India must rethink its Arctic outlook

The Hindu

04-05-2025

As conflict zones multiply globally, another frontier is quietly slipping into turmoil — the Arctic. Long seen as a realm of scientific cooperation and environmental protection, the polar north is becoming a theatre of military and geopolitical competition. With Russia more assertive, China expanding its Arctic ambitions, and Washington renewing interest in Greenland, the region appears set for a renewed phase of strategic contestation.
In a curious way, the Arctic's movement from the margins of international politics to the heart of great power competition is an outcome of more than just clashing geopolitical ambitions. Climate change has been decisive, opening new maritime corridors and resource frontiers, and spurring a scramble for access. The Northern Sea Route (NSR), once passable only during narrow summer windows, is now virtually an open sea lane. Traffic is rising, potentially redrawing global trade patterns.
A growing militarisation
Alongside this commercial promise lies a more concerning development: the steady militarisation of the high north. With Arctic states reopening old military bases, deploying submarines, and reinforcing claims through visible shows of force, the stakes for control and influence in the region are higher than ever.
To be sure, the militarising impulse of Arctic powers is not new. Nor is the tendency to leverage polar presence for wider strategic manoeuvering. United States President Donald Trump was the first to drop pretences when he proposed buying Greenland in 2019. Far from the absurdity many deemed it, the idea had clear geopolitical merit; behind Mr. Trump's theatrics lay a deeper instinct — a recognition that the Arctic was no longer peripheral to global power play, but central to it.
For non-Arctic powers such as India, the implications of a militarised Arctic are serious, prompting many to reassess their regional postures. Even so, New Delhi remains curiously insulated from the region's shifting realities. Faced with complex challenges closer to home, India appears oddly impassive to the dangers taking shape in the high north.
India's 2022 Arctic Policy offers a thoughtful road map focused on climate science, environmental protection and sustainable development. It draws strength from the parallels between the Arctic and the Himalayan 'Third Pole' — anchored in the belief that glacial melt and atmospheric shifts in the far north have cascading effects on South Asia's water security and monsoon cycles.
Yet, the policy underplays the Arctic's rapidly evolving strategic landscape. As regional actors pivot from cooperative science to geopolitical contestation, India's restrained posture risks relegating it to the margins. The predisposition to remain apolitical — justifiable in an earlier era — now appears increasingly anachronistic. Besides being absent from conversations reshaping access and governance, India remains detached from the emerging politics of influence in the Far North.
This is not to say that India lacks a presence in the Arctic. It operates a research station in Svalbard, contributes to polar expeditions, and holds observer status in the Arctic Council. But these mechanisms were designed for a more benign order — one built on consensus and mutual trust. With the existing order visibly fraying, scientific diplomacy no longer seems fit-for-purpose.
A constructive role for India
The stakes for India are far from hypothetical. As the NSR becomes more viable, trade flows may shift northwards, potentially undercutting the relevance of the Indian Ocean sea lanes. Should Russia and China consolidate control over Arctic sea routes, India's aspirations to be a connectivity hub in the Indo-Pacific — articulated through initiatives such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) — could face serious headwinds.
More concerning for New Delhi is the blurring of boundaries between the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific. Growing Russia-China strategic coordination in the Arctic and China's expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean are making it harder for India to focus solely on its maritime interests in the south. An added challenge is the growing unease among Nordic states over India's long-standing ties with Russia, particularly as Moscow's brazenness in the Ukraine war deepens.
India has yet to reassure its Arctic partners that an approach guided by strategic autonomy, rather than alignment, can still be beneficial for all sides.
A more purposeful engagement
New Delhi, then, needs a recalibration — one that retains its climate-conscious ethos but builds sharper strategic focus. This calls for a three-part strategy. First, India must institutionalise Arctic engagement beyond science, with dedicated desks in the Foreign and Defence Ministries, regular inter-agency consultations, and collaboration with strategic think tanks. Second, New Delhi should partner with like-minded Arctic states on dual-use initiatives — polar logistics, maritime domain awareness, and satellite monitoring — that enhance India's credibility without raising red flags. Third, India must claim a seat at the table as new Arctic governance forums emerge — on infrastructure, shipping regulation, digital standards, and the blue economy. India must also approach the Arctic's political landscape with sensitivity, avoiding an extractive mindset and engaging local communities with restraint and respect.
India's current Arctic posture is not without merit, but it is no longer adequate. It rests on the hope that scientific cooperation and climate diplomacy can smooth over growing geopolitical fault lines. That hope is fast fading. The Arctic is now shaped less by principle than by power. Those unwilling to adapt could find themselves edged out of the emerging order.
Abhijit Singh is the former head of the maritime policy initiative at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi