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Lesufi's government undermines the role of opposition by withholding information

Lesufi's government undermines the role of opposition by withholding information

IOL News4 days ago

Panyaza Lesufi The Gauteng Premier, Panyaza Lesufi, has refused the request for access to the records requested, says the writer.
Image: Oupa Mokoena Independent Newspapers
The Democratic Alliance (DA) Gauteng, the official opposition in the province, is committed to safeguarding South Africa's constitutