Hitler Used a Bogus Crisis of ‘Public Order' to Make Himself Dictator

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10-06-2025

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Adolf Hitler was a master of manufacturing public-security crises to advance his authoritarian agenda.
He used inflammatory tactics and rhetoric to disable constitutional protections for the Weimar Republic's 17 federated states, crushing their leadership and imposing his will on the country. 'I myself was once a federalist during my time in the opposition,' Hitler told Hans Lex, a Reichstag delegate for the Bavarian People's Party, in mid-March 1933, 'but I have now come to the conviction that the Weimar constitution is fundamentally flawed.' Federalism, Hitler said, encouraged states to pursue local interests at the expense of the nation.
'The rest of the world watched in astonishment and glee as democratic leaders of the individual states, relying on the Weimar Constitution,' Hitler continued, 'did not hesitate to attack the Reich government in the fiercest way possible at public rallies, in the press and on the radio.' Hitler vowed to end the 'eternal battle' between the states and the central government by dismantling the federated system, crushing states' rights, and forging 'a unified will' for the nation.
In a statement to the press, Hitler said that the imposition of central authority should be seen not as the 'raping' of state sovereignty but rather as the 'alignment' of state policies with the central government's.
[Timothy W. Ryback: What the press got wrong about Hitler]
Hitler had been more circumspect when he addressed the Reichsrat, a federal body of state representatives intended to monitor the relationship between the Reich and state governments, on Thursday, February 2, 1933, three days after his appointment as chancellor. The country's federated states, Hitler had said then, were the 'historic building blocks of the German nation.' He insisted that he had no intention of intruding on state sovereignty. He would assert Reich control only 'where absolutely necessary.'
Three weeks later, on February 27, the Reichstag fire provided Hitler with the 'absolutely necessary' excuse he needed. Hitler claimed that an arson attack on the Reichstag by a lone perpetrator—who was caught in the act— was the start of an attempted Bolshevik revolution, using that false claim to suspend civil liberties and suppress the voting rights of the German Communist Party, thereby enabling his supporters in the Reichstag to pass legislation granting him authoritarian power.
At Hitler's urging, President Paul von Hindenburg issued an Article 48 emergency decree, 'Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State.' The first paragraph suspended civil liberties, providing Hitler the means to suppress political opposition in advance of the upcoming elections on March 5. The second paragraph gave Hitler the power to trample states' rights: 'If any state fails to take the necessary measures to restore public safety and order, the Reich government may temporarily take over the powers of the highest state authority.'
That second paragraph sent alarm bells clanging in state capitals across the country, nowhere louder than in Bavaria, where concern over state sovereignty had run high from the outset of Hitler's chancellorship. Heinrich Held, the minister president—the equivalent of a U.S. state governor—of Bavaria, the second-largest federated state after its neighbor Prussia, was among the Weimar Republic's fiercest states'-rights advocates. He had a jurist's keen eye for legal loopholes and political subterfuge. Though the Weimar constitution was lauded by legal experts as one of the most democratic and progressive of its time, Held considered it to be disquietingly unclear and pliable when it came to states' rights. In the emergency-powers provision of Article 48, he detected the 'seeds of dictatorship.'
'The developments in public affairs in Germany fill the Bavarian state government with grave concern,' Held had written to Hindenburg five days into Hitler's chancellorship. 'Based on what has been announced, it seems the relationship of the states to the Reich could undergo a significant change.'
By 'developments in public affairs,' Held was referring to what had happened in Prussia the previous year. In July 1932, a Reich governor had been installed there, ostensibly to restore public order following street violence between communists and National Socialists. Prussia claimed that the Reich government had overreached, and took the matter to the Constitutional Court. Fearing what a ruling for the Reich would forebode for other federated states, Held had Bavaria join the lawsuit.
State of Prussia v. Reich Government placed the high court in a precarious position not just judicially but also politically—the Reich governor's installation in Prussia was a fait accompli. If the judges ruled in favor of Prussia, the Reich could simply ignore the court. But the greater danger, Held feared, was that Hindenburg would exercise his Article 48 powers to invoke a constitutionally permissible 'Reich Execution' that would permit the army to impose central authority on a state. If Prussia were to resist such an imposition, a constitutional crisis could quickly devolve into civil war.
