Four China Coast Guard ships enter Japanese waters off the Senkakus
According to the Japan Coast Guard's 11th regional headquarters in Naha, this was the first intrusion by Chinese official vessels into the Japanese waters around the Senkaku chain since June 14.
The four ships crossed into the Japanese waters near Uotsurijima, one of the islands, at around 4 p.m. and left the area by around 6 p.m. The Japanese-administered islands in the East China Sea are claimed by China.
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Japan Times
an hour ago
- Japan Times
As trade deadline approaches, Japan must draw lines
According to conventional wisdom, a strong national leader will force a weak one, or one with less popular support, to buckle in tough negotiations. By that logic, U.S. President Donald Trump has the whip hand in trade talks with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Yet, Ishiba has held out, resisting U.S. pressure to sign a quick deal, a position that is strengthened, ironically, by Ishiba's weakness. The prime minister cannot afford to make concessions as the July 20 Upper House election approaches. His spine is stiffened by the failure of the U.S. to make clear its demands and the U.S. president's record of ripping up deals that even he negotiated. Clarity and trust are the essential prerequisites of successful negotiations. Neither exists today. Japan was worried about Trump's return to the White House, fearful that the bilateral relationship would suffer given the 45th and 47th president's long-time animus toward Japan and the absence of a 'Trump whisperer,' former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Yet, in January, Trump described the partnership as 'a friendship like few others,' certain that 'the cherished alliances between our two countries will continue to flourish long into the future!' Sensing opportunity, Ishiba hurried to Washington to meet Trump, a move that some considered unseemly and perhaps unwise, but the resulting summit was a success. When Trump announced that he would impose blanket 10% tariffs on all trade partners, with still greater sanctions on specific sectors like autos, auto parts, steel and aluminum, Japan was one of the first countries to begin negotiations on a deal, its faith in the relationship yielding confidence that an agreement was possible. Since then, Ryosei Akazawa, Japan's chief tariff negotiator, has visited Washington regularly, sometimes weekly, in search of a deal. Despite seven rounds of talks, periodic claims that an agreement was imminent and impressive efforts by Japan to court the mercurial U.S. president — at one point, Akazawa wore a 'Make America Great Again' cap while meeting Trump — the two countries remain at loggerheads. In the last round, held late last month, Akazawa failed to even meet Scott Bessent, U.S. treasury secretary and chief U.S. negotiator, or U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. Worse, when the talks adjourned Trump unloaded on Japan, complaining that the country was 'spoiled' and took no U.S. rice or automobiles. Talking to reporters, he wasn't sure if a deal with Japan was possible, saying 'I doubt it. ... They're very tough.' Trump said that he would be sending Japan 'a letter,' or notice of his intent to impose tariffs on its goods, which would mark 'the end of the trade deal.' In an interview, Trump warned that Japan would 'pay a 25% tariff on your cars,' and later comments hinted it could be as high as a 35% levy. Japan responded with silence. While the current deadline for a deal is July 9, Bessent has indicated that an extension might be possible. There are reports that Akazawa may make yet another trip to Washington for another round of talks. One of the questions he needs answered is what purpose U.S. tariffs serve. If they are intended to raise revenue that facilitates the restructuring of the U.S. tax system, which would imply that they are permanent, then the parameters of a deal are much changed. An agreement is difficult when one side doesn't understand the facts. The charge that Japan imports no U.S. rice is false, as agriculture minister Shinjiro Koizumi explained. 'Rice imports from abroad, including from the U.S., had increased 120 times from a year earlier.' If Japanese consumers don't buy U.S. automobiles, it isn't because of tariffs — this country imposes no levy on imported passenger cars — but because American automakers don't build vehicles that Japanese want. Koizumi was right to call Trump's comments an 'obvious misunderstanding of the facts.' Autos are central to any eventual resolution of this dispute. Trump insists that his 25% tariff, imposed in March, is nonnegotiable. Japan wants it gone. The U.S. may believe that Japan will be squeezed by its tariffs. And, in fact, exports to the U.S. dropped by 11% year on year in May, with automobile exports down 24.7%. Automakers have been working to avoid passing on the tariff costs, but they are reaching the limits at which they can squeeze their supply chains. Japanese automakers have increased production in the U.S., which is one of Trump's objectives. Any eventual resolution is more likely to reflect larger political and economic considerations than the specific terms of any document. Fearful of some of the consequences, Trump has been criticized for failing to follow through on his threats and the prospect of an economic slowdown in the U.S. — the perpetual warning of economists when they evaluate his trade policy — could force him