Trump says he will probably extend TikTok deadline again
WASHINGTON: US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday (Jun 17) he would likely extend a deadline for China-based ByteDance to divest the US assets of short video app TikTok.
The president said in May he would extend the June 19 deadline after the app helped him with young voters in the 2024 election. His comments to reporters on Air Force One on Tuesday reiterated that sentiment.
"Probably, yeah," Trump said when asked about extending the deadline. "Probably have to get China approval but I think we'll get it. I think President Xi will ultimately approve it."
Trump has already twice granted a reprieve from enforcement of a congressionally mandated ban on TikTok that was initially due to take effect in January.
The law required TikTok to stop operating by Jan 19 unless ByteDance had completed a divestiture of the app's US assets. Trump began his second term as president on Jan 20 and opted not to enforce it. He first extended the deadline to early April, and then again last month to Jun 19.
A deal had been in the works this spring that would spin off TikTok's US operations into a new firm based in the United States and majority-owned and operated by US investors but it was put on hold after China indicated it would not approve it following Trump's announcements of steep tariffs on Chinese goods.
Democratic senators argue that Trump has no legal authority to extend the deadline, and suggest that the deal that had been under consideration would not meet legal requirements.
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an hour ago
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Commentary: The myth of the suppressed Chinese consumer
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