Gayton McKenzie reacts to claims he LIED about his race
This week, the Minister of Sport, Arts and Culture called for the hosts of the Open Chats Podcast to be cancelled over their derogatory comments about the racial minority.
On his Facebook account, Gayton McKenzie reacted to screenshots of social media users who accused him of 'lying' about being a coloured person.
One screenshot of an X post said of the minister: 'Gayton Mckenzie's real surname is Makena. It was allegedly changed by his father to McKenzie during Apartheid for better employment opportunities.
Another claimed that Patriotic Alliance leader's son Calvyn Le John used his mother's maiden name as to secure government contracts, a claim he has since disputed.
Gayton reacted to the accusations with several laughing face emojis.
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣 Posted by Gayton Mckenzie on Sunday 10 August 2025
In his 2006 biography The Choice, Gayton McKenzie – who was born and raised in Bloemfontein – shed light on his diverse background.
He wrote: 'My grandmother is Irish, my grandfather Japanese. My father is a product of that, but looks like a coloured man. My mother is Sotho. I simply look black.
'I am not entirely clear about my ethnicity. My parents have the photographs at home, but the genetics have been shuffled with a deck of wildcards, and the result is me, someone who looks nothing like the Irish, but has their luck, who looks nothing like the Japanese, and can't think of anything I have that's remotely related to them, except the DVD player at home.
'I can't even say I'm a typical Sotho, but at least I can tell you that in Sotho. Ke ka o bolelo ntho eo ka Sesotho'.
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