On October 25, 1932, the court ruled that although Hindenburg had acted within his constitutional authority in installing a Reich governor, Prussia nonetheless still retained administrative control over its territory. The tangled ruling baffled legal experts and general observers alike. Vorwärts, the Social Democratic newspaper, wrote, 'Only the gods know how this situation can realistically be resolved.' Hitler resolved the situation rather bluntly: After taking office as chancellor, he simply dissolved the Prussian state government.
Having watched the Reich government do this, Held now feared a similar intrusion—or worse—in Bavaria: At Hitler's first cabinet meeting as chancellor, he had considered deploying the army to quell public unrest. Hitler's defense minister informed the new chancellor that ordering German soldiers to shoot German citizens on German soil was unthinkable—the army was trained exclusively to fight an 'external enemy.'
In his letter to Hindenberg, Held had reminded the German president of his solemn oath to uphold the democratic principles and federated structures of the Weimar constitution. 'The Bavarian state government places its trust in Your Excellency as protector of constitutional rights and of justice,' Held wrote. Hindenburg wrote back offering reassurance. 'Neither the Reich government nor I personally,' he wrote, 'are pursuing plans designed to eradicate the sovereignty of the federated states and to establish a centralized state.' Hindenburg added that he also had no intention of 'inserting Reich Governors into the business of state governments.' Still, rumors of Hitler's designs on Bavaria's sovereign authority persisted.
[Timothy W. Ryback: How Hitler dismantled a democracy in 53 days]
Two weeks later, Fritz Schäffer, the head of the Bavarian People's Party, traveled to Berlin to meet with Hindenburg and reiterate the state's concerns about Hitler's anti-federalist designs. Schäffer did not mince words. 'If the Reich sends a Reich governor to Bavaria, he will be arrested at the state border,' Schäffer told Hindenburg. Further, if Hitler's storm troopers attempted to stage a coup in Bavaria, Schäffer said, the state government would mobilize the Bavaria Watch, a state militia of 30,000 men that was aligned with the Bavarian People's Party. The Bavarian militia, battle-hardened by the Great War, Schäffer warned, would crush Hitler's ragtag bands of brownshirt storm troopers 'with ruthless force.'
Hindenburg assured Schäffer that even if the state government were not politically aligned with the Reich, he had 'no intention of installing Reich governors in states where order prevails.' Hindenburg said that he valued 'Bavaria and the Bavarian people and would avoid anything that would bring Bavaria into conflict with the Reich.'
Ten days later, the Reichstag fire and ensuing emergency decree scrambled the constitutional calculus. A day after Hindenburg exercised his Article 48 authority, Heinrich Held was in Berlin for a meeting with Hitler. The Bavarian minister president informed the Reich chancellor in no uncertain terms that his federated state did not require Reich assistance in maintaining public order. After an hour and a half, Held emerged, with Hitler's assurance 'that there will be no use of paragraph two against states in which, like Bavaria, law and order are maintained by state authorities.'
The March 5 Reichstag elections delivered Hitler 44 percent of the electorate and with that a claim on political power at every level of government. The next day, 200,000 National Socialist brownshirts stormed state and municipal offices across the country. Swastika banners draped town halls. Civil servants were thrown from their desks.
But not in Bavaria. Held's solid block of more than 1 million voters, along with the threat of armed resistance by the Bavaria Watch, gave Hitler pause. So did Schäffer's threat to call on Bavaria's Prince Rupprecht to reestablish monarchical rule.
Hitler huddled with his lieutenants to frame a strategy for Bavaria. Storm troopers would stage public disturbances, triggering a response under paragraph two of Article 48, enabling Hitler to suspend the Held government, and install a Reich governor in its place.
Three days after the election, on Wednesday, March 8, Held was in his office when he heard Hitler storm troopers singing the Nazi Party anthem in a public square. Shortly before noon, three Hitler lieutenants—Ernst Röhm, Heinrich Himmler, and Adolf Wagner—all in brown uniforms and jackboots, stomped into Held's office. Noting the 'protesting' Nazi storm troopers outside Held's office—staged there per Hitler's secret decree—Röhm expressed concern about public safety, and demanded that Held agree to install a Reich governor. Wagner slapped a whip across Held's desk. Held rose to his feet. He informed the three men that, as minister president, he needed to consult his cabinet. Wagner demanded an answer by noon. Held refused. 'Noon is lunchtime,' he is reputed to have said. 'I never make decisions at lunchtime.'
