La French Tech India Summit 2025 Drives Indo-French AI Partnership with 250+ Leaders as India-France Year of Innovation 2026 Approaches
French Tech Board
The summit focused on aligning efforts in inclusive AI innovation, public interest-driven technology, and international cooperation. It opened with a video message from Ms.Clara Chappaz,France's Minister of State for Digital Affairs, followed by remarks from Mr.Marc Lamy, Consul General of France in Bengaluru and Ajay Krishnan, Vice President, Karnataka Digital Economy Mission (KDEM). Together, they set the tone for a day of open and constructive dialogue on how AI can be shaped to serve broader societal goals.
The summit served as a pivotal platform to showcase how France's strengths in deeptech, cutting-edge research, and ethical regulation can complement India's scale, digital public infrastructure, and world-class talent, shaping a new global model for AI.
Mr. Sharad Sharma, Co-founder of iSPIRT, delivered the keynote address and called for India and France to lead a model of AI development that balances technological advancement with local and global responsibilities. This was followed by a panel discussion with leaders including Dr. Gaurav Aggarwal of Jio Reliance, Mr.Partha Rao Co-founder & CEO, Prints.AI, Mr. Amit Pingle of Michelin Innovation Lab, and Mr. Umakant Soni of AI Foundry moderated by Ms. Madhusha Mishra of Link. They shared perspectives on how both countries can collaborate on scalable AI applications that serve real-world needs.
The second half of the summit turned to the ethical challenges surrounding AI. Mr. Hari Subramanian, Fellow at NitiAI and iSPIRT, presented guiding principles for public trust in emerging technologies, followed by a keynote from Ms. Mehak Kasbekar of Brut India on media's responsibility in shaping technology narratives. A panel moderated by Mr. Rajesh Desai of Lyra India brought together Mr. Olivier Flous of Thales, Ms. Astha Kapoor of Aapti Institute, Mr. Shiv Kumar DVS of OVH, and Mr. Sachin Kumar, VP of AI Solutions, QpiAi, who discussed frameworks for building AI systems that respect human values and protect societal interests.
Souad and Charlotte
Souad Tenfiche, CEO of Link Innovations and Co-Chair of La French Tech India, said, 'AI will define the future. The real question is: who defines AI France and India are stepping forward together to offer a new answer, one not based on surveillance or monopoly, but on openness, trust, and the common good. This summit builds on our joint declaration to develop AI that respects human rights, protects fundamental freedoms, and addresses global priorities. For French companies aiming to build impactful, scalable AI solutions, India is more than a market, it's a strategic growth partner.'
Charlotte de Beauregard, Director at Capgemini and Co-Chair of La French Tech India, said, 'Technology leadership today is not just about creating new solutions, but about guiding their use responsibly. What we saw at this summit was a clear and shared vision from India and France to build AI systems that reflect shared values and practical needs. With La French Tech, our aim is to help build bridges between the French and Indian tech ecosystems, so this vision translates into joined projects that enable people, support businesses, and help AI evolve in a way that benefits society.'
The summit concluded with a renewed commitment to deepening India-France cooperation in technology and innovation. With AI shaping the next phase of digital transformation globally, the La French Tech India AI Summit underscored the urgency of developing shared frameworks that are both practical and people-first. The partnerships and exchanges initiated at this platform are expected to continue shaping bilateral projects and policy dialogues in the months to come.
France currently ranks third in the world for AI research and training, with over 1,000 AI startups and global leaders such as Mistral AI, Hugging Face, and Dataiku anchoring their European operations there. This summit further positions India and France as architects of a third, credible model of AI that promotes openness, ethics, and scalability.