to back off again. Trump has also been promising deals for so long and has achieved such meager results — only agreements with Vietnam and the U.K., while a purported pact with China remains unclear — that his administration might settle for something with Japan that is more symbolic than real. If Trump believed that Ishiba would readily submit to his demands, he was mistaken. That error is understandable. The U.S. is central to Japan's economy and critical to its security but the leverage that affords the U.S. president is limited. Growing numbers of Japanese voters oppose gross concessions. One poll shows more than half of voters believe Japan should not make a deal even if it hurts the bilateral relationship. Only 15% agree to concessions to avoid additional tariffs. Most worrisome now is a growing sense among the Japanese public that the U.S. is no longer a reliable partner. After all, in 2019, Trump and Abe released a joint statement after signing a trade pact that said 'While faithfully implementing these agreements, both nations will refrain from taking measures against the spirit of these agreements and this Joint Statement.' Yet here we are again. American credibility is also diminished by constant calls for ever-more defense spending, first to 2% of gross domestic product, then 3% and now 5%. It is not surprising, then, that another recent poll showed that only 22% either greatly (3%) or somewhat (19%) trust the U.S., while 68% somewhat (46%) or entirely (22%) distrust it. An agreement is difficult in these circumstances. Still, it is possible. And Japan has cards to play. It could pledge to increase purchases of crude oil, natural gas and agricultural products to help balance trade accounts. While these are ultimately private sector decisions, the Japanese government could also encourage companies to invest in the U.S. This shouldn't take much effort since it is already occurring. But Japan must also draw lines. While this country needs a good working relationship with the U.S., it must not be at any cost. This country has national interests to protect. They include a thriving security partnership, a stable and growing economy and a rules-based international order. Indulging a mercurial if not arbitrary U.S. president is not among them, especially if it threatens those other concerns. The Japan Times Editorial Board
Japan Times
2 hours ago
- Japan Times
Sizing up the forthcoming Upper House election
This month, the Japanese public will be going to the ballot boxes to vote for members of Japan's Upper House. In the past, these elections have been moderately important — and far less so compared to Lower House votes. However, based on the current state of politics in Tokyo, this is the most consequential Upper House election since 2007, when the outcome catalyzed the toppling of the Liberal Democratic Party-led government. The stakes in this election are equally as high as they were back then. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba needs a win to secure longer-term viability as the country's leader. The ruling coalition is already struggling with a minority government and stands to lose even more legislative power in this vote. As for the opposition parties, this election is a battle to do something they have long been unable to do: position themselves as the standout alternative to the LDP. They all now have less than three weeks to win over the Japanese public. Upper House elections are fundamentally different from Lower House votes in terms of the number of seats and regularity. The Upper House is composed of 248 seats with lawmakers serving six-year terms. Unlike the Lower House, which can be dissolved by the prime minister or via a no-confidence motion, Upper House elections are held every three years, with only half the seats up for a vote to preserve stability in governance. In other words, for the forthcoming election, only 124 of the 248 seats are up for grabs. Based on their constitutionally mandated authorities, the Upper House is the weaker of the two houses in the Japanese Parliament. The Lower House has the ability to overrule decisions from the Upper House, it proposes the budget and every prime minister since the promulgation of the constitution has been a Lower House politician. Because of this, Upper House elections have always been about one thing: securing a simple majority. The goal for the ruling coalition is to preserve that majority rule so that whatever bills make it through the Lower House can be rubber stamped in the Upper House. The goal for the opposition is to win the Upper House majority to disrupt the legislative efforts of the ruling coalition. This means that the Upper House can frustrate lawmaking by voting against Lower House-passed bills and forcing the ruling coalition to cobble together a two-thirds vote to overturn the Upper House decision. The opposition winning a majority in the Upper House can be a death knell for the ruling coalition, as evidenced in the late 2000s. In 2007, the Democratic Party of Japan won the majority in the Upper House, handing them an essential tool for disrupting the ruling coalition's legislative designs. The LDP-led government had already been on the decline and the inability to achieve meaningful progress in the Parliament — particularly after the Lehman Shock in 2008 — expedited the public's declining confidence in the party's ability to lead Japan. By the next Lower House election in 2009, the LDP lost total control to the opposition for the