Armenia's precarious position on Iran
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visiting the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran in July 2024. Photo: Press release from the Office of Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia
Relations between Armenia and Israel have been limited primarily because Israel maintains a strategic alliance with Azerbaijan. Israel serves as one of Azerbaijan's main military suppliers, a role that has been pivotal in Azerbaijan's victory in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, subsequent military offensives against Armenia resulting in the occupation of over 200 square kilometers of its border areas in 2021–2022, and the military conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. This alliance has created an environment of mistrust, limiting Armenian-Israeli cooperation. Israel has also exploited the issue of the Armenian Genocide by simultaneously refusing to officially recognize it while at the highest levels of leadership invoking it as a political tool against Turkey to deter criticism of Israel's actions in Gaza. Armenia on its turn recognized Palestine in 2024.
Conversely, Armenia has recently strengthened ties with the United States, formalized through a formal strategic partnership agreement signed by the outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in January 2025. While scepticism initially emerged within Armenian society regarding whether the Trump administration would commit to its implementation, this uncertainty has been dispelled. President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and other prominent American officials publicly reaffirmed the agreement's validity, signalling continued support for strengthening US–Armenian relations. Several US delegations and interagency teams have visited Armenia in recent months to follow up on the implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement, supporting Armenia's broader objectives of diversifying its security partnerships, the civilian use of nuclear energy through small modular reactors, and thus reducing its longstanding dependence on Russia. Armenia and the US have also conducted the joint 'Eagle Partner' military exercises in 2023 and 2024.
Despite their fundamentally different political and ideological systems, Armenia and Iran share certain regional interests that have fostered pragmatic cooperation. Armenia has embraced democratic governance and a commitment to human rights. It also maintains a secular political system, while holding the historical distinction of being the first nation to adopt Christianity as a state religion. In contrast, Iran is an Islamic authoritarian state in which the religious authority is deeply embedded in the structure of political power. Iran's regional posture is shaped by stigmatization and isolation by the West and economic sanctions.
As regional powers compete over the future of connectivity in the South Caucasus, Iran has emerged as a key actor providing an implicit security buffer for Armenia amid Azerbaijan's contentious demand for an extraterritorial corridor through Syunik. The contrasting visions represented by the proposed 'Zangezur Corridor,' Armenia's 'Crossroads for Peace' initiative, and the Iran–Azerbaijan 'Aras Corridor' underscore broader geopolitical rivalries and competing interests over the modalities of regional transport routes.
Azerbaijan's notion of a 'Zangezur Corridor' refers to its demand for establishing an extraterritorial route through Armenia's Syunik province to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. The project is backed by both Russia and Turkey: Russia supports the establishment of such a corridor under the control of its Federal Security Service (FSB), viewing it as a means to circumvent western sanctions. Turkey, in turn, envisions the corridor as a key component of its broader pan-Turkic or pan-Turan aspirations, linking the Turkic world through contiguous territory. This notion leaves Armenia in a blockade and threatens its territorial integrity.
Armenia's project 'Crossroads for Peace' envisions opening regional transportation routes, crossing its territory under its national sovereignty and reduced customs procedures, including from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, expecting to use other regional communications in exchange. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen suggested that Armenia could become part of the Middle (Trans-Caspian) Corridor, positioning it as a key transit hub between Europe and Asia. However, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev swiftly dismissed the proposal, publicly rejecting any plans to include Armenia in the Middle Corridor framework. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has recently discussed Armenia's vision with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, seeking to convince him that the 'Crossroads of Peace' could also serve Turkey's regional economic interests. Iran, on the other hand, has shown little enthusiasm for the project.
These divergent models of connectivity reflect deeper strategic orientations: Armenia advocates for cooperative, sovereignty-respecting solutions, while Azerbaijan, supported by Russia and Turkey, pursues a coercive and unilateral approach aimed at asserting regional hegemony.