About La French Tech India
La French Tech India is the official French Tech community in India, established in 2019 to bridge the French and Indian startup ecosystems. Connecting over 600 members, including startups, investors, and tech professionals, through events, advocacy, and cross-border collaboration, it is part of the La French Tech International Communities, volunteer-led groups of French or Francophile entrepreneurs based around the world. As integral members of the French Tech network, these communities promote Frances innovation ecosystem globally, support the international expansion of French startups, and foster connections between local and French tech stakeholders. In close collaboration with the French embassy, the consulates, and institutional partners, La French Tech India organizes high-impact events like the French Tech India AI Summit, catalyzing partnerships in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
&w=3840&q=100)
Business Standard
8 minutes ago
- Business Standard
Vedanta shares rise 2% as board set to consider second interim dividend
Shares of Vedanta rose over 2 per cent on Tuesday after it announced that its board will meet to consider and approve an interim dividend for the financial year 2025-26 (FY26). The Anil Agarwal-owned company's stock rose as much as 2.57 per cent to ₹449.5 per share. However, the stock pared gains to trade 2 per cent higher, compared to a 0.27 per cent advance in the benchmark Nifty50 as of 11:31 AM. Shares of the company trade at the highest level since July 25 and have risen 1 per cent so far this year, compared to a 5.3 per cent gain in Nifty50. The company has a market capitalisation of ₹1.75 trillion as per BSE data. Track LIVE Stock Market Updates Here Vedanta to consider interim dividend Vedanta has said its Board of Directors will meet on Thursday, August 21, 2025, to consider and approve the second interim dividend on equity shares for FY26, if any. The company has fixed Wednesday, August 27, 2025, as the record date to determine the entitlement of shareholders for the proposed dividend, as per an exchange filing. Vedanta Q1 results The mining major reported an 11.7 per cent drop in its consolidated net profit to ₹3,185 crore for the June quarter (Q1) of FY26. During the same period last year, the company had reported a net profit of ₹3,606 crore. On a quarterly basis, consolidated net profit fell 8.5 per cent from ₹3,483 crore in Q4 FY25. Consolidated revenue from operations, however, grew by 6.2 per cent to ₹37,434 crore year-on-year (Y-o-Y) from ₹35,239 crore. Quarter-on-quarter (Q-o-Q) revenue fell 6 per cent from ₹39,789 crore, due to weaker pricing and lower volumes, the company said in its exchange filing on Thursday. Viceroy Research calls Vedanta a 'financial zombie' The New York-based investigative financial research Viceroy Research alleged and shorted of debt stack of Vedanta Resources last month. The short-seller alleged that the parent of India-listed Vedanta Ltd. "poses a severe, under-appreciated risk to creditors," and "resembles a Ponzi scheme". The 87-page report, which was released on Wednesday, said its investigation has uncovered material quantitative and qualitative discrepancies in the Vedanta group companies' operations. Bait and switch funding model, inflated asset values, capex fraud and governance failure are some of the discrepancies that the short-seller alleges. Vedanta Group, however, dismissed the "baseless" report, saying it's a malicious combination of selective misinformation.
The Print
22 minutes ago
- The Print
Amid Trump's tariff bombs, India's business with America surged while imports from Russia dipped 10%
On the other hand, India-Russia trade, which has increasingly come under fire by the Trump administration, has decreased, from $24.03 billion in April-July last year to $21.61 billion in the same quarter this year. Crude oil and petroleum products are Russia's key exports to India, with exports to India amounting to $56 billion last year. Notwithstanding a baseline tariff of 10 percent imposed on Indian goods by Trump in April this year, India's April-July exports to the US grew by 21 percent this year from last year, according to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's provisional data, published last week. New Delhi: India's April-July imports from Russia this year fell by nearly 10 percent compared to the same period last year, whereas its April-July imports from the US this year grew by roughly 12 percent amid the redrawing of global trading rules by United States President Donald Trump. The provisional data does not indicate the country-wise import basket for this year. A look at the data from last year, however, reveals that roughly 89 percent of all Russian imports—worth $21.61 billion—in the April-July 2024 quarter were in mineral fuels and crude oil. Russia was not always India's largest supplier of crude oil. The G7 imposed a price cap on the sale of Russian crude oil in 2022. The move brought the cost of a barrel of Russian crude oil down to $60, which other countries found attractive and cheap. India has maintained that it will continue to decide on its energy purchases, keeping the larger national interests in view. The Trump administration, in the past week, targeted India over its oil purchases from Russia. As a 'penalty', the US President, on 6 August, imposed an additional 25 percent levy on Indian exports to the US. The total tariff that India will pay for its imports to the US by the end of August is likely to exceed 50 per cent in some sectors. Officials in the US, including the President, have accused India of funding Moscow's war machine in Ukraine through the continued purchase of crude oil from Russia. The war between Russia and Ukraine is now inching towards its fourth year, and has come into focus for Trump. India rejected the US assertion