Opinion Military lessons from the Pahalgam tragedy

Indian Express

28-04-2025

What happened in Pahalgam on April 22 will remain in the institutional memory of our security forces for a long time to come. The absence of security forces in the Baisaran meadows, over a period of time, emboldened terrorists to select it as the location for their dastardly act. The methodology they adopted, of ascertaining the religious identity of potential victims before shooting them in cold blood, was designed to send a divisive message, the aim being to tear a hole in the secular fabric of our society and of Kashmiriyat. Encouragingly, the horrific act drew condemnation from various sections of society, including school children, throughout Jammu and Kashmir. Outside Kashmir, the narrative generated by the terrorists — of attacking Hindus — have unfortunately been lapped up by the mainstream media and made to reach the drawing rooms of households across the nation.
Having said that, this article endeavours to take forward the argument of Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain (retired) in his article, 'The day after, back to basics' (IE, April 25). The writer highlighted the most crucial and indispensable facet of basic unit-level patrolling tactics that deters terrorist activity: Area Domination Patrols (ADPs), which are used to demonstrate presence in an area.
When it comes to the basics, in addition to ADPs, there are several other tactical operations that a counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism (CI/CT) unit undertakes. These measures include day/night surveillance, road opening, picketing for securing an identified passage for the parties undertaking movement, etc. The prime example of picketing that security forces have been undertaking in J&K is the task of securing the Shri Amarnath Yatra route from Jammu to the two base camps at Sonmarg and Pahalgam. In a nutshell, all the above-mentioned tactical operations are the very basics that General Hasnain talks about. It is possible that such basics were overlooked, leading to the horrors of April 22. Of course, this is a conjecture, since one is not aware of the situation that prevailed on the ground when terrorists had their run.
The declining insurgency indices in the area over the last few years seemingly led to a sense of complacency at the unit level. Any operation planned by soldiers or well-trained terrorists — which the cadres under reference seem to have been — is always preceded by preliminary reconnaissance and confirmation of the movement patterns of the adversary. The absence or infrequent presence of troopers at Baisaran and the availability of soft targets in the form of tourists must have emboldened the terrorists.
Troops deployed in CI/CT, especially when terror indices are receding, face the challenge of complacency as keeping up the vigil 24 hours a day, seven days a week, is a daunting task. It falls upon the leaders, starting at the platoon, company and battalion levels to make a difference, by keeping the troops involved and motivated. The foundation for sustaining the interest levels of troops and thus their motivation can be laid by leading from the front. Irrespective of the prevalent situation and the various narratives that soldiers may be privy to while deployed on a task, their guard is not supposed to be lowered. Although this is an aspect that is obvious to the unit leadership, it is often taken for granted.
The leaders need to make the soldiers feel like they are a part of the big picture. This is achieved by repeatedly emphasising the role that they play in ensuring the security of the area and people. More often than not, due to distractions of various kinds — including the pace of operations, the dynamic situation, and the demanding environment — the leaders overlook the situation inside their command. Such oversight can lead to complacency, and in the worst case, can lead to an episode like Baisaran.
In the end, as per the classical teaching of CI/CT, all the tactical operations like ADPs, surveillance, road opening, picketing, etc., ought to be based on psychological operations that hinge on eliciting the support of the local population, the centre of gravity in CI/CT. In order to execute effective psychological operations, the orientation of soldiers to the local population and culture is indispensable. This is what facilitates human intelligence or HUMINT, a necessity for successful CI/CT. Employing soldiers as described above keeps them fruitfully occupied and motivated, since they see themselves as important stakeholders in the campaign against terrorists, and as part of the government. The overall efficiency of security providers is ensured by adhering to the basics that are normally overlooked. Ultimately, it is the agency of the unit leadership which can prevent incidents like Baisaran.