The Azerbaijan-Iran Aras Corridor is an infrastructure project under construction along the Aras River, that connects mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan via Iranian territory – bypassing Armenia. It reflects the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran, and serves as a strategic alternative to Azerbaijan's demanded extraterritorial route through Armenia. However, it also diminishes the relevance of transit options through Armenia in regional planning. Iran opposes the so-called Zangezur corridor, viewing it as a threat to its 44 kilometres-long northern border with Armenia, as it provides Tehran with direct access to the South Caucasus and serves as a buffer against regional isolation by Turkey and Azerbaijan for both Iran and Armenia. At the same time, faced with growing risks, Iran may be tempted to soften its red line on the so-called 'Zangezur Corridor' in the hope of reducing Azerbaijan's support for Israel or securing backing from Russia.
Given the blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia's access to international markets remains constrained. In this context, Iran and Georgia serve as Armenia's only land gateways to the outside world. Iran provides Armenia with vital connectivity to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia – including growing strategic and trade ties with India, now an important military supplier and trade partner. The viability of Armenia's border with Iran is therefore indispensable to its economic security and strategic diversification.
Since the Trump administration took office, Azerbaijan has reportedly tried to leverage its close relationship with Israel to secure tacit approval or at least minimize US opposition to its potential military actions aimed at creating the 'Zangezur corridor' through Armenia by force. Nevertheless, senior US officials, including Rubio, have publicly noted a 'real risk' of an Azerbaijani invasion of Armenia, emphasizing that the US is actively working to prevent such an escalation.
This stance combined with the opposition of Iran and the presence of the EU civilian observation mission in Armenia, effectively serve as security deterrents against a potential Azerbaijani military offensive. The defence of Armenia's territorial integrity represents a rare point of convergence among the US, the EU, and Iran, despite their broader geopolitical disagreements.
A further risk stemming from the Iran–Israel–US conflict is the erosion of the global rules-based order. The normalization of unilateral military offensives, especially those launched under the pretext of 'preventive war' which lacks clear justification under international law, sets dangerous precedents. When such actions are driven by ambitions of regional hegemony, they pose an even greater threat. For a small state like Armenia, which has recently been subjected to cross-border attacks and coercion by Azerbaijan, these developments represent a serious and enduring risk to its security and sovereignty.
A critical dimension of the Iran–Israel conflict's impact on Armenia is the potential risk of nuclear disaster. Military targeting of nuclear facilities could trigger catastrophic regional consequences and is therefore prohibited under international law. Any attempt to legitimize such actions also sets a highly dangerous precedent. Given Armenia's proximity to Iran and its small territorial size, this risk further heightens its vulnerability, reinforcing the urgency of returning to negotiations on Iran's nuclear deal.
Looking ahead, potential 'regime change' in Iran could trigger profound regional instability, beyond a change in governance system. Iran's multi-ethnic composition includes approximately 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis residing near the Armenian border, with a history of irredentist sentiments promoted by both Iranian and Azerbaijani nationalist actors at different times. Any future political upheaval could risk the fragmentation of Iran's multi-ethnic structure and destabilization of its border regions. Iran's Armenian community, estimated at around 70,000 people and recognized as a religious minority under the Iranian constitution, may face increased security risks. In such a scenario, a potential refugee influx into Armenia could pose both economic and hybrid challenges for the country.
Ultimately, Armenia faces a strategic dilemma as it seeks to balance neutrality and multi-alignment amid growing regional and global polarization. It relies on both Iran and the United States as de facto security deterrents against Azerbaijani aggression. Balancing relations between these two actors, who are adversaries in the Iran-Israel conflict, places Armenia in a vulnerable position. Maintaining neutrality may become increasingly difficult as regional tensions escalate, and Armenia risks becoming a collateral victim of the broader Iran–Israel–US rivalry.
Sossi Tatikyan holds a Master of Public Administration degree from the Harvard Kennedy School, has been a NATO Defense College Partnership for Peace Research Fellow, and is currently a PhD Researcher in Sorbonne Nouvelle University. Her main research topics are: Ethnic conflicts, cognitive and information warfare and lawfare, Euro-Atlantic integration, and security dilemmas of small states.
