China boosting development of AI for use in trade war with US
Encouraged by the enthusiastic reception to its DeepSeek artificial intelligence platform in January, China's leaders are going all out to encourage AI companies to harness the power of this technology to compete with the United States and other countries in business and military spheres.
China considers AI an important tool to handle U.S. restrictions on Chinese business, particularly after DeepSeek shook up Wall Street, resulting in a loss of $589 billion for Nvidia stockholders in late January.
"The government in China works directly with the private sector and universities in the advancement and deployment of AI technology and are reducing their dependence on imports of high-technology products," said Lourdes Casanova, director of Cornell University's Emerging Markets Institute.
The past few weeks have seen China rolling out several new AI models, including Manus, which experts say can rival the latest model of ChatGPT. Industry experts were more than surprised to find that DeepSeek was equally efficient as ChatGPT, though it used older generation Nvidia chips. The U.S. has banned the supply of advanced chips.
"China and the U.S. have pulled way out front in the AI race. China used to be one to two years behind the U.S. Now, it is likely two to three months," Jeffrey Towson, owner of Beijing-based TechMoat Consulting, told VOA.
"Alibaba's Qwen is now a clear leader internationally in LLMs [large language models]. Chinese Kling AI and Minimax are arguably the global leaders in video generation," Towson said.
Government involvement
In 2017, China released an AI development program to make the country a world leader by 2030. The government's Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan said that AI would be adopted across different sectors and drive economic transformation.
"China has the most elaborate AI strategy compared to any other country," Rogier Creemers, assistant professor in Modern Chinese Studies at Leiden University in the Netherlands, told VOA.
China has established a National Computing Power Grid — somewhat like electricity grids — making it possible for Chinese AI companies to invest less in their own computing power. In the U.S., each company must fend for itself, Creemers said.
Competition
ChatGPT's updated GPT4 large language model has gotten the attention of several top-ranking CEOs of Chinese tech companies. Baidu chief Robin Li recently said his firm was under "huge pressure and a sense of crisis" after seeing the updated ChatGPT. Baidu, which has launched Ernie Bot, said "the gap [between China] and leading international levels [in the field] has widened."
"AI plus robotics is likely where China will take a commanding lead over the U.S., just like in EVs,' Towson said. 'Chinese companies like Unitree are already pulling ahead. Watch for China to surprise everyone in personalized robots, industrial robots and speciality robots,' he said.
Communist Party control
Chinese President Xi Jinping recently convened a meeting with heads of private companies, including tech firms, calling on them to "show your talent" in overcoming challenges such as an economic slowdown and U.S. restrictions on Chinese business.
"There are discussions that the growth of large language models — the technology behind chatbots like DeepSeek and ChatGPT — may be hindered by media censorship, because the models will have less diverse data to work with," said Creemers.
On the other hand, the government's control ensures industrial policy coordination, which is helpful in the growth of AI in China.
China is focusing more on specialized software for health and other industries, which can largely tolerate political censorship. Chinese AI models are improving diagnostic accuracy in diverse areas from detecting rib fractures to cancer.
US ban on advanced chips
"It will take some time, but it would not be a surprise if China is also soon capable of building advanced chips for AI," Cornell's Casanova said.
Companies such as Huawei have shown that they can design and manufacture advanced chips successfully, thereby overcoming restrictions imposed by the U.S., she said.
Towson said China is 100% dedicated to building an independent semiconductor supply chain.
"It is advancing faster than anyone thought possible. But the frontier is always advancing, and it's unclear how this will play out over time," he said.
"But you can do a lot with software,' Creemers said. 'China can work with more chips with less computing power or with fewer sophisticated chips."
The risk for China is not limited to chips, because the Trump administration could impose restrictions on the Chinese AI model. It could also react to China's restriction on the use of ChatGPT, because it can violate its censorship rules.
AI and the military
China's air force is using AI-powered biometric tests to screen potential pilots as part of a rigorous hiring process, according to state broadcaster CCTV.
"AI now plays a crucial role in interpreting candidates' biological signals, revealing underlying health risks that might not be immediately apparent to human evaluators," CCTV said. "This data-driven approach allows the air force to predict long-term risks, ultimately ensuring that only the most suitable candidates are chosen."