By the time Hitler's lieutenants reconvened with Held, at 3:40 that afternoon, this time in the company of a prospective Reich governor, Franz von Epp, Held had conferred with his cabinet. 'The Bavarian government is fully capable of maintaining peace and public order on its own,' he said, adding that he would not be coerced or intimidated. That evening, Held telegraphed Hindenburg. He requested support from Reichswehr Division VII, garrisoned in Munich, in case the National Socialists staged a coup. Hindenburg declined to help. That Friday, Franz von Epp made his first public appearance as Bavaria's Reich governor. Armed storm troopers swarmed state administrative offices. Still, Held didn't budge. A pair of Nazi storm troopers, intended to intimidate the intransigent minister president, were posted outside Held's office, rifles slung over their shoulders.
[Timothy W. Ryback: The oligarchs who came to regret supporting Hitler]
That weekend, Hitler flew south to try to resolve the crisis personally. He summoned Hans Lex, the Reichstag delegate who now headed the Bavaria Watch militia. Hitler told Lex he wanted to discuss, in confidence, a potential coalition. Lex cautioned Hitler that the degree to which the Bavarian People's Party would be willing to cooperate with the National Socialists was limited. For instance, Lex said, he could in good conscience imagine placing '1,000 Social Democratic functionaries' in protective custody—but only so long as they were detained within the parameters of the law and were 'treated humanely.' However, 'one could not,' Lex continued, 'align with Christian values, for example, a terrorist action that saw political opponents randomly snatched and thrown up against a wall.' Lex assured Hitler that Minister President Held had matters in Bavaria well in hand, and he explained that, having won more than 1 million votes in the latest election, Held represented 'a solid and unshakable' political force, supported by the martial force of the 30,000 armed men of the Bavaria Watch. Unable to close a deal, Hitler returned to Berlin.
But Hitler didn't need a deal. Instead, he unleashed his own storm troopers—both the SA and the SS—on Bavaria. The Bavaria Watch did not mobilize. Prince Rupprecht did not intervene. Fritz Schäffer was accosted and beaten on the street, then hustled to the Nazi Party headquarters in Munich for interrogation. Held was forced from his official residence, and his family was threatened; eventually, he was forced to flee to Switzerland. With Held gone, the Reich governor assumed full authority over Bavaria. 'With the führer at midday when we receive the latest news from Munich,' Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary on March 15. 'There can no longer be talk of resistance anywhere.' The New York Times reported that Hitler's efforts to 'steamroller' the country on his path to unchecked power were proving successful.
The ironies of history can be multilayered. Heinrich Held understood the threat that Hitler posed to democracy long before most people had ever heard of National Socialism or its leader. And a decade earlier, at a moment when Hitler was effectively a stateless immigrant in Germany, Held had been unable to deport him from the country.
In September 1924, the warden of Landsberg Prison, where Hitler was serving a five-year sentence for his failed Beer Hall Putsch, reported that incarceration had done nothing to temper the Nazi leader's authoritarian impulses. If anything, he wrote, Hitler had grown 'more mature, calmer, more calculating in his convictions.'
'There is no doubt that Hitler, after his release from the detention facility will return to political life,' the warden cautioned. 'He will seek to revive the nationalist movement according to his vision.' Held, then newly installed as minister president of Bavaria, moved to action. He prepared for Hitler's immediate deportation to his Austrian homeland upon release from prison.
A Bavarian delegation was dispatched to Vienna to discuss the handover, only to be told that the Austrians would under no circumstances allow the return of their native son. Vienna argued that Hitler had forfeited his Austrian citizenship as a result of his service in a Bavarian regiment. 'Hitler is considered as stateless, and as a result of the refusal by Austria to receive him, his deportation is no longer possible,' Held lamented in an internal memorandum. 'The government fears nonetheless that incarceration has in no way sobered or calmed Hitler, rather compelled him to continue to pursue his goals with undiminished energy.'
Article originally published at The Atlantic