Al Shara's appointment as Syria's President sparks fears of new iron rule
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The National
11 hours ago
- The National
UN Security Council members disagree on when to lift Syria sanctions
A potential dispute is widening among UN Security Council members over sanctions on Syria, with some opposing a US-led drive to lift all restrictions on Damascus. President Donald Trump last month ordered an easing of sanctions on Syria but as some US measures require an act of Congress to be wiped, several Security Council designations remain in place. The US sees full and immediate sanctions relief as vital to stabilising and rebuilding Syria after a 14-year civil war ended in December with the removal of president Bashar Al Assad. His defeat was led by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), which once had ties to Al Qaeda and has been on the US sanctions list since 2014 - though its designation as a foreign terrorist organisation was revoked this month. Several HTS members including Syria's interim President Ahmad Al Shara remain subject to a travel ban, frozen assets and other measures. The US this week urged the Security Council to review its sanctions on Mr Al Shara and HTS, saying changes were necessary to support Damascus in its fight against terrorism, including ISIS and Al Qaeda-linked groups. Dorothy Shea, acting US ambassador to the UN, said Washington was working with council members to address the Syria-related sanctions, stressing the government in Damascus had demonstrated a commitment to combat extremist threats. The 36th UN report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team said that while no operational ties between HTS and Al Qaeda had been observed, some member nations raised concerns that other members, particularly those in tactical positions or absorbed into the newly formed Syrian army, remained ideologically loyal to Al Qaeda. Ms Shea called on the Security Council to adjust its sanctions so 'the Syrian government can prevail in the fight against terrorism, while keeping the most dangerous and unrepentant actors designated". The report estimated more than 5,000 foreign 'terrorist fighters' remain at large in Syria, posing a threat to regional stability. 'Member states noted the complexity of the issue and expressed concern that efforts to legitimise foreign terrorist fighters may regularise their status in the Syrian Arab Republic without reducing their threat,' the report notes. Some foreign terrorist fighters – in particular those from Central Asia- retained 'external ambitions' and were dissatisfied with the interim government's approach. Several council members, including Russia, China and France, advocate a more measured approach to lifting sanctions, with Beijing the most vocal. 'China's main issue with delisting HTS remains the question of foreign fighters, specifically the presence of Uighur nationalists in Syria, whom they consider an issue of national security concern,' Maya Ungar, a UN analyst at the International Crisis Group, told The National. 'Russia, France and other European countries remain concerned about foreign fighters as well, as there are European, Chechen and Central Asian fighters active in Syria." She noted any compromise on foreign fighters that satisfies the Chinese on the issue is also likely to end up satisfying Russia and France as well. Mr Trump has embraced Mr Al Shara's presidency and during a visit to Saudi Arabia in May he said he would end all sanctions on Syria. But only the US Congress can repeal the Caesar Act, legislation from 2019 that sought to punish the Assad regime. In Washington, recent violence in Syria is fuelling a debate in Congress about whether it should repeal the Caesar Act in full, or adjust it so restrictions can be lifted only if Damascus meets human rights and other benchmarks. Republican Representative Mike Lawler this month introduced a bill that would amend the act to allow it to be waived if the Syrian government is not targeting civilians, among other provisions. The Syrian Emergency Task Force, which works to help build democracy in Syria, urged US legislators to vote against Mr Lawler's bill and push for a clean repeal. Because the Caesar sanctions were placed against the Assad regime, they should by definition be lifted without conditions, Mouaz Moustafa, the task force's executive director, told The National. 'Lifting those sanctions does not mean the US can't sanction Syria, or individuals or groups or whoever in Syria that commits any crimes against any minority,' he said. The Caesar Act currently has a temporary and renewable waiver but Mr Moustafa said the US has a moral obligation to scrap the legislation once and for all. He said using Caesar as leverage over Syria's new government threatens to destabilise Syria and risk further civil war. 'Caesar is not the way to hold the Syrian government accountable for any mistakes it may make, or has made,' Mr Moustafa said. 'Caesar was about Assad. Assad is gone.'