Chinese researchers have also revealed that the Chinese army has been using Meta's publicly available Llama model to develop an AI tool for potential military applications.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Voice of America
15-03-2025
- Voice of America
Russian foreign minister exaggerates Russia-China relations, ignores nuances
On March 12, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke with American bloggers Mario Nawfal, Larry C. Johnson and Andrew Napolitano in Moscow. When asked whether the U.S. administration's efforts to normalize relations with Moscow are just to use Russia "cynically against the Chinese," Lavrov rejected such possibility. He described Russia-China relations as long-term, stronger and more confidential, based in deep trust and mutual understanding, and he emphasized widespread public support in both countries. That is misleading. The claim overlooks the underlying complexities and skepticism in the Russia-China relationship. Underlying tensions: Despite the appearance of a strong partnership, ongoing tensions underlie the relationship. This includes skepticism on both sides, especially about economic stability, military strength and the extent of mutual trust. Economic imbalance: China has become a dominant economic partner for Russia, but many Russians are concerned about China's increasing influence and the lack of substantial Chinese investment in Russia. Military relations: Unlike the strong military alignment seen in the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950, today's cooperation is not as deeply integrated, particularly in military terms. China has not provided direct military aid to Russia in the Ukraine conflict, which would have been expected in a deeply allied relationship. Public sentiment: There is skepticism about the partnership in both Russia and China. Russian citizens are not entirely supportive of Chinese products or investments, and many Chinese question the long-term economic and military viability of Russia. Historical context Sino-Soviet Alliance (1950s): This period marked a high point of cooperation, with the Soviet Union providing substantial economic, technological and military support to China. Yet, the alliance ended with the Sino-Soviet split by the late 1950s. This contradicts Lavrov's characterization that current relations are unprecedented in their depth. Strategic Partnership (1996-2014): The strategic partnership strengthened after the Cold War, especially under Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin. However, China still balanced its relations with the West, highlighting that the partnership was pragmatic, not based purely on mutual trust. Anti-Western Alignment (2014-2025): The relations have become closer since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Ukraine invasion. China has been providing crucial economic support. Beijing, however, avoids direct military aid to evade Western sanctions and maintains neutrality. This signals that the cooperation is based on shared opposition to the West, not genuine trust or an alliance akin to that of the 1950s. Current economic dependence Moscow is now heavily dependent on Beijing: China has become Russia's largest trading partner, and Russia plays a key role in supplying China with oil and gas. The economic relationship has its imbalances, however. China's total investments in Russia remain relatively low compared with its global investments. China still prioritizes its global economic ties, while Russia has become increasingly dependent on Beijing. Vedomosti, Russia's leading business daily, reported that China rarely invests directly in Russia, noting that while Russia seeks high-tech investments, China prioritizes mining, real estate, and banking. Since 2023, China has been Russia's largest trading partner, whereas Russia ranks only sixth among China's top trade partners. Skepticism in both countries Russians question Chinese investment and the long-term benefits, while many Chinese doubt Russia's economic resilience and military strength. In February 2025, FilterLabs released the results of research that used its Talisman data tool to analyze Chinese and Russian news and social media. Talisman's analysis reveals deep skepticism about Russia among Chinese social media users, many of whom question whether Russia's economy is truly as resilient as Moscow claims, whether its military strength matches its rhetoric, and what its long-term intentions are. These doubts suggest that despite official narratives of strong ties, public confidence in Russia within China is far from unanimous. The research also shows that online sentiments in Russia toward economic cooperation with China are more negative than official narratives suggest. International sanctions have pushed many Western products out of Russia, allowing Chinese goods to fill the gap in sectors such as automobiles and technology. While their market share grows due to affordability and geopolitical shifts, many Russians remain skeptical and dissatisfied with Chinese products, FilterLabs reported. In both countries, social media discussions are consistently less positive than mainstream press coverage, which itself was not uniformly supportive, revealing underlying skepticism about the partnership. "Their partnership is vulnerable," FilterLabs founder Jonathan Teubner told VOA. Conclusion While Lavrov's statement reflects an official narrative of a strong and enduring partnership, the truth is more nuanced. Relations are indeed closer than at any point since the 1950s, but they are shaped more by pragmatism, economic necessity and shared opposition to Western influence than by deep trust or historical affinity. In both countries, public opinion reveals skepticism, and the economic and military cooperation, while growing, is not without concerns.
