Russia in major Ukraine advance ahead of Trump-Putin meet in Alaska
According to an AFP analysis of battlefield data from the US-based Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces have made their biggest 24-hour advance into Ukraine in more than a year.
And, as battle raged, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders met to hold urgent online talks with Trump, hoping to convince him to respect Kyiv's interests during Friday's looming summit with Putin.
Zelensky flew to Berlin and met Chancellor Friedrich Merz on Wednesday before both were to be joined online by French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and other European leaders as well as the heads of the EU and NATO.
They were then all set to hold a second call with Trump and Vice President JD Vance -- an effort Russia's foreign ministry branded "politically and practically insignificant" and an attempt at "sabotaging" US and Russian efforts to end the conflict.
Zelensky has not been invited to the Alaska meeting, fuelling fears Kyiv could be forced into painful concessions.
The Ukrainian president said on social media Tuesday that "we see that the Russian army is not preparing to end the war. On the contrary, they are making movements that indicate preparations for new offensive operations."
With the world's eyes on the Alaska summit, Russia has made rapid advances this week in a narrow but important section of the front line in Ukraine's east.
An AFP analysis of data from Institute for the Study of War showed that the Russian army took or claimed 110 square kilometres on August 12 compared to the previous day. It was the most since late May 2024.
In recent months, Moscow has typically taken five or six days to progress at such a pace, although Russian advances have accelerated in recent weeks.
'Fair peace'
Zelensky acknowledged Tuesday that Russian troops had advanced by up to 10 kilometres (six miles) near the eastern coal mining town of Dobropillia, but said that Kyiv would soon "destroy them."
Russia -- which currently has full or partial control over 19 percent of Ukrainian territory -- said Wednesday that it had taken two villages close to Dobropillia.
The Russian military fired at least 49 drones and two ballistic missiles at Ukraine during the night, the Ukrainian air force said Wednesday.
At least three people were killed in Russian artillery and drone attacks on the southern Kherson region, regional officials said.
In the Donetsk region, authorities announced they had evacuated 1,200 people including 42 children from front line areas since Tuesday.
Ahead of his arrival in Berlin, Zelensky, whose team has spoken with more than 30 international allies in a few days, said "pressure must be exerted on Russia for the sake of a fair peace".
"We must learn from the experience of Ukraine and our partners to prevent deception on the part of Russia. There are currently no signs that the Russians are preparing to end the war," he said in a social media statement.
'Listening exercise'
German government spokesman Steffen Meyer said the main aim of Wednesday's talks was to ensure that "Ukraine must be able to determine its own destiny and take control of its own future".
"No decisions should be made over the heads of the Ukrainian people," he said.
The fact that Zelensky had travelled to Berlin also showed that "Putin's attempts to drive a wedge between Europe and Ukraine, which we have seen time and again, have not been successful", he said.
Trump on Monday played down the possibility of a breakthrough in Alaska but said he expected "constructive conversations" with Putin.
"This is really a feel-out meeting a little bit," Trump said. But he added that eventually "there'll be some swapping, there'll be some changes in land".
Trump's spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt said Tuesday that the aim was "for the president to walk away with a better understanding of how we can end this war".
"I think this is a listening exercise for the president."
Zelensky meanwhile has called the Alaska encounter a "personal victory" for Putin.
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The development of parallel financial systems requires significant resources and may limit transaction volumes compared to established networks. Russia's GDP is projected to remain relatively stable at $1.6 trillion by the end of 2025, but defense and security spending now accounts for a substantial portion of government expenditure, constraining other economic priorities. Future Forecast and Sustainability Analysis Short-term Outlook (2025-2027) The current pattern of China-BRICS assistance to Russia is likely to continue in the short term, though with some modifications. China's recent trade volume decline may represent a 'new normal' of more cautious but sustained engagement. BRICS expansion will provide Russia with additional partnership opportunities, though these may develop gradually as new members establish operational frameworks. The sustainability of current assistance levels depends heavily on three factors: the evolution of secondary sanctions enforcement by Western countries, China's assessment of costs versus benefits in supporting Russia, and the broader geopolitical climate including potential changes in the Ukraine conflict. Medium-term Trajectory (2027-2030) Medium-term sustainability faces greater uncertainties. Russia's partnerships provide current stability but may prove insufficient for long-term growth and technological advancement. The country risks falling further behind in technological innovation, potentially making it a less valuable partner for countries like China that prioritize technological leadership. However, if current partnerships deepen and institutionalize through formal agreements, alternative payment systems, and joint development projects, Russia could establish a more permanent alternative economic framework. The success of BRICS initiatives for alternative financial systems and de-dollarization efforts will significantly influence this trajectory. Long-term Implications (2030 and Beyond) Long-term sustainability depends on fundamental questions about global economic architecture. If BRICS countries successfully create alternative international institutions and payment systems, Russia could maintain economic functionality indefinitely outside Western-dominated frameworks. However, if technological gaps widen and partnership countries prioritize relationships with Western economies, Russia's position could become increasingly precarious. The demographic challenges facing Russia pose particular long-term concerns that external partnerships cannot easily address. Economic partnerships can provide trade opportunities and financial assistance, but they cannot resolve fundamental domestic constraints on growth and development. Conclusion Russia's economic resilience despite unprecedented Western sanctions demonstrates the effectiveness of strategic partnerships with China, BRICS nations, and other sympathetic countries. These relationships have provided crucial assistance through increased trade volumes, sanctions circumvention mechanisms, alternative financial frameworks, and technology transfers. China's role as Russia's primary economic partner has been particularly vital, though recent trade volume fluctuations suggest this relationship may be entering a more cautious phase. The expansion of BRICS and the development of alternative economic institutions provide Russia with growing opportunities to maintain economic functionality outside Western-dominated systems. Countries like India, Iran, and various Middle Eastern partners have contributed to Russia's sanctions resilience through continued trade relationships and specialized expertise in operating under international restrictions. However, this resilience faces significant challenges. Technology gaps, demographic pressures, and financial system limitations create vulnerabilities that external partnerships cannot fully address. The sustainability of current assistance patterns depends on evolving geopolitical circumstances, secondary sanctions enforcement, and the long-term strategic calculations of partner countries. The forecast suggests continued but potentially modified support in the short term, with medium and long-term sustainability depending on the success of alternative international institutions and Russia's ability to address domestic economic constraints. While Russia has demonstrated remarkable adaptability, the ultimate test of its economic resilience will be whether current partnership arrangements can support not just survival, but sustainable growth and technological advancement in an increasingly complex global environment. The Russian case illustrates both the possibilities and limitations of alternative economic partnerships in challenging established international systems. As this economic experiment continues, its outcomes will have profound implications for global trade patterns, international institutions, and the future architecture of the world economy.