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Armenia, Armenian foreign policy, Azerbaijan, Iran, Israel, South Caucasus, turkey, USA
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Novaya Gazeta Europe
5 hours ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
The fog of war. Is there any basis to Russian claims that Ukrainian villages on the frontline are falling like dominoes? — Novaya Gazeta Europe
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Operational encirclement 'In July, the Russians were able to capture about 600 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory,' Israeli military analyst David Sharp told Novaya Europe, adding that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) were currently most under pressure in the Donetsk region near Pokrovsk and neighbouring Myrnohrad, where Russian forces have edged ever closer to the two cities and sabotage and reconnaissance groups have been creeping into the outskirts and fighting in residential areas. 'Pokrovsk itself is at risk of operational encirclement and the Dobropillya-Pokrovsk highway, which is extremely important for defence logistics, is at risk of being cut off,' Sharp says, citing the lack of Ukrainian defensive installations in the area. 'The AFU is trying to control the line of contact using its scattered strongholds and drones, but these clearly aren't sufficient to hold off the advancing enemy forces.' 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Photo: AFU / EPA The gateway to Kostyantynivka AFU defences are still resisting the Russian onslaught around Chasiv Yar, says Sharp, and though no independently verified information is yet available about whether the city has been completely captured or not, it's clear that Russian troops have not been able to achieve their offensive targets in full. Despite video footage being shared online that appears to show Russian flags flying from buildings in various parts of the city, Sharp says that the AFU is still holding on to some positions, and citing maps published by DeepState, that Chasiv Yar's Shevchenko district remains under Ukrainian control. Though he stresses that it's yet to happen, Svitan says he believes that if the Russians are able to take full control of Chasiv Yar, they will immediately move on Kostyantynivka, though he also notes that it may take years to capture due to its large size. 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Even a slight advance here could eventually lead to their breaking through Ukrainian defences and serious territorial losses for the AFU, while any further stretching of the line resistance will greatly complicate matters for the Ukrainians and create logistics problems, Sharp notes.
Novaya Gazeta Europe
6 days ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
Strategic realignment. Armenia and Azerbaijan are inching towards a long-sought peace deal. What does this mean for Russia? — Novaya Gazeta Europe
At a time when Vladimir Putin needs friends in his neighbourhood, he appears instead to be losing them in the South Caucasus. After two centuries of Russian involvement in the region, balancing the historical rivalry and at times acting as mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan, there is growing speculation that the two countries are preparing a major reset in relations. Anna Matveeva Visiting Senior Research Fellow, King's Russia Institute, King's College London When Armenia's prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, met the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, in Abu Dhabi on 10 July, they reportedly came close to agreeing a peace treaty. The big question is whether, if these two countries can iron out mistrust and violence born of the territorial conflict, there will still be a role for Russia in the South Caucasus. To understand the complex geopolitics of the region, you need to go back to the early 19th century, when Azerbaijan and Armenia were ceded to Russia following the Russo-Persian wars. After the Russian revolution, the two countries achieved brief independence between 1918 and 1920 (though not in their present borders) before being invaded and annexed by Russia. During the Soviet era, the union republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan both felt that Moscow favoured the other. Armenia was unhappy that the Soviet leadership allocated Nagorno-Karabakh, a majority-Armenian exclave surrounded by Azerbaijani-populated lands, to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan was dissatisfied that its borders denied it a land connection to its population in Nakhchivan, an exclave of ethnic Azerbaijanis that could only be reached via southern Armenia. 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After 9/11, when combating international terrorism became a global priority, Azerbaijan put measures in place to prevent the transfer of fighters and weapons through its territory to the war in Chechnya, which further improved relations with Moscow. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan speaks to Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, 24 October 2024. Photo: EPA/ MAXIM SHEMETOV At this stage, Azerbaijan was pursuing what it described as a 'multi-vector' foreign policy, which allowed it to develop ties with a variety of countries, including the US, Russia and others to whom it sold oil. While remaining in the Commonwealth of Independent States, it did not sign up to the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Armenia, by contrast, was a fully participating member of the CSTO. Having signed an Eternal Friendship Treaty with Russia in 1997, this was a clear strategic choice for Armenia and one that was partly motivated by long-standing historical ties. Indeed, it was Nagorno-Karabakh which really soured relations between Armenia and Moscow. Russia was traditionally seen as a defender of Christianity in the days of the Ottoman empire. Many people had fled massacres in Western Armenia (in modern-day Turkey) in 1915 to come under the protection of the Russian tsar. But Armenia also saw Moscow as a vital security guarantor against an increasingly militarised Azerbaijan, which was determined to recover control of Nagorno-Karabakh and other areas occupied by Armenia. Indeed, it was Nagorno-Karabakh which really soured relations between Armenia and Moscow. In 2020, when — aided by Turkey — Azerbaijan launched its offensive to retake the territory, Russia failed to come to the aid of its CSTO ally. This was expected, given that relations had begun to deteriorate in 2018 when Pashinyan came to power in Armenia. In hindsight, most commentators believe Russia had become tired of Armenia's intransigence over the plan, agreed in Madrid in 2007, for it to cede back the six districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Instead, Moscow brokered a ceasefire agreement and deployed 2,000 peacekeepers along the Lachin corridor, a strip of land connecting Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. But these troops also failed to intervene when an Azerbaijani offensive retook the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, forcing the population of about 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee. An Armenian church in the town of Shushi, Nagorno-Karabakh, overlooks a crater caused by Azerbaijani shelling, 29 October 2020. Photo: EPA / HAYK BAGHDASARYAN /PHOTOLURE Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, meanwhile, have gone downhill rapidly. In December 2024, an Azerbaijani civilian airliner was shot down in Russian airspace. Putin apologised, but Azerbaijan insisted on Moscow disclosing the results of the investigation and paying compensation to the victims. Things got worse at the end of June, when the Russian authorities arrested a group of ethnic Azerbaijanis on suspicion of their involvement in a decades-old murder case, two of whom were killed while being detained. Azerbaijan retaliated by raiding the Baku offices of Russia's Sputnik news agency and detaining its staff as well as a group of Russian IT workers. When they appeared in court, some of the men appeared to have been beaten in custody. Azerbaijan's state media denounced Russia and Russia House, the state-funded Russian cultural agency in Baku, was closed down, with several cultural events cancelled. Security agencies began to enforce documentation checks on all Russian nationals in the country. A complete shutout of Russia in the South Caucasus is unlikely. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan depend on remittance income from their nationals in Russia. At the same time, Azerbaijan and Armenia were already talking about concluding a peace treaty independently, without intermediaries. All this has prompted speculation of a serious loss of influence in the region for Moscow. However, a complete shutout of Russia in the South Caucasus is unlikely. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan depend on remittance income from their nationals in Russia. Both countries also remain close trading partners with Russia, and while Armenia suspended its membership in CSTO, it has not quit the organisation altogether. Far more likely is that the two countries, mindful of the growing influence of Turkey in the region and the shifts created by Donald Trump in world affairs, are maneuvering while weighing their options. Geography matters, as neighbouring Georgia demonstrates — efforts to cut ties with Russia by its former president, Mikheil Saakashvili, have been partially reversed by the current government, which increasingly leans towards Moscow. In the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan, economic ties, transport links and human connections still favour a relationship with Russia. So, a temporary breakdown in political relations can be mended if all three leaders demonstrate enough statesmanship to sail through the troubled waters. This article was first published by The Conversation. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe
Balkan Insight
15-07-2025
- Balkan Insight
A post-Soviet mafia wreaked havoc for Iran. Who will be its next client?
