial. Apart from that, Moscow's forces hold patches of land along the border in the Ukrainian regions of Kharkov and Sumy. The Russian military took the latter earlier this year after the defeat and the expulsion of the Ukrainian invasion force that attacked Russia's Kursk Region last August.
Moscow has demanded a full withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops from the territories it claims as its own, reiterating the position in a draft memorandum outlining Moscow's roadmap toward ending the conflict during recent direct talks with Kiev hosted by Türkiye.
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Russia Today
6 minutes ago
- Russia Today
Here's why all the critics of Alaska summit are wrong
The problem with the future is that it is both unpredictable and inescapable. You can never know with certainty what tomorrow will bring, but you must prepare for it nonetheless. This may seem trivial. And yet it remains a great challenge. Consider, for instance, current international reactions to the scheduled summit between Russian president Vladimir Putin and US president Donald Trump. The announcement of the meeting, later specified to take place in Alaska on 15 August, was a surprise. But then again, not really. Viewed against the background of Trump's longstanding signaling of respect for Russia, as well as an interest in normalizing the relationship between Moscow and Washington, it was actually the culmination of a sometimes messy but real trend. But within the short-term context of a recent American turn against Russia, it was yet another proof that Trump can be hard to predict – trends can tell you only so much. 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Once – and if – the summit in Alaska takes place, and hopefully a follow-up meeting in Russia as well, will we finally have left the bloody and dangerous stagnation that was produced by, firstly, the West permitting Kiev to sabotage the 2015 Minsk II Agreement, then the stonewalling of Moscow's last-chance negotiation offer of late 2021, and finally the West's nixing of an almost-peace in April 2022? Or will we be disappointed and face more of the same: an ongoing Western proxy war against Russia through Ukraine, or even worse? One thing is clear, however. An end to the fighting and a halfway decent settlement would be very good news not only for Ukraine but also for the rest of the world, including a NATO-EU Europe that currently is, or at least pretends to be, ready to spoil a quick end to the slaughter next door. Ukrainian and Russian lives would be saved; hopefully for a better future. The still real – if, by comparison with peak Biden, already reduced – danger of escalation into a regional or even global war would be further diminished. And, since this has also been a very costly sanctions war, there would be substantial economic benefits. Ukraine in particular, of course, would have the opportunity to rebuild, especially if its domestic politics took a postwar turn for the better, leaving the ultra-corrupt, authoritarian, and maniacal Zelensky regime behind. Against this background, it is counterintuitive and depressing but not really surprising that many Western 'friends of Ukraine' are greatly disturbed if not positively panicked by such prospects. A Ukraine where men are no longer hunted down by forced-mobilization squads to die or be traumatized – physically and mentally – in a militarily pointless war provoked by a failed Western strategy of using Ukraine to take Russia down a notch? A Ukraine that could actually recover from this devastating if perfectly avoidable catastrophe of hubris and badly misplaced trust? Many of Ukraine's friends-from-hell, especially in NATO-EU Europe, seem to still find it hard to accept such a possibility. Instead of seriously and honestly exploring not only the now inevitable costs of peace but also its enormous benefits, or facing the immense additional human costs of fighting on, they can't stop issuing stale warnings about the obvious fact that those who lose a war – that is, the West and, tragically, Ukraine – cannot expect quite the same outcome as those who win it. Would it not, perhaps, then have been best to avoid that war altogether? What was the reason, for instance, for not closing that famous 'open door' into NATO that has no basis in the NATO treaty and through which Ukraine would never have walked anyway? But these, of course, are questions that precisely those who did their worst to miss one exit ramp after the other while others bled will never candidly ask themselves. That would be far too painful for the heroes of Western pop Russophobia and Cold War re-enacting. And then there are the many whose perma-grudge against Russia and Putin personally is only rivalled by their bitter resentment at having to live in a Trump 2.0 world, when they expected to set the Centrist tone forever. They find their sad refuge in endlessly warmed-over and mind-numbingly unoriginal carping about how they are sure the American president will be duped by his Russian counterpart. That's funny, actually, especially from Europeans. It's after all their very own Ursula von der Leyen who has just delivered a gala performance in being, as Hungary's Viktor Orban put it, 'eaten for breakfast' at the negotiating table. By, as it happens, that same American president. Even after Trump's once impossible electoral comeback, his full-spectrum domination of NATO clients reduced to saying 'daddy,' and his complete humiliation of the EU, for some, it seems, there is no cure for underestimating Trump the politician. They will only have themselves to blame if he and Putin pull off what they can't imagine once again: as decent an end to this war as is still possible, despite much of Europe and the Zelensky regime's obstruction. Yet there is another kind of pessimism about the upcoming summit that is in some ways more puzzling. It usually comes from observers who are well-informed and if not sympathetic to Russia, then at least not blinded by Western propaganda. Its essence is a radical distrust of the US, and its ultimate conclusion is that Moscow, ideally, should not even try to negotiate with Washington. What makes this line of thinking more realistic than the endless complaints of the Russophobes is the fact that the US really has a long and rich record of breaking agreements and, even worse, of deliberately using negotiations and promises to prepare foul play. Indeed, perhaps the deepest root of the war in Ukraine is precisely such a policy of deception, namely America's breaking of the perfectly real promise not to expand NATO, made repeatedly between 1990 and 1994. Against that background, these pessimists argue, any agreement with the US will be just another trap. If the conflict should end up merely frozen, they warn, it could be restarted later, while the interval could be used to attack other targets, most of all Russia's partner