The National
a day ago
- The National
'We will never go back': Bedouin families forced into permanent exile after Sweida violence
Khitam Hawarin, an 18-year-old Bedouin from the town of Shahba in Syria 's Druze-majority province of Sweida, said she lay soaked in her own blood for more than an hour. She recalls watching helplessly as her mother's corpse burnt beside her, after Druze fighters had opened fire on her family. The assailants killed her mother, her aunt, her uncle's wife, her grandmother and two cousins, including one who was only six years old, as they hid behind a stone wall. 'Everyone died, except for me,' she said two weeks later, her arm and leg wrapped in white gauze, her movements sluggish with pain and grief. The young Syrian survived only because Druze neighbours intervened, taking her to a nearby hospital. 'They told people I was their daughter and changed my name so no one would know I was Bedouin,' she said. Armed men from Druze factions had been roaming the hospital, threatening to kill any Bedouin they found. 'There are good Druze and bad Druze,' Khitam said candidly. 'The ones who attacked us were armed. The ones who saved me weren't.' She spoke little, still visibly in shock, her brown eyes heavy with sorrow. Khitam and her family were evacuated days later in a humanitarian convoy. The girl, who was supposed to take her baccalaureate exam this summer, is now living in a classroom in Izraa, in Syria's Deraa governorate, as a displaced person. She no longer sees a future for herself. The school is one of 64 displacement centres hosting thousands of families who fled the vicious sectarian violence that erupted two weeks ago between Druze militants and armed Bedouin. What began as retaliatory attacks between two long-standing rivals escalated rapidly, as Syrian troops entered the fray on July 16. Druze factions, who distrust the new authorities led by a now-disarmed rebel group formerly affiliated with Al Qaeda, accused Syrian forces of siding with Sunni Bedouin and mobilised to repel them. The violence soon engulfed the entire Sweida region, killing more than 1,300 people, including civilians from both sides, general security forces, tribesmen and Druze gunmen, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based war monitor, Though a ceasefire between Druze leaders and Damascus was announced on July 19, civilians are still reeling from the conflict and the situation remains unstable. No return Though Druze civilians were the primary targets of the sectarian clashes, Bedouin families were also subjected to summary executions, according to testimonies gathered on the ground. The National could not independently verify all witness accounts. Bedouin families accused the faction aligned with Sheikh Hikmat Al Hijri, the influential Druze religious leader and vocal critic of Syrian authorities, of being behind the violations. Sweida governorate, home to about 700,000 people, includes a small Bedouin minority. Families interviewed by The National said they had lived peacefully alongside their Druze neighbours for years. They described the recent violence as a turning point, one that is irreversible. 'This is a departure with no return. It's truly a change in the religious and cultural make-up of the region,' Cedric Labrousse, a specialist in Syrian affairs, told The National. 'If you remove those who left voluntarily, those who were evacuated in recent days, and those still trying to flee, there won't be many Bedouin left here in a few weeks. Most Bedouin homes have been burnt. So even if they return, where would they go?' He said what had long been a localised feud between some Druze armed groups and certain Bedouin factions has now taken on a deeply sectarian dimension. 'It wasn't really there before, but now it's been implanted and it will stay in people's minds,' Mr Labrousse warned. 'Just imagine what Bedouin children will think of the Druze after this. And imagine what Druze children will think of the Bedouin in 20 years.' Hind, Khitam's sister, said she saw a missile tear a child apart. 'His head flew one way, his body another, right in front of my eyes,' she said. 'We can't go back. There's no way we can ever return." Their home has been looted and burnt down. Meanwhile, in a Druze-majority village, tribal fighters daubed graffiti on walls that read 'down with the collaborators, down with the Druze pigs'. In Sweida, The National also collected harrowing accounts from Druze civilians who survived attacks and summary executions, which they said were committed by Syrian troops and tribal gunmen. 'I don't see how trust between the two communities can ever be restored,' Mr Labrousse said. Marginalised community Mr Labrousse said the conflict between some Druze and Bedouin started as a trade rivalry. 'For years, Sweida has relied on smuggling, drugs, fuel, weapons … control over trafficking routes has always been critical, even before the civil war,' he said. He said that during the war, the smuggling business, particularly Captagon trafficking, expanded significantly, involving Druze and Bedouin groups. Their alliances often shifted, with groups alternating between business partners and rivals. He said that after former Syrian president Bashar Al Assad's fall, many cartels, storage sites and Captagon warehouses were dismantled'. 