Malaysia's Perodua aims to localize 60% of parts for its first EV, says CEO
Zainal Abidin Ahmad, president and chief executive of Perodua, officially Perusahaan Otomobil Kedua, told reporters on Thursday at the Malaysia Autoshow 2025 that the company's first EV, the eMO, will be locally assembled at its factory in Selangor near the capital, with production set to begin in October.
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Japan Today
2 hours ago
- Japan Today
Malaysia rules out return of F1 over costs
auto racing By Isabelle LEONG Malaysia on Thursday ruled out Formula One returning to the country in the near future, citing costs and an already packed racing calendar. The Southeast Asian nation first hosted an F1 race in 1999 at its Sepang International Circuit, with the last grand prix held there in 2017. Malaysia dropped out of the F1 calendar from 2018 amid the rising costs of hosting the event. Sepang still annually stages MotoGP motorbike racing. Sports minister Hannah Yeoh said hosting F1 again would require the Malaysian government to pay about 300 million ringgit ($71.09 million) annually. Beyond hosting rights, Yeoh said the circuit requires about 10 million ringgit a year to maintain to the required standards for top-level motor racing. "Malaysia must also bind itself to a contract of between three to five years with Liberty Media (which holds F1's commercial rights), amounting to a commitment of about 1.5 billion ringgit during this period," she told parliament on Thursday. "The current race calendar is very tight and if Malaysia is interested in hosting again, we will have to compete with other countries for a place on the calendar," she added. In the region, Singapore stages a night race and Thailand hopes to become the latest host. The Thai cabinet in June approved a $1.2 billion bid to stage F1 on the streets of Bangkok from 2028. Yeoh said Malaysia is not shutting the door completely on having F1 races again, if any corporate entities were willing to shoulder the costs. "We are open to this and can cooperate," she added. "The Formula 1 is a very prestigious sporting event that is followed by many fans around the world. So if we could afford it, it's a good-to-have event in Malaysia." © 2025 AFP
The Diplomat
9 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Bangladesh-Malaysia Relations Go Beyond Trade and Migration
If Bangladesh's interim government does not hold elections as promised by February, Malaysia's Anwar Ibrahim could be criticized for legitimizing an unelected regime. During the visit of Chief Advisor of Bangladesh's interim government Muhammad Yunus to Malaysia on August 11-13, the two sides signed five Memorandums of Understanding and three Exchanges of Notes, covering defense, energy, trade, education, diplomatic training, the halal industry, and migrant workers issues. The two sides pledged to develop a free trade agreement, improve protections for Bangladeshi migrant workers, and step up cooperation in renewable energy and the blue economy. Yunus urged investors in Malaysia to invest in Bangladesh. As for Malaysia, it promised to join an ASEAN-led mission on the Rohingya issue, a crisis that has deeply affected Bangladesh for a long time. The agreements signed during Yunus' visit signal that the two countries are looking to deepen ties beyond trade and migration. Among the big outcomes of Yunus' recent visit was the MoU on defense. This is the first time that Malaysia and Bangladesh have agreed on a framework for joint military training, and intelligence and security cooperation in the Bay of Bengal and the Strait of Malacca. Through such cooperation, Malaysia and Bangladesh have signaled that they would stand together in securing these seas and guiding the strategic flows of these regions. The defense MoU could also open the door for defense industry cooperation and technology transfers, enabling Bangladesh to modernize its military even as it helps Malaysia diversify its defense industry. Yunus' trip came less than a year after Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim visited Bangladesh. It was on October 4, 2024, that Anwar and his 58-member delegation landed in Dhaka. Bangladesh was still roiled in uncertainty; only two months earlier, Hasina's 15-year-long authoritarian rule had ended, following weeks of student-led mass protests that had left around 1,400 people