July 15, 2025 - Alexander Neuman - Articles and Commentary Lower Manhattan, where a court in the United States Southern District of New York convicted two Eastern European mobsters of plotting to kill a dissident on behalf of Iran. Photo: Shutterstock In March, a Manhattan jury convicted two mobsters – one Georgian and one Azerbaijani-Russian – for attempting to murder an Iranian activist and American citizen in New York. A third member, the triggerman, was arrested in July 2022 near the would-be victim's doorstep with an AK-47 assault rifle and testified as a government witness. Two months later, the United Kingdom arrested four Iranian nationals , for the first time, for targeting regime opponents in the UK. Iran has shown the clearest pattern of state operatives hiring local criminals for overseas assassinations. But the nexus of crime and resurgent hybrid war also concerns other adversaries of the West – Russia, China and North Korea. It even involves strategic partners like India, leading some security scholars to predict a 'fifth wave' of global organized crime. The embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Knightsbridge, London. The British Foreign Office summoned the Iranian ambassador after the UK government arrested four, and charged three, Iranians for National Security Act violations. Photo: Spanning Iran, the Caucasus, Central Europe and the United States, the Manhattan murder-for-hire case is unique in revealing two trends: how states use irregularly arrived organized criminals in the West, and the enduring relevance of Soviet-style organized crime in great power competition. The subversive threat According to the US charges, the plot originated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization, a state security agency on the US Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list since 2019. An IRGC-IO general hired Rafat Amirov, an Azerbaijani and Russian citizen in Iran and a Russian mafia group member, to the sum of 500,000 US dollars. Their job was to kill Masih Alinejad, a New York-based Iranian-American journalist. Khalid Mehdiyev, who arrived with false documents in the United States, illegally bought an AK-47 to complete the job. In the UK case, three defendants also arrived by irregular means. The attempted murder-for-hire followed previous attempts by 'Iranian intelligence officials and assets' to kidnap the journalist for rendition. The outcome exemplifies the tradeoffs of outsourcing state violence to transnational criminals. First, it enables political subversion for states with reduced operating capacities in the target country. Pariahs like Iran and North Korea have a minimal diplomatic presence in the West. In the United States, they lack embassies and consulates to provide cover and immunity from prosecution for intelligence officers. Russia has been similarly hamstrung following a wave of diplomatic expulsions in 2018, which followed the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal by Russian GRU military intelligence operatives in Salisbury, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The pattern in point is the string of arson attacks in Poland, Lithuania and the United Kingdom in 2024 by Ukrainian, Romanian and other non-Russian citizens who, according to European intelligence agencies, were hired by Moscow. Since 2024, Poland has shuttered two Russian consulates, while Czechia and France publicly attributed previous sabotage attempts to the Kremlin's GRU military intelligence agency. The director of Britain's domestic security agency, MI5, has warned of Russia's mission to 'generate mayhem on British and European streets'. On May 7th, the head of the UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Richard Horne said that Moscow is 'waging acts of sabotage, often using criminal proxies in their plots'. Both leaders are surely investigating Russian links after the Crown Prosecution Service charged two Ukrainians and one Romanian national in connection to arson attacks targeted at Prime Minister Keir Starmer. These actions still have unexplained motives. While there is no public evidence that Russia's sabotage and assassination campaign has successfully reached North America yet, Iran's clearly has, showing an enduring threat. Another advantage of recruiting criminals is low cost, which has been presented in detail in Tehran's case thanks to US prosecutors. Iran spent only 30,000 US dollars on an advance payment to assassinate Alinejad. At the same time, Mehdiyev testified that success would result in a bounty of 160,000 US dollars. This is likely much cheaper than Iran organizing its own logistics, with western security services highly vigilant when it comes to the Iranian threat. Additionally, no Iranians were at risk of arrest. Diplomatic blowback was also rather quiet overall. Several levels of outsourcing helped obscure Iran's role – Mehdiyev was even told that the operation was Baku's 'gift' to Iran. Even a figment of deniability can prevent western governments from retaliating for subversive acts. Compared to state operators, criminals also have disadvantages, starting with poor professionalism. One mafia enforcer in New York proposed burning down Alinejad's house instead of killing her. And Mehdiyev, despite having around a decade's experience in violent crime, likely had no surveillance or covert action training on par with Russian or Iranian intelligence. His attorney argued that he wanted to 'scam' the Iranians without killing Alinejad. The defendants ultimately helped the authorities by taking convenient selfies with their mob tattoos. Rafat Amirov, an Azerbaijani-Russian citizen and resident of Iran, with his birthday cake. The eight-pointed stars symbolize his status as a 'vor v