and emphasised that Washington, DC, and the European Union (EU) continue trade, including in the critical sectors, with Russia. China and Türkiye are other countries maintaining strong trade ties with Moscow, but the US did not impose additional tariffs on them. Trump promised to end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours of assuming power on his election campaign trail last year, but a ceasefire deal has also not materialised so far. A partial ceasefire that President Vladimir Putin of Russia and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine verbally agreed upon on individual calls with Trump also turned out to be a dead end. Trump met with Putin 15 August in Alaska—the first meeting between the American leader and the Russian President in four years. Zelenskyy, along with several European officials, will travel to the US for a meeting with Trump Monday, when the two will focus on Putin's demands for a peace deal with Ukraine. The Trump administration is pushing India to increase purchases of crude oil from the US. Last year, India purchased roughly $12 billion worth of crude oil from the US. Trump is additionally frustrated with the stalled mini-trade negotiations with New Delhi, as well as India's unwillingness to open its sensitive sectors, agriculture and dairy, to American exports. India is willing to make certain concessions in the agricultural and dairy sectors. However, it started negotiations with reduced tariff rates across different sectors, its very aim. The US could sign deals with Vietnam and organisations such as the European Union, eliminating tariffs for the export of American industrial goods to their markets. The next round of trade negotiations between India and the US, expected later this month in New Delhi, is likely to be rescheduled for a later date. Also Read: No deal on Ukraine, Trump hints at softening stance on Russian oil buyers after Putin meet in Alaska India's high exports to the US India's April-July exports to America increased by 21.64 percent this year from last year. In 2024, India exported goods worth $27.5 billion to the US between April and July, with its exports in the same quarter this year increasing to $33.53 billion. The US is the largest market for Indian exports. In the 2024-2025 financial year, India exported roughly $86 billion worth of goods to the US, according to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Its second-largest market, the United Arab Emirates, received $36.6 billion worth of Indian goods for the period. Key Indian exports to the US are smartphones, gems and jewellery, and pharmaceuticals. Its electronic exports to the US stood at roughly $15 billion last year, according to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. With the initial tariff of 25 percent already in effect, the additional levy—another 25 per cent—on India for its Russian oil purchases will likely take effect from the end of August. In India, the tariffs will impact several sectors, including gems and jewellery, as well as textiles and apparel. In the past financial year, gems and jewellery exports were worth $9.9 billion, whereas textiles were $6 billion. These are particular sectors that face American tariffs. Indian exports in the April-July quarter this year increased by three percent from those in the same quarter last year, reaching $149.2 billion. (Edited by Madhurita Goswami) Also Read: 'Dialogue & diplomacy' only way forward, says MEA as it welcomes Trump-Putin's Alaska summit
The Print
22 minutes ago
- The Print
Indian foreign policy is in free fall. Can we balance national pride with new power reality?
Unless dramatic reversals take place, the core of India's foreign policy stands on the verge of collapse. To understand this, let us remind ourselves what the primary goals of Indian foreign policy have been, especially over the last two-and-a-half decades. Four such goals can be easily identified. India cultivated greater closeness with the US; it wanted to avoid a return of equivalence with Pakistan; it sought parity with China; and it wished to maintain cordial relations with Russia. All major foreign policies can be conceptualised as having a core, a semi-periphery and a periphery. This tripartite division is not geographical, but one based on different layers of significance. The core of India's foreign policy, at least since 2000, has focused on the US, Pakistan, China, and Russia. The semi-periphery includes relations with the UK, France, and Germany in Europe; Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran in the Middle East; India's neighborhood beyond Pakistan and China; and Canada, Brazil, Australia, Japan, and Singapore. For reasons of space, the periphery need not detain us here. Unless US President Donald Trump's tariff threats are primarily a negotiating ploy, India's foreign policy has run into a virtual abyss. It faces its greatest crisis since 1998, when India conducted nuclear tests and was subjected to international isolation. The big difference is that the 1998 tests added to India's overall power, which stands significantly diminished at the present moment. If the Indian economy had grown at an average of 8-9 per cent per annum over the last decade, instead of 6-6.5 per cent, and had India invested heavily in military modernisation, the country's power in the international system would have been greater. Now, a significant restructuring of policy priorities under pressure might have to be undertaken. Cordiality with Russia remains undiminished, though it is under significant threat. A large part of Trump's tariff penalty is aimed at undermining India's reliance on oil imports from Russia. Even if the threats lead to a diversion to some other sources of oil, such as Saudi Arabia, India's dependence on Russia for arms and weapons will not decline rapidly, keeping India-Russia