first time since 1993. Understanding this, one of the implied tasks for Lower House lawmakers is that they must stump for Upper House politicians. After all, if they want their legislative priorities realized, they need help from their Upper House counterparts. So, while this is a vote for only 124 seats out of the total 713 in the two houses of Parliament, it is an 'all-hands-on-deck' situation. This is even more so in the forthcoming election than previous Upper House votes. The current situation has forced the LDP into negotiations and consultations with opposition parties unlike anything it has experienced before. Meanwhile, public faith in Ishiba's government and the LDP remains relatively low. The only saving grace for the LDP is that public approval has not yet found a home in a single opposition party. Major political competitors will seek to change that with this forthcoming election. For Ishiba, this election will seal his fate as the leader of the LDP and prime minister of Japan. He is already a polarizing figure inside the LDP and there are others like former economic security minister Sanae Takaichi vying to succeed him. While the LDP was willing to privilege stability under Ishiba despite his inability to excite the Japanese public ahead of the last snap election, consecutive campaign failures would provide an opportunity for intraparty opponents to make political moves. The bar for Ishiba remains the same as any Upper House election: ensure the LDP-Komeito coalition maintains the majority. He has already enjoyed a bump in the polls owing to progress on the highly visible issue of rice prices in Japan, but he will spend the next few weeks avoiding any contentious topics. This includes things such as tariff negotiations and defense spending discussions with the United States, which are political landmines for the prime minister. Instead, observers should expect Ishiba to put his full weight behind policy measures aimed at relieving economic pressure on individual households. The ruling coalition will throw its full weight behind campaign efforts because they cannot afford to lose any more legislative power. The coalition has been in a downward spiral with regard to voter confidence. The public handed the LDP and junior partner Komeito a defeat in the October 2024 Lower House election owing to waning confidence in their ability to lead the government. The negotiation requirements inherent to a minority government have only further disrupted the coalition's ability to implement its policy and lawmaking priorities, which may negatively impact the coalition's chances of success in the forthcoming vote. Losing the Upper House would only frustrate its efforts further, contributing to even less voter confidence that may be just what the opposition needs to wrest control. To break this cycle, the LDP and Komeito will need to go beyond their traditional power bases. While both parties maintain large vote-getting apparatuses throughout the country, they must find new ways to appeal to nontraditional support blocs. The focus on alleviating economic burdens versus global geopolitical issues will help, but there is still a question of how the LDP and Komeito will modernize their engagement with voters via social media and in their messaging efforts. Meanwhile, the opposition parties must use this election to stand out from the pack. Despite the LDP's negative trends in public approval over the past few years, opposition parties have neither coalesced as a viable coalition nor stood out as individual challengers. Continued failure to seize these political opportunities may well give the LDP the space needed to correct its internal policy challenges and regain just enough voter confidence to start reversing its public image. The two conventional contenders in the forthcoming race are the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and the Democratic Party for the People. The CDPJ has returned to its DPJ roots by leaning on former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda's leadership as an alternative to LDP-led rule. Meanwhile, the DPP has doubled down on Yuichiro Tamaki despite his widely publicized extramarital affair, which sidelined him briefly between 2024 and 2025. It is betting that his centrist approach and willingness to work across the aisle in Parliament can lift it beyond fringe status — a party that has stayed relevant mainly by exploiting the LDP's weakness as a minority government. Neither the CDPJ nor the DPP has figured out yet how to excite broad masses of Japanese voters, but they will be scrambling during the next three weeks to do so. As for unconventional contenders, the right-wing populist party Sanseito is drumming up unexpected support. Coming off a surprising showing in the Tokyo municipal elections, Sanseito is heavily leveraging social media to continue its momentum through the Upper House race. This new group of prospective lawmakers is counting on their promise of 'Japan First' policies to peel conservative voters away from the mainstream parties. Of course, this would not be the first time a new party roars onto the political scene only to fizzle out after poor showings at national-level elections, so Sanseito will be fighting hard to avoid that outcome. Given all these circumstances, this is shaping up to be one of the most unusual Upper House elections in decades. With stakes at play, it will certainly be one of the most impactful. Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.