Voice of America
14-03-2025
- Voice of America
Exclusive: Second Iranian ship suspected of carrying missile ingredient leaves China
A second Iranian ship that Western news reports have named as part of a scheme to import a missile propellant ingredient from China is heading to Iran with a major cargo load, an exclusive VOA analysis has found. Ship-tracking websites show the Iranian-flagged cargo ship Jairan departed China on Monday, a month later than the expected departure cited by one of the news reports. The Jairan was named in January and February articles by The Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal and CNN as one of two Iranian cargo ships Tehran is using to import 1,000 metric tons of sodium perchlorate from China. The three news outlets cited unnamed Western intelligence sources as saying the purported shipment could be transformed into enough ammonium perchlorate — a key solid fuel propellant component — to produce 260 midrange Iranian missiles. The other Iranian cargo ship named in the news reports, the Golbon, completed a 19-day journey from eastern China to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on Feb. 13. During the trip, it made a two-day stop at southern China's Zhuhai Gaolan port and delivered an unknown cargo to Iran, according to ship-tracking website MarineTraffic. Both the Golbon and the Jairan are sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department as vessels operated by the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, which itself is sanctioned for being what the State Department has called "the preferred shipping line for Iranian proliferators and procurement agents." As the Golbon sailed from China to Iran in late January and early February, the Jairan's automatic identification system transponder — a device that transmits positional and other data as part of an internationally mandated tracking system — reported the vessel as being docked at eastern China's Liuheng Island. In a joint review of the Jairan's AIS data on MarineTraffic and fellow ship-tracking website Seasearcher, VOA and Dubai-based intelligence analyst Martin Kelly of EOS Risk Group determined that the Jairan reported no significant draught change while docked at Liuheng Island through February and into early March. That meant the Iranian vessel was sitting at the almost same depth in the water as when it arrived in eastern China late last year, indicating it had not been loaded with any major cargo since then. The Jairan remained at Liuheng Island until March 3, when it headed south toward Zhuhai Gaolan and docked at the port on March 8. Two days later, the Jairan departed, reporting its destination as Bandar Abbas with an expected arrival of March 26. The Iranian ship also reported a significant draught change upon leaving Zhuhai Gaolan, transmitting data showing it was sitting more than 2 meters deeper in the water and indicating it had taken on a major cargo at the port, Kelly told VOA. As of Friday, local time, the Jairan was in the waters of Indonesia's Riau Archipelago, heading southwest toward the Singapore Strait. The U.S. State Department had no comment on the Jairan's departure from China when contacted by VOA. Iran's U.N. mission in New York did not respond to a similar VOA request for comment, emailed on Tuesday. Last month, the State Department told VOA it was aware of the January news reports by The Financial Times and Wall Street Journal regarding Iran's purported use of the Golbon and Jairan to import sodium perchlorate from China. A spokesperson said the State Department does not comment on intelligence matters but "remains focused on preventing the proliferation of items, equipment, and technology that could benefit Iran's missile or other weapons programs and continues to hold Iran accountable through sanctions." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the news reports in a Jan. 23 press briefing, asserting that China abides by its own export controls and international obligations and rejects other countries' imposition of what Beijing considers illegal unilateral sanctions. In the past month, Chinese state media have made no reference to the Jairan, while China's social media platforms also have had no observable discussion about the Iranian ship, according to a review by VOA's Mandarin Service. In its Jan. 22 report, The Financial Times cited "security officials in two Western countries" as saying the Jairan would depart China in early February, but it did not leave until March 10. Gregory Brew, a senior Iran analyst at the Eurasia Group, a New York-based political risk consultancy, said Iran may also have wanted to see if the Golbon could complete its voyage from China without being interdicted before sending the Jairan to follow it. "Ships carrying highly sensitive materials related to Iran's missile industry, which is under U.S. sanctions, are at risk of interception, and the Iranians likely are conscious of that," Brew said. Eight Republican U.S. senators led by Jim Risch and Pete Ricketts sent a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio about the purported Iran-China chemical scheme dated Feb. 4, urging him to work with global partners of the U.S. "to intercept and stop the shipments currently underway" if the press reports proved accurate. There was no sign of the Golbon being intercepted on its recent China to Iran voyage. Responding to VOA's query about the letter, a U.S. State Department press officer said: "We do not comment on Congressional correspondence." Ricketts' office also did not respond to a VOA inquiry about whether Rubio has responded to the senators' letter. VOA's Mandarin Service contributed to this report.
Voice of America
13-03-2025
- Voice of America
Can the US pry Russia away from China?