dead and thousands injured. The fall of the Hasina government left Bangladesh in a raw state, and its institutions shaken, even on the brink of collapse. The Bangladeshi people were caught in uncertainty over old grief and the promise of a new Bangladesh as Yunus took charge of the interim government. Anwar was the first foreign leader to visit Bangladesh since the fall of the Hasina government. It was a clear sign of solidarity, which served as a reminder to Dhaka that it was not alone in its moment of transition. For Anwar, the visit was an opportunity to increase Malaysian influence in Bangladesh amid its changing political landscape, and to strengthen Malaysia's stakes in the South Asian region through Bangladesh. Malaysia's historic relationship with Bangladesh gave Anwar's visit deeper resonance. In 1972, Malaysia was among the first Muslim-majority countries to recognize Bangladesh's independence. By visiting post-Hasina Dhaka, Anwar revived that symbolic connection, aligning Malaysia as a reliable friend of Bangladesh. During his visit to Malaysia, Yunus described Bangladesh's political situation as a 'magnitude-9 earthquake' that shook every institution and laid bare problems that have been brewing for a long time. His words conveyed the nation's struggles and the hope of the future ahead, presenting Bangladesh not as a country in need of stability, but one that was in the process of reform. Yunus also let Malaysia know that its support to Bangladesh during its difficult times would be remembered always. Bangladesh's outreach to Malaysia also stems from Dhaka's desire to diversify its foreign policy with regional powers. Traditionally, Dhaka has maintained close economic and political relations with New Delhi and Beijing, particularly in the fields of infrastructure and investment projects. Trade between Bangladesh and Malaysia has been growing continuously. Two-way trade was worth almost $2.92 billion in 2024, a 5.1 percent increase from the previous year. However, the trade balance is in Malaysia's favor. Bangladesh is Malaysia's second biggest trading partner in South Asia, with Malaysia exporting petroleum products, palm oil and chemicals to Bangladesh, and importing footwear, textiles and manufactured products. Visa problems are an important obstacle in the way of Bangladeshi nationals traveling to Southeast Asian countries, especially over the past year. Vietnam is not issuing visas to Bangladeshis due to security concerns since the regime change in Dhaka. It takes Bangladeshis 40-60 days to secure a Thai visa these days, compared to barely two weeks a year ago. While Bangladeshis find it easier to get a visa for Malaysia than for other Southeast Asian countries, a growing number of Bangladeshis have been deported from Kuala Lumpur to Dhaka in recent months. This problem shows how hard it is for Bangladeshi nationals to access better economic prospects in Southeast Asia despite their government's attempts to build closer diplomatic and economic relations with the region. Migrant workers are the cornerstone of Bangladesh-Malaysia ties. As many as 898,970 Bangladeshis are working in Malaysia's construction zones, factories, and plantations, and they remit money back home. But exploitation and horrific working conditions cast a shadow on the migrants' quest for jobs abroad. The bilateral discussions during Yunus' visit resulted in pledges to ensure fair wages and better working conditions. Despite these efforts, there are significant challenges to the bilateral relationship. First, without overhauling the recruitment system, in which middlemen charge Bangladeshi migrants exorbitant fees, both governments risk perpetuating this cycle of exploitation. Second, there will have to be serious policy initiatives to stimulate trade diversification. Bangladeshi ready-made garments face competition from other regional rivals, especially following Trump's tariffs. Malaysia and Bangladesh have to look to other sectors, such as digital services, halal industries, and renewable energy to boost bilateral trade. Third is the political instability in Dhaka. If the interim government begins to face difficulties in organizing free and fair elections within the promised timeframe, Anwar could come under criticism for legitimizing an unelected regime. Furthermore, it is also unclear what stance Bangladesh's post-election government will take.
