Incorrect speed record card caused 2024 Nepal plane crash, panel says
A CRJ-200LR aircraft, owned by Nepal's Saurya Airlines, crashed shortly after taking off from the capital Kathmandu in July last year, killing all 17 passengers and the co-pilot. Only the captain survived.
The crash was caused by a "deep stall during take-off because of abnormally rapid pitch rate commanded at a lower-than-optimal rotation speed", the report submitted to the government said.
Aviation expert Nagendra Prasad Ghimire told Reuters the aircraft made a premature takeoff before gaining the necessary speed.
The report said errors in a speed card - a document that provides important airspeed information for a specific aircraft, particularly during takeoff, climb and landing - had gone unnoticed and the airline had failed to address previous cases of a high pitch rate - the rate at which an aircraft's nose rotates up or down - during take-off.
It said there had been gross negligence and non-compliance by the operator during the entire process of cargo and baggage handling.
It recommended all operators review their speed cards and comply with the requirements of cargo and baggage handling.
The panel also asked the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) to review the procedure for permitting non-scheduled flights.
CAAN spokesman Babu Ram Paudel declined comment, saying he had not seen the report.
Saurya Airlines will do "everything necessary" to implement the recommendations, operation manager Bivechan Khanal said.
The crash focused attention on the poor air safety record of landlocked Nepal, which is heavily dependent on air connectivity.
In 2013 the European Union, citing safety concerns, banned air carriers certified in Nepal from flying the European sky.
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