'This led to the collapse of the informal economy, the main source of livelihood in marginalised Sweida. Druze and Bedouin groups began fighting over a shrinking pool of resources, further fuelling tensions." But this time the feud took on a sectarian dimension. On one hand, 'the Bedouin have been gradually pushed to the margins of Druze society,' Mr Labrousse explained. 'The Druze had organised themselves, with their own local administration, while the Bedouin felt increasingly excluded, neglected, and marginalised.' On the other hand, the Druze remain distrustful of the new Syrian government, citing its Sunni Islamist roots, and view the new Syrian government as more sympathetic to the Bedouin. The Druze are a minority religious group that emerged from a branch of Islam, with followers in Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Some hardline Sunni Muslims consider them heretics. Their distrust has deepened as the Syrian Ministry of Defence continues to struggle to rein in a patchwork of factions, some of them radical, despite pledges of unification. In March, nearly 1,500 mostly Alawites citizens, the minority sect to which former Mr Al Assad belongs, were killed in a spree of sectarian violence, reportedly involving groups recently integrated into the army. At the start of the recent clashes, thousands of tribesmen from across Syria deployed to Sweida to support Bedouin fighters opposing Druze factions. 'Some of them had clear sectarian motives,' Mr Labrousse said. They stayed in the area for days despite calls from interim President Ahmad Al Shara to withdraw. 'I can't trust anyone' Assaf Mohammad Dahmash, a Bedouin man at a displacement centre, said he would never return to Sweida, a place he had called home since 2016 when he fled from ISIS in Deir Ezzor. 'They're capable of doing bad things. Not all of them, some are truly good people. But I don't think anyone can trust any more,' he said. 'It's become pure sectarianism. Like, if they see a Sunni, they will slaughter them. I heard a sheikh say that with my own ears." He said he had good relationships with his Druze neighbours in Sweida, whom he may never see again. 'I called my friend yesterday, we've known each other since 2016. We used to eat and drink coffee together. He was crying on the phone. His house was looted and his car was burnt. He told me to come back to Sweida but it's impossible.' A member of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, providing humanitarian assistance at one of the shelter centres, said the number of displaced people was still rising and there is no plan for what comes next. In the displacement centres, families are too shocked to even think about it. 'People here have no hope, no ambition. They just want shelter, wherever it may be,' said Mr Dahmash.
Middle East Eye
2 days ago
- Middle East Eye
Why Syria needs to play the long game against Israel
Israel's unprecedented aerial assault on Syria this month, targeting military and civilian sites in Damascus and Sweida, has been sold as a protective measure for the Druze minority - an ironic stance, given Israel's ongoing war against Palestinians, including Gaza's Christian minority. The Israeli aggression followed the Syrian government's intervention in the country's south amid escalating violence between Druze factions and Bedouin communities. This intervention was part of the government's broader efforts to consolidate national sovereignty and regain full authority over all of Syria, amid efforts by foreign-backed minority groups to establish sectarian or ethnic enclaves. Ahead of its assault, Israel promoted the narrative that Syria's new government was prepared to normalise relations with Tel Aviv under favourable conditions, including sustained Israeli control over the occupied Golan Heights. But Damascus has denied reports of any direct talks between President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Israeli officials. Regardless, the recent Israeli aggression points to the failure of Israel's diplomatic and military pressure on Syria's new administration. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that Israel's ambitions in Syria include demilitarisation of the south, under the guise of protecting the Druze, but Tel Aviv's broader geopolitical strategy is clear: to weaken the Syrian government, while fostering sectarian and ethnic divides. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters Such managed chaos would enable Israel to consolidate its occupation, accelerate its land grabs, and expand its influence eastwards through alliances with other minority groups, such as the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). Israel's longstanding strategy involves weaponising minorities across the region to further its expansive geopolitical agenda, as demonstrated historically in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Fragmenting the region Israel has employed the Druze community against Palestinians, including in the recent Gaza genocide. In Lebanon, Israel supported the Christian-dominated South Lebanon Army, which ultimately disbanded in 2000 after the Israeli withdrawal. Tel Aviv has also long supported Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, throwing its weight behind their independence aspirations. For Israel, fragmenting the region into smaller ethnic and sectarian entities serves in the long run to legitimise its own presence as a settler-colonial state. In addition, it believes that fostering such divisions creates a sense of unity and alignment among minority groups against regional majorities, mainly Sunni Arabs. This strategy has been used by other foreign regional powers, enabling the Assad regime to survive 14 years of civil war. For Syria, its strategic options remain limited as Sharaa attempts to navigate Israel's destabilising military power and influence Druze leader Hikmat al-Hajri, who supported the Assad regime during the Syrian uprising, has become a central figure opposing the new administration. After former President Bashar al-Assad's fall last December, Hajri reportedly represented a local military council, including former Assad generals, that was aligned with Israel and the YPG; in addition to demanding a land corridor eastwards from southern Syria towards the American al-Tanf military base, some members of the council reportedly pledged loyalty to Israel. In parallel with Israel's recent strikes on Syrian government positions, Hajri also demanded the establishment of a corridor connecting Sweida to the country's northeast, where the YPG operates. This request has prompted strong reactions, particularly from Turkey - especially as the Syrian Democratic Forces, of which the YPG is the primary component, have refused to dissolve and surrender their weapons to the central government in Damascus, anticipating support from Israel. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has denounced Israel as a 'terrorist state' aiming to undermine Syria's sovereignty and unity, and rejected the partitioning of Syria along ethnic or sectarian lines. Still, amid a shifting regional power balance following the brief Israel-Iran war, Ankara has exercised notable restraint towards Israel, recognising that further escalation could lead to the Syrian state's collapse, thus serving Tel Aviv's interests. Diplomatic route Turkey's reluctance to counter Israel in this moment is influenced by a combination of internal and external factors, including economic challenges, domestic political opposition, and the ongoing dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. While ties with the administration of US President Donald Trump previously helped Turkey advocate for Syria, recent events have shown that trusting Trump is unwise; he is not a reliable ally. Deciding to counter Israel using hard power, based on perceived support from Trump, would be a mistake. As a consequence, Turkey has chosen a diplomatic route, joining 10 Arab states in condemning Israel and reaffirming Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to the Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, intervention from Ankara and some Arab countries to counter Israel's schemes in Syria has "saved the region from an unknown fate". From Damascus to Gaza, Israel's doctrine of domination has one fatal flaw Read More » For Syria, its strategic options remain limited as Sharaa attempts to navigate Israel's destabilising military power and influence. Advocating for a military confrontation - with an unrestrained Israel and an unprepared Syria - might not be the most prudent choice, especially if it were to result in further gains for Israel. While the new administration and the Syrian people continue to prioritise reconstruction, stabilisation and institution-building, it is crucial to consider strategies that could increase the costs of Israeli actions in Syria. Given the geopolitical and security complexities, Syria might benefit from leveraging diplomatic channels and regional alliances more actively, particularly with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and supportive Arab states, to counter Israel's ambitions without immediate escalation. Strengthening internal cohesion, enhancing national legitimacy, and isolating minority factions backed by foreign powers through intense public pressure could help to reduce the state's vulnerabilities. Ultimately, Syria's resilience will depend upon balancing diplomatic engagement, internal stability and military preparedness against Israel's multifaceted strategy. One critical move could be to eliminate the internal threat stemming from the YPG, in cooperation with Ankara and a willing coalition. In other words, if the current negotiation process does not result in YPG surrendering weapons and disarming, a military operation would seem inevitable against the armed group to discourage Israel from banking on separatist minorities. Such a move could undermine the value of the Hajri card for Israel, and potentially block Israel's expansion to eastern and northern Syria via the Druze Trojan horse. By deepening military and security ties with Turkey, delimiting maritime borders with Ankara, and intensifying its readiness to play the long game, Syria could ultimately raise the costs of Israeli intervention in the future. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
