Pope warns of AI risks to young brains
Since his election as head of the Catholic Church on May 8, the pope — a mathematics graduate — has repeatedly warned of the risks associated with AI but this is the first time he has spoken out exclusively on the subject.
"All of us... are concerned for children and young people, and the possible consequences of the use of AI on their intellectual and neurological development," the American pope warned in a written message to participants at the second Rome Conference on AI.
"No generation has ever had such quick access to the amount of information now available through AI.
"But again, access to data — however extensive — must not be confused with intelligence," Leo told business leaders, policymakers and researchers attending the annual conference. AFP
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Europe and China, public money on new rails Europe is preparing a digital euro, China has piloted the e CNY for years. These are retail CBDCs, digital legal tender issued by a central bank, designed to work like cash in your phone, with strong privacy controls and offline features. Different governance, same purpose, fast settlement, clear rules, programmable money for a networked economy. Bitcoin's role, digital gold for the digital rails Bitcoin has fortified its place as digital gold. It plays for the digital financial system the role gold has long played for the traditional one, a neutral, scarce, non sovereign store of value. This does not replace gold, it complements it. With each halving, new issuance slows, and over the next cycles supply becomes even more scarce. In a world where money moves on programmable rails, a widely held reserve asset that sits outside any single government's control provides a familiar anchor. 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Last month, the White House released America's AI Action Plan, a document that frames AI development as a high-stakes race in which 'whoever has the largest AI ecosystem will set global AI standards and reap broad economic and military benefits.' The language is blunt: the US must 'achieve and maintain unquestioned and unchallenged global technological dominance.' This is not simply about innovation; it is about securing and entrenching American power. To that end, the American plan rests on three pillars: accelerating AI innovation, building American AI infrastructure and leading in international AI diplomacy and security, with the last pillar designed explicitly to 'counter Chinese influence in international governance bodies.' The plan promotes an 'AI alliance' composed of the US and select partners, to which Washington will export its full AI technology stack: hardware, models, software, applications and standards. Crucially, this comes with a defensive edge: stringent export controls to prevent 'foreign adversaries' from accessing advanced computing, enhanced location-verification of chips and coordinated global enforcement to keep high-end AI resources out of the hands of rivals. In other words, Washington's AI diplomacy is about building a gated community, one in which entry is granted on US terms. The US openly links this to national security, implying that AI superiority must be preserved not as a shared global asset but as a strategic advantage for America and its allies. Beijing, by contrast, has spent the past two years articulating a vision for AI governance that is overtly multilateral and inclusive, with an emphasis on participation from the Global South. Premier Li Qiang, speaking at the 2025 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) held in Shanghai from July 26 to 28, called AI 'an international public good that benefits humanity.' He stressed that 'only by working together can we fully realise the potential of AI while ensuring its safe, reliable, controllable, and equitable development.' Li underscored the urgency of creating a truly global framework for governance, stating, 'there is an urgent need to foster further consensus on how to strike a balance between development and security.' He warned that without broad cooperation, AI risks becoming 'an exclusive game for a few countries and companies.' China's Action Plan on Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence frames AI as a tool for 'serving the people, respecting sovereignty, fairness and inclusiveness, and open cooperation.' The plan advocates reducing technical barriers, promoting technology transfer, and developing open-source communities to foster a diverse and accessible innovation ecosystem. It goes further by explicitly committing to support 'countries, especially those in the Global South' in building their AI capabilities in line with their own national conditions. The most concrete manifestation of this philosophy is China's proposal for a global AI cooperation organisation. The body would aim to align governance rules, technical standards, and development strategies, while respecting policy differences between nations. Beijing presents this not as an ideological bloc but as a pragmatic platform: a means for countries to undertake joint technical research, share open-source technologies, and strengthen their own AI innovation ecosystems. As Li explained, 'China is willing to share its AI development experience and technological products to help countries around the world — especially those in the Global South — to strengthen their capacity building.' He further proposed 'greater cooperation on innovation to achieve more groundbreaking results,' pledging that China 'will be more open in sharing open-source technology and products.' The Global South is central to this vision. Chinese officials position the cooperation body as a way to bridge the 'digital and intelligence divide,' ensuring developing nations benefit equally from AI's economic and social potential. For countries outside the US orbit, many already drawn into China's Belt and Road networks, this is an attractive proposition: access to AI technologies, capacity-building support and a seat at the governance table without having to choose sides in a zero-sum competition. This is not to say China's approach is entirely altruistic. Extending AI cooperation deepens Beijing's global influence, especially in regions where Western technology and capital have been limited or conditional. By positioning itself as the champion of multilateralism, China counters the US narrative that it should be isolated from key technological flows. In effect, China's inclusive rhetoric also functions as strategic outreach to counter Washington's exclusionary alliance-building. Still, the differences in tone and substance between the two plans are striking. The US blueprint treats AI as a high ground to be seized and defended. The Chinese plan treats it as a commons to be cultivated. These divergent philosophies carry profound implications for the structure of the emerging AI order. If Washington's approach prevails, the world could see the consolidation of closed technology blocs: one led by the US and populated by its security partners, another orbiting around China and those willing to defy American export controls. Innovation might accelerate within each bloc, but the gaps between them — in capabilities, standards, and access — would widen. The very idea of global governance would fragment into parallel systems, mirroring Cold War-era divides. If Beijing's approach gains traction, there could be greater cross-border sharing of AI resources, especially between advanced economies and the developing world. This could help narrow the AI divide and create more interoperable global standards, though it would also require trust in China's commitment to openness and in its own governance norms. Given that China's domestic AI environment is subject to extensive state oversight and censorship, some countries may remain cautious about whether its version of 'openness' aligns with their values. For the Global South, the stakes are especially high. Under the US plan, access to cutting-edge AI may be contingent on political alignment, limiting the ability of non-aligned nations to leverage AI for their own development. Under the Chinese plan, access might be easier, but the terms could be shaped by Beijing's strategic priorities and its own vision for digital sovereignty. The choice facing much of the world, then, is not simply between 'free' and 'restricted' AI, but between different models of technological interdependence: one based on selective exclusivity, the other on conditional inclusivity. Both are political, both are strategic and both will shape how AI transforms the global economy.