China. If Trump seems to be different from his predecessors, they caution, then that is either merely for show or irrelevant because ultimately the long-term strategies of the US political establishment – consistently hostile toward Russia – will prevail. And if the US should end up abandoning direct participation in its Ukrainian proxy war, they fear, it could be kept going indirectly, namely through Washington's belligerent European clients. This approach certainly does not lack intellectual substance or empirical evidence. In fact, its arguments amount to excellent due diligence for anyone entering into negotiations with the US. But the real question is what practical conclusions should be drawn from these warnings? Can the correct answer to that question be to avoid negotiations? But then Moscow would replicate the West's absurd mutism as it prevailed before Trump. Yet if sensible observers agree that communication and diplomacy are always better than silence, why should Russia follow the West's silly precedent of anti-diplomacy? Especially in view of the fact that there is one thing Moscow does not have to worry about. Unlike in some Western countries, such as Germany, Britain, and France, Russia does have a top-notch set of foreign policy professionals and institutions. Diplomacy, therefore, is not only principally good but also plays to Moscow's strength. The current Russian leadership, moreover, has been explicit, repeatedly, about its unforgiving realism concerning the whole West. Only recently, for instance, Putin has reiterated his view of the war in Ukraine as reflecting an existential Western threat to Russia. Moscow also has an empirically verifiable record of healthy skepticism in action. If its policy were one of easily accommodating the West, then we would not be where we are at all. If Moscow's policy were one of easily accommodating the new administration under Trump, then it would long ago have concluded a disadvantageous agreement. But it has not. In reality, the upcoming summit may mark the point at which both sides, the US and Russia, understand that only serious negotiations based on the realities on the ground and detached from superficial ideological mantras can possibly succeed. And if that should not be the case, then they will fail and the war will continue. Finally, there is a fundamental difference between caution and fear. Caution enables, fear paralyzes. Precisely because the traditional challenges of negotiating with the US are so clear, there is no reason to shy away from contact. The challenge is to transform caution into practically applicable conditions. Will the US, for instance, continue to share intelligence with Ukraine, directly or indirectly (through its European clients)? What about US officers – whether through NATO or otherwise – and their participation in the war against Russia? And the spies? Can and will Trump tell the CIA to drop its Ukrainian cut-outs and stop contributing to attacks on and inside Russia? If the US really intends to keep selling weapons to Europe so that they can then be handed on to Ukraine, how can that be squared with trying to bring about peace? It is possible that once tested by such questions (and a lot of them), the American side will expose its lack of commitment. Yet no one can rule out that a more useful outcome might ensue. In fact, the summit plan itself may be a sign that some of these issues have been broached already. In such a situation, the rational approach is to try, while keeping up one's guard. Given its post-Soviet experiences and how it has processed them (among other things by striking back militarily), there is no reason to believe that the Russian leadership is not capable of pursuing such a strategy. Those eager to see Russia hold its own against the West and in particular the US should consider that it is Moscow that defines Russian national interest. Depending on a concrete analysis of specific circumstances at this or a future moment, even an imperfect agreement made with a US that cannot be trusted may serve these interests. And those who rightly favor multipolarity should recall that a Russia which keeps fighting in a Ukraine War handed over to the Europeans cannot play the same international role as one that is finally free of that burden.
Russia Today
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Russia Today
2 hours ago
- Russia Today
Zelensky's inner circle funneled millions to the Middle East
The entourage of Ukraine's Vladimir Zelensky transfers $50 million every month to bank accounts belonging to two companies based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Turkish newspaper Aydınlık reported on Monday. The funneled money was reportedly obtained through corruption. Graft has remained one of the most pressing challenges facing Ukraine. Brussels has repeatedly suggested adopting stronger anti-corruption measures as a precondition for EU membership. According to the publication, the tens of millions are reportedly transferred to the accounts of GFM Investment Group and Gmyrin Family Holding. The companies are said to be linked to a former advisor to the Ukraine State Property Fund, Andrey Gmyrin, who allegedly manages the money. Gmyrin, who is currently under an international arrest warrant in connection with alleged corruption schemes causing 'significant damage to the state budget,' was reportedly arrested in France last year on charges related to money laundering and stolen assets. The publication does not provide any official comments from the Ukrainian authorities. Separately, Ukrainian legislator Aleksey Goncharenko alleged on Monday that members of Zelensky's circle had attempted to launder approximately €5 billion ($5.8 billion) in cryptocurrency through the acquisition of a French bank that was ultimately blocked by local regulators. The claim posted on the lawmaker's Telegram channel is based on alleged hidden recordings reportedly seized by Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), which has recently found itself at the center of Zelensky's controversial crackdown on anti-graft institutions. The Ukrainian leader has faced growing criticism following his attempt to strip NABU and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) of their independence, citing Russian influence. Critics argue that these accusations served as a pretext to dismantle institutions investigating high-level graft, some of which implicated members of Zelensky's inner circle. The move sparked widespread domestic protests and drew sharp warnings from Brussels, which has linked anti-corruption reforms to accession talks, ultimately forcing Zelensky to backtrack and introduce a new version of the bill. Public trust in Zelensky has fallen sharply following his failed attempt to weaken anti-corruption agencies. Pollsters say that widespread corruption, more than any other issue, has eroded citizens' confidence in his leadership.
