Convicted war criminal Lubanga announces new rebel group in east Congo
(Reuters) - A convicted war criminal based in Uganda has announced a new rebel movement intent on toppling the government in eastern Congo's Ituri province, creating another potential security threat in the war-scarred region.
The formation of the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR) by Thomas Lubanga, an Ituri native, comes as Congo's army faces an unprecedented advance by Rwandan-backed M23 rebels elsewhere in eastern Congo.
The International Criminal Court secured its first conviction against Lubanga in 2012 on charges of recruiting child soldiers and sentenced him to 14 years in prison.
He was released in 2020 and President Felix Tshisekedi appointed him to a task force to bring peace to Ituri. But in 2022 he was taken hostage for two months by a rebel group, which he blames on the government, and is now based in Uganda.
In written responses to questions from Reuters, Lubanga said the CPR had both political and military elements, including armed men in three areas of Ituri.
Bringing peace to the area "requires an immediate change in governance and government," he said, though he added that the group has not launched military operations.
It is unclear how many combatants Lubanga might control. U.N. experts last year accused him of mobilising fighters to support a local militia and M23.
Congo's presidency did not respond to a request for comment on Monday.
Ituri has been rocked by violence by various armed groups for decades. Doctors Without Borders last week described "a renewed spike in atrocities" that had killed more than 200 civilians and displaced around 100,000 people since the beginning of the year.
Ugandan troops are present in Ituri to help the government fight the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which is affiliated with the Islamic State and stages brutal attacks on villages.
(Writing by Robbie Corey-Boulet; Editing by Ros Russell)
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