The Diplomat
a day ago
- The Diplomat
China Slowly Making Security Inroads in Southeast Asia, Report Says
While the U.S. is still the region's security partner of choice, Sydney's Lowy Institute has noted a growing divide between mainland and maritime Southeast Asia. China's efforts to build up its security engagement with the nations of Southeast Asia are starting to make progress, Sydney's Lowy Institute Analysis said in a new report, although the United States remains by far the region's most influential security player. The report, published yesterday, analyzed Southeast Asia's defense agreements, dialogues, and joint military exercises with ten countries: Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It noted a broad expansion of these engagements over the past decade, as Southeast Asian nations have sought to diversify their defense partnerships in a context of growing strategic competition between China and the United States. As a result, the report said, 'the landscape for defense cooperation in Southeast Asia is becoming more complex and contested.' An important part of this, as the report notes, has been China's attempts to bolster its defense engagement with the region, as a complement to its strong economic and trade ties. While this is intended to challenge the predominance that the U.S. has enjoyed since the end of World War II, Beijing's efforts have had patchy results. According to the Lowy Institute's analysis, the U.S. was the top overall defense partner for Southeast Asia, leading the region for both military exercises and dialogue mechanisms, and ranking equal first with India for the number of defense agreements signed between 2017 and 2024. China only ranks eighth overall, and sixth for the number of dialogue mechanisms, defense agreements, and combined military exercises. Beijing's efforts have been heavily weighted toward the five nations of mainland Southeast Asia (Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam), which have, in general, seen much less interest from external defense partners than the maritime region. This is likely due to China's growing maritime assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea, which has led to a raft of new defense initiatives involving the Philippines in particular, but also with Indonesia and Singapore. This has allowed China to make more substantial inroads in mainland Southeast Asia. China is now the top defense partner for Laos and Cambodia, while also bolstering its engagement with Thailand, which saw its security engagement with its U.S. treaty ally drop after the military coup of 2014. China also remains a key defense partner of the Myanmar military, which is currently fighting to maintain its hold on power in the face of a coalition of resistance forces and ethnic armed groups. While China has made some recent gains in terms of strengthening its defense ties with Indonesia and Malaysia, the current trends point toward a possible intra-regional split within Southeast Asia into areas of relative Chinese and American defense influence. The region 'risks dividing into two camps: maritime countries with deep defense ties to the United States and its allies, and mainland countries lacking such cooperation,' Susannah Patton, the report's co-author and the Institute's deputy research director, said in a statement accompanying the report's release. However, it is also true that not all defense agreements are created equally. As the Lowy Institute report notes, U.S. and Japanese engagement tends to serve a more practical function. As an example, it cited the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that the U.S. signed with Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand in 2005. This covers logistical support, supplies, and equipment used during exercises between U.S. forces and their Southeast Asian counterparts. Chinese engagement, on the other hand, is more likely to be subordinated to diplomatic and political goals. China's defense agreements with countries such as Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam 'are mostly vague and symbolic, containing only general commitments to cooperation and dialogue.' Most of China's agreements 'lack substantive provisions for technology transfer, combined training, or intelligence sharing.' The report notes that China is also more restrained and cautious in how it engages in joint military exercises with Southeast Asian partners. 'Interoperability is conspicuously lacking in China's military exercises with regional partners, a reflection of Beijing's reluctance to expose its capabilities, and differences in systems and doctrines,' the report stated. 'China's cautious stance has in turn bred mistrust.' Elsewhere, the report's findings reflected the region's attempts to escape the U.S.-China binary by building defense partnerships with other prominent regional partners. The report notes that between 2017 and 2024, Australia, India, and Japan have 'signed more defense agreements with Southeast Asian countries than China and the United States combined.' Moreover, 'If Canada and South Korea are included, the collective figures for the middle powers dwarf those of the United States and China.' Overall, the report points to the limits of China's defense engagement with the region, and suggests that the current trend, of deepening economic integration with China alongside growing security cooperation with the U.S. and its partners and allies, is likely to continue. Given that new defense cooperation initiatives from the United States and its allies focus largely on the maritime region – unsurprisingly, given the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea – this trend also 'risks leaving mainland Southeast Asia more reliant on cooperation with China and Russia, increasing the geopolitical divide within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,' the report stated.