warmth substantially intact. Invulnerable to rapid erosion, India's defence relationship with Russia is long–lasting. The other three core elements – concerning the US, Pakistan, and China — are nearly in a free fall. Shadows of an earlier era Trump has dealt two crushing blows. First, by threatening to impose a 50 per cent tariff on India's exports to the US, leaving only electronics such as smartphones and pharmaceuticals out, he has essentially declared a trade embargo on Indian goods (though not on services). The US accounts for nearly a fifth of India's total exports. It will take time for India to find alternative markets. Clothing from Tiruppur, polished diamonds from Surat, shrimp from Andhra Pradesh, machinery from Noida and Chennai, and auto parts from western and southern India run the risk of incurring losses adding up to tens of billions of dollars, at least in the short run. The second Trumpian blow is channeled through Pakistan. At least since 1999, if not earlier, the US has consistently downgraded its relationship with Pakistan, placing India on a higher pedestal. This was a reversal of the Cold War pattern of Pakistan first and India later. Presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, Biden, and even Trump in his first term sought friendship with India. A bipartisan consensus greeted India's policy makers in Washington, as both Democrats and Republicans embraced India. The recent India-Pakistan military conflict appears to have brought about a qualitative transformation, showing deepening shadows of an earlier era. Nothing symbolises the change more than Trump's invitation to Pakistan Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir for a luncheon meeting in the White House. Military chiefs of foreign countries are not invited to the White House unless they are also the head of state, as General Pervez Musharraf was. Agreements with Pakistan on cryptocurrency and exploration of potential oil reserves (which could well be a stand-in for mining rare earths in Balochistan) have also been struck. Of course, an old-style military alliance is missing, but one should note that the outgoing chief of the US Central Command, General Michael Kurilla, said that Pakistan was a US ally in the fight against terrorism, a surreal statement from Indian perspective and a dramatic change from the days that led to the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden who was living less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad. A potential role for Pakistan in Iran may also be under consideration. In other words, this turn might have an autonomous strategic and economic logic. But it was almost certainly aggravated by India not recognising the US' role in bringing about a ceasefire during the military conflict with Pakistan. India's diplomacy could not muster up an appropriate response to Trump's well-known penchant for credit-seeking. What words to use to appease egos, when policy becomes highly personalised, is always a diplomatic challenge. India's decision-makers could not craft a formulation that simultaneously satisfied India's sense of self-respect and the dictates of realpolitik or realism. Let us now turn to China, the last core element of India's foreign policy. Also read: US bullying spurred Green Revolution. Let tariffs give us a Business Revolution Where do we stand? In 1990, India and China had roughly the same GDP. But today, thanks to a blistering economic growth rate averaging 9 per cent per annum, China's economy is five times larger than India's. China's military power is also significantly greater. As Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi write in a recent essay, 'How to Survive the New Nuclear Age', China is determined to become a 'nuclear powerhouse' under Xi Jinping. (Foreign Affairs, July-August 2025) And 'Xi has chosen.. to build hundreds of new silos for land-based Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which can be launched within minutes to devastate the U.S. homeland.' In short, China's military prowess is inching closer and closer to that of the US. In contrast, India's search for parity with China — both economic and military — has eluded its grasp. To reach the perimeters of parity, India's economy needed to grow at 8-9 per cent per annum over the last 10-15 years, as it did in the first decade of this century, while heavy investments in military modernisation were also needed. Neither has happened to a desirable degree. Equally, the US had begun to see India as a counterweight to China, which after 2012-13 came to be viewed as America's prime adversary. This logic drove the pro-India bipartisan consensus in Washington, though the rising capabilities of India's American diaspora also played a role. India received valuable benefits from this turn. Defence cooperation rose and, quite markedly, the world's third-most valuable company, Apple, also commenced its switch from China to India. How will India approach China under the new circumstances? Earlier, the US sought India to counterbalance China. Will India seek China's support for counterbalancing the US, if things worsen further? What will be the price of this greater closeness, given that Chinese support for Pakistan is longstanding and India also has an unresolved border dispute with China? India will have to approach China with a severe imbalance of power. India's policy makers and strategic thinkers have to find a way out of this abyss. The key is trying to strike a balance between the norms of self-respect, without which proud nations can't live, and the realities of power, which can only be ignored at great peril. Ashutosh Varshney is Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences and Professor of Political Science at Brown University. He tweets @ProfVarshney. Views are personal. (Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)