zakone' (thief in law). Screenshot from US Department of Justice, United States of America v. Rafat Amirov, Polad Omarov and Khalid Mehdiyev indictment. The Soviet connection The Russian crime group, identified as the 'Thieves-in-Law' ( Vory v Zakone ) in court documents, passed instructions through Polad Omarov, a Georgian citizen extradited from Czechia, down to Mehdiyev, who joined the group as a teenager in Azerbaijan before illegally entering the US. The hitman claimed to follow orders from a vor or oğru (thief in Russian and Azeri, respectively) leader in an Azerbaijani prison. He also noted that they adhered to the correct criminal lifestyle, which involves never cooperating with governments. Polad Omarov, a Georgian citizen who resided in Slovenia and Czechia and passed Iranian targeting information from Rafat Amirov to the hitman and sports a vor v zakone tattoo. Screenshot from US Department of Justice, United States of America v. Rafat Amirov, Polad Omarov and Khalid Mehdiyev indictment. These traditions show the surprising continuity of Soviet criminal culture and operating methods. The term vory v zakone originates in the Soviet Union's gulag system. The superpower's collapse in 1991, amid liberalized capital and border controls around the world, was 'the single most important event' for the expansion of globalized crime in the next two decades. The British journalist Misha Glenny gives an effective world tour of these developments in his 2008 book. The American security scholar Phil Williams described the Soviet collapse, globalization and neoliberalism as triggers for the 'third wave' of organized crime – the first originated in 'hotspots' like Sicily, and the second went global with narcotics after the Second World War. Mark Galeotti described this new shift in the 2000s through discussion of the legendary, tattooed vory , who transformed into 'hybrid gangster-businessmen' with little concern for traditions. Evidently, the vory are still relevant. Eurasian crime groups (calling them Russian is too narrow) have become intertwined with waves of diaspora emigration after the Soviet collapse and established functional outposts in key entryways like New York, Istanbul and Dubai. Moreover, the transnational criminals abroad clearly have ties at home that complicate their willingness to cooperate with host governments. Mehdiyev did not testify until the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) helped relocate his mother from Azerbaijan to the US and he was granted the 'golden ticket' of a legalized stay. However, this tool is becoming more precarious amid the rise of populist movements and anti-immigration agendas across North America and Europe. Khalid Mehdiyev, an Azerbaijani citizen residing in Yonkers, New York, who appeared at Alinejad's doorstep with an AK-47. Screenshot from US Department of Justice, United States of America v. Rafat Amirov, Polad Omarov and Khalid Mehdiyev indictment. No rules, no boundaries Transnational criminal groups remain a low-cost, but also low professionalism, policy option for great power adversaries of the West. They have been used time and again by Russia and Iran with few evident reasons to stop this practice. This has several implications for western law enforcement, domestic security services, and diplomatic policymakers. First, the line between national security and domestic crime will continue to deteriorate and is unlikely to be restored any time soon. Pariah states' co-option of criminals – especially immigrants – will further securitize immigration and policing debates, as recently seen in Poland, Germany and the UK's asylum policy restrictions. The Trump administration has also used the Alien Enemies Act to deport alleged Venezuelan cartel members, some of whom could now potentially end up in Kosovo. At the same time, national security organizations may lose valuable leverage in investigating and prosecuting transnational criminal networks working for great power competitors if western governments restrict asylum options for informants and their families, like Mehdiyev's 'golden ticket'. This risk will worsen amid the deteriorating international taboo against refoulement, or the forced return of asylum seekers to countries where they will be in danger. This especially has implications for great power competition when police states are concerned, like in the cases of Uyghurs in China or anti-war activists in Russia. Western authorities may have good reasons to deny asylum cases, but scandalous denials may influence future potential informants to ask: 'is that what you might do to me?' Lastly, western foreign ministries should consider this criminal/state nexus in their calculus for diplomatic limitations on great power competitors. With recent meetings in Istanbul and Riyadh, the United States is in talks with Russia about restoring diplomatic operations, having closed its consulates in San Francisco, Seattle, and annexes in New York and Washington. Governments like Hungary and Slovakia, and European populist parties elsewhere, would also like to see closer diplomatic ties with Russia. Such restorations will be a small but important factor in an eventual war settlement in Ukraine. The West should remember that, if opened, these facilities are more likely to be staffed by professional operators than mafia hitmen taking selfies with mob tattoos. Alexander Neuman holds an MA in International Security and a BA in International Politics and Russian and Eurasian Studies from George Mason University. He is also a former visiting student at the University of Warsaw and an alumnus of New Eastern Europe's Think Tank School. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. 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