Western politicians have repeatedly called on China to limit or cease tacit support for Russia's bloody war against Ukraine. In response, China's leadership insists it is committed to peace and respect for the territorial integrity of other nations. But unlike most United Nations member states, China has never condemned Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and their military-diplomatic partnership — from joint bomber flights near the U.S. state of Alaska to votes in the U.N. Security Council — has only helped the Kremlin overcome its international isolation. While President Donald Trump has said he has good personal relations with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, there is a consensus among experts in Washington that the China-Russia partnership poses a threat to U.S. interests, and that while Trump's predecessor, Joe Biden, tried to establish a strategic dialogue with China, the Trump team appears to be prioritizing normalized ties with Russia while punishing China over trade. As the White House talks about the possibility of restoring economic cooperation with Russia, some of its officials are hinting at lifting or reducing the sanctions Washington has imposed on Moscow in recent years. Charles Hecker, an expert on Western-Russian economic ties and risks, and author of the book Zero Sum: The Arc of International Business in Russia, says some Western companies will quickly return to Russia if sanctions are lifted, particularly those involved in energy, metals and minerals. 'There's only so much oil in Norway, and there's only so much oil in Canada; the rest of it is in some countries that have a very high-risk environment,' Hecker told VOA's Russian Service. 'And so, these kinds of companies are accustomed to business in these sorts of places, and they have the internal structures to help protect them. You know, there are energy companies doing business in Iraq right now. And I don't want to compare Russia and Iraq, but they are high-risk environments.' Still, Hecker cautions, their return to doing business in Russia wouldn't signal an overall U.S.-Russian rapprochement — let alone a fracturing of Sino-Russian relations. 'I think it will be very difficult for the West to pull Russia away from China,' he said. 'Allowing Western companies back into Russia doesn't necessarily change President Putin's hostility towards the West. President Putin remains antagonistic towards a Western-dominated political and economic system, and he has said over and over again that he wants to create an alternative political and economic environment – an alternative to the West. 'Part of that alternative includes China,' he added. 'You have never heard President Putin say anything ideologically against China. And the two are now important energy partners.' Limited popular domestic appeal U.S.-based FilterLabs analyzes public sentiment in regions where polling is problematic. According to a recently published assessment of popular attitudes expressed on Russian and Chinese social media networks, Sino-Russian relations are 'full of underlying tensions, mistrust, and diverging interests.' One of the report's authors, Vasily Gatov, told VOA its research found that 'the Chinese and Russian populations are far from happy with this alliance of their authorities.' "China does not perceive Russia as a reliable, safe and equal partner,' he said. 'Russia annexed the Amur Region from China; Russia adopted a completely colonial policy towards China during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Therefore, in my opinion, it is entirely possible to consider historical frictions as a vulnerability.' A media analyst at the University of Southern California's Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Gatov also noted that, despite the Kremlin's expectations, China's economic presence inside Russia today remains 'several times smaller' than that of either Europe or the U.S. before Russia invaded Ukraine. Thus, while Russian and China have overlapping interests, they are not 'marching in lockstep.' "They are very different, they have very different geopolitical focuses, very different political philosophies,' he said. Other experts, however, question the Filterlabs findings, warning that random Russian and Chinese opinions online are of limited value, especially as those casting the insights aren't likely to influence policy. "People who have the time and desire to comment on things on social media do not have much influence on how state policy is conducted,' Alexander Gabuev, director of the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told VOA. 'And these people certainly do not have much influence on whether China transfers components for Russia's weapons or takes certain military technologies from it, since the people who comment on this simply do not have real knowledge of what is actually happening.' Gabuev added that 'the Chinese leadership has reasons to think that they have something to take from Russia in terms of military technology,' suggesting that China is extremely interested in gaining Russian experience in countering Western weapons during Russia's war in Ukraine. Does Trump see China as a threat? One critical question about whether Washington's improved ties with Russia will loosen the Sino-Russian pact, say some analysts, is how Trump perceives China. Ali Wyne, senior research and advocacy advisor on the U.S. and China at the International Crisis Group, describes Trump as an anomaly for U.S. policy. 'Widespread bipartisan agreement in Congress and from one administration to the next [is] that China is American's foremost strategic competitor,' he said. But 'President Trump, in many ways, is the most prominent dissenter from this alleged China consensus.' 'He doesn't view President Xi [Jinping] in adversarial terms,' Wyne said. 'He actually calls President Xi a 'dear friend' of his. And he believes that his personal rapport with President Xi will be the decisive dynamic in setting — or resetting — the U.S.-China relationship over the next four years.'