Japan Times
2 hours ago
- Japan Times
Japan's Do It Yourself Party: Who we are and where we are headed
Ahead of the Upper House elections on July 20, Sanseito, the party I lead, has adopted the slogan 'Japanese First' and is fielding candidates in all electoral districts. Together with proportional representation, we aim to win six seats. Our slogan is not xenophobic by any means, and instead focuses on the needs of the Japanese citizen first, which the ruling party, pursuing a globalist agenda, has increasingly forgotten. While Sanseito is gaining voters and news coverage nationwide, some may still have questions about who we are, what we stand for and how we got started. The Sanseito — or 'do it yourself' — party was formed in April 2020 by a group of citizens under the slogan: 'If there is no party you want to vote for, let's create one from scratch.' In a true grassroots movement, the party was launched by ordinary citizens, most of whom had no political experience at the national or local level. The results were impressive. Without relying on major supporters, such as large corporations or religious groups, Sanseito secured more than 1.7 million votes in our first national election in 2022, just two years after becoming an organized party. I was elected to the Upper House at this time and have served as a member of the House of Councilors as well as the president of the party beginning in 2023. I was re-elected as party president in 2025. Following the election of three other members to the Lower House in 2024, our party currently has four members in the national legislature and operates 287 regional branches across Japan. More than 140 of our members have been elected in local elections, serving in local assemblies throughout the country. Our core philosophy is 'to protect Japan's national interests and bring about harmony in the world.' Our platform explicitly states the goal of achieving a harmonious society centered around the emperor and valuing traditional culture. Our party focuses on three key policy areas: 'education and human development,' 'food and health,' and 'national security.' As a father of three small children (and planning for more) all living in the countryside, these issues and commonsense approaches — explained below — are near and dear to my heart. Education and human development Promote education that fosters not only academic ability but also a love for family and community and pride in one's country, encouraging students to learn independently. Provide monthly subsidies of ¥100,000 to families with children under the age of 15 as part of child-rearing support. Food and health Support agriculture that does not rely on pesticides and chemicals and prioritize preventive medicine that contributes to the health of the people and the reduction of medical expenses. Improve the treatment of workers in primary industries (agriculture, forestry and fisheries) and aim to achieve 100% food self-sufficiency. Review the excessive influence of the World Health Organization (WHO) and pharmaceutical companies on pandemic policies and reconsider vaccination policies. National security Reduce the burden on households by gradually abolishing the consumption tax (equivalent to Japan's value-added tax) and lowering social insurance premiums. We will impose restrictions on foreign capital investment in real estate and infrastructure to protect national sovereignty and security. We will tighten regulations on voting rights and eligibility for election for immigrants and foreign residents. We will call for a review of radical policies related to gender and gender issues (As well as DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) promotion policies). Regarding climate-change measures, the party advocates moving away from decarbonization policies that ignore economic rationality. With these policies, Sanseito's impact is increasingly being felt in local elections, achieving 19 wins out of 21 elections (a win rate of over 90%) since the start of 2025. In recent elections in several smaller cities, the party has won the most votes and secured the top spot, rapidly expanding its support base in local communities. Moreover, in the recent Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, our party's candidates won three of the four seats we vied for, with the fourth candidate losing by a thin margin. Public opinion polls, which have gotten the attention of foreign observers and commentators, also show an upward trend in support rates. In a survey conducted by major Japanese media in June 2025, the party's support rate reached 3.9%, nearly tripling from the previous year's 1.3% and rising to fourth place among all parties. Sanseito already has over 80,000 members and supporters and our reach on social media platforms such as YouTube is also notable. The official Sanseito channel has over 270,000 subscribers, making it one of the largest among Japan's major parties. The party's unique election strategy, which combines grassroots networks with online outreach capabilities, is drawing significant attention. More and more voters are aware of our policies, energy and diversity among age groups, backgrounds and experiences — including supporters in international marriages and with much international travel and work under their belts — and want us to help promote commonsense and immediate change for the country. Japan has been very much open to foreign nationals and there has been a huge rise in the number of overseas workers in recent years. As with Europe and the United States, however, excessive immigration has become a problem causing issues in law and order. Because of this, we are simply calling for stricter rules and limits on the number of immigrants. This policy is supported by the Japanese public. With regard to other excesses of the globalist agenda of the ruling party, examples include the privatization of public enterprises such as the postal reform in 2006 under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Now, there's chatter of dismantling the agricultural cooperative, with Koizumi's son Shinjiro Koizumi at the helm of the farm ministry. Privatization will result in profits flowing overseas. Japan's 'green transformation,' or GX, policies have also become excessive, with renewable energy surcharges alone costing taxpayers ¥3 trillion a year. And the forced promotion of electric vehicles has inflicted significant damage on the Japanese automotive industry, causing some associated interests to flow overseas. Our efforts over the past five years have shown that the Japanese voter is not apathetic, as some tend to believe. If anything, they are highly committed and passionate about their communities and country and are very concerned about the direction Japan is heading. It is normal for any nation's citizens and voters to feel this way. Along with them, Sanseito seeks to change the direction in which the country is headed and bring power back to the people. Sohei Kamiya is the president of Sanseito and a first-term member of the House of Councilors. He previously was the founder of the Ryoma Project and a member of the Suita City Assembly. He runs the Channel Grand Strategy on YouTube.
