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Hiroshima releases outline of peace declaration for 80th atomic bomb anniversary

Hiroshima releases outline of peace declaration for 80th atomic bomb anniversary

NHKa day ago
The mayor of Hiroshima plans to quote atomic bomb survivors known as hibakusha to call for peace in a divided world at the ceremony to mark the 80th anniversary of the city's atomic bombing.
Hiroshima on Friday released the gist of the peace declaration that Mayor Matsui Kazumi will read out at the ceremony on August 6. Hibakusha joined experts in drafting the statement.
The declaration will quote the phrase "never give up" that hibakusha Tsuboi Sunao repeated during his lifelong campaign to seek the abolition of nuclear weapons. Tsuboi, who was active at home and abroad, died four years ago at the age of 96.
It will also draw on the testimonies of other survivors to convey the importance of passing on their wish for peace.
The declaration will take note of the spreading idea that nuclear weapons are needed for national defense. It will ask world leaders if they've ever considered the possibility that their security policies are producing international conflicts.
Mayor Masui told reporters that the peace declaration will emphasize the hibakusha's wish for peace, to urge world leaders to establish security frameworks based on relationships of trust built through dialogue.
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