Time to act on information warfare

Bangkok Post

3 days ago

As tensions escalate along the Thai-Cambodian border, the unfolding conflict has become not only a confrontation of arms but also a war of narratives. For many in Thailand, this is the first time war has felt real. Not distant, not historical, but tangible: fighter jets in the sky, news of casualties, fear seeping into the national consciousness.
And yet, what we see and feel may not be the full story.
Alongside physical warfare, a more insidious struggle is taking place; one waged through misinformation, propaganda, and psychological manipulation.
Call it by what it is -- information warfare. While conventional war leaves craters and shrapnel, information warfare leaves confusion, hatred, and division. Truths are twisted, images manipulated, and emotions weaponised.
The recent Facebook post by a prominent Cambodian public figure, which accused the Royal Thai Air Force of using chemical weapons, accompanied by an image of a California DC-10 firefighting plane spreading pink-coloured flame retardant to tackle fire, was not an isolated misstep, but could rather be seen as a calculated provocation. The intent is clear: inflame public sentiment, stir outrage, and escalate tensions; not through troops or tanks, but through a post and a click.
This weaponisation of information is not just reckless; it is strategic. It is disinformation deployed with purpose, and it raises a crucial legal question: is this kind of warfare covered under international law? The short answer is: not quite.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict, was built around conventional warfare: tanks, trenches, and treaties. The Geneva Conventions, the cornerstone of IHL, are designed to protect civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, and medical personnel during armed conflict. They define the rules for when and how force may be used and who may be targeted. But IHL is showing its age.
Drafted in the aftermath of World War II, these conventions were never intended to regulate digital conflict. Cyberattacks, autonomous weapon systems, and psychological manipulation via social media were simply beyond the imagination of the 1949 drafters. As such, these texts are ill-equipped to confront the realities of 21st-century warfare, particularly the kind now unfolding between Thailand and Cambodia.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has acknowledged this gap. While reaffirming that any use of force, whether physical or cyber, must comply with the UN Charter, particularly Article 2(4), which prohibits aggression, the organisation has also recognised the growing challenge that digital operations pose to civilian protection.
What, then, is information warfare?
Information warfare (IW) is a broad term encompassing a range of activities intended to influence, disrupt, or manipulate public perception, decision-making processes, and communications infrastructure. These include hacking, disinformation, propaganda, and psychological operations, carried out through social media platforms, encrypted apps, and even AI-generated content.
In today's conflict, the Thai public has been bombarded with false narratives, inflammatory images, and viral accusations. IW has reached Thai citizens not just on the battlefield, but in their living rooms. With internet access and smartphones, everyone becomes a potential target and an unknowing participant. The law is currently struggling to keep up.
Under IHL, protection hinges on concepts like "attack", "combatant", and "military objective": terms that assume physical consequences. Geneva Convention IV, which governs the protection of civilians, prohibits acts such as targeting civilian objects and collective punishment. But it is silent on the use of harmful but non-kinetic tactics like online incitement, election interference, or coordinated psychological destabilisation campaigns.
Unless a direct, tangible link to physical harm can be proven, these digital acts remain in a legal grey zone.
And yet we know, from bitter experience, that words can kill. Hate speech spread through digital platforms has been linked to ethnic violence in Myanmar, communal riots in India, and even genocide in Rwanda, where radio propaganda laid the foundation for mass atrocities. The threshold between speech and violence is thinner than we think, especially when incitement is deliberate and systematic.
So, can international law be stretched to meet this moment?
One promising avenue lies in International Human Rights Law (IHRL). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Cambodia is a state party, explicitly prohibits "any propaganda for war" and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence. These provisions can, and should, be invoked when information warfare crosses the line from opinion to incitement.
Moreover, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides legal grounds to prosecute individuals who incite or participate in attacks against civilian populations, especially when such acts are part of an official policy or strategy.
In theory, information warfare that results in real-world violence could meet the criteria for crimes against humanity or war crimes. But in practice, accountability is elusive. Building a legal case that links a viral post to a violent act requires extraordinary evidence. The threshold for criminal prosecution at the international level is high, and digital trails are often obscured or erased. Prosecuting IW under current international legal frameworks remains a daunting task.
So where does this leave us? It leaves us with responsibility.
While international mechanisms may be slow to respond, states can, and must, act. Thailand cannot afford to be reactive. It must engage proactively on all fronts: legal, diplomatic, communicative, and societal.
First, it must counter falsehoods with facts swiftly and transparently. Government communication channels should be mobilised to correct misinformation in real time. Silence or hesitation creates a vacuum that misinformation will eagerly fill.
Second, Thailand must work with digital platforms to identify and remove harmful content. Collaboration with tech companies, civil society, and international partners is essential to strengthen content moderation and counter-speech.
Third, the government should work through diplomatic channels to raise the issue in regional forums such as Asean. If information warfare is the new front line, then a collective response is needed. Thailand could spearhead an Asean initiative to develop a regional code of digital conduct, guiding principles for state and non-state actors on disinformation, election integrity, and hate speech.
Fourth, it is time to invest in digital literacy. A population equipped to discern truth from manipulation is a powerful antidote to propaganda. Civil society and educational institutions should be empowered to teach media literacy, critical thinking, and responsible digital engagement.
Finally, Thailand has an opportunity to shape the future of law itself. By pushing for the modernisation of IHL and the development of soft law instruments governing cyber and information operations, Thailand can help set the agenda for how wars are fought and how civilians are protected in the digital age.
The current conflict is dangerous, but it also presents a moment of clarity. The old laws are no longer enough. The battlefield has expanded, and so must our tools for peace and accountability. The drama may wear many faces, but it is law, truth, and cooperation that must take centre stage.
Assistant Professor Pawat Satayanurug, PhD, is the Vice Dean of Research and Academic Resources, Programme Director for the Master of Laws (Thai Programme) at Chulalongkorn University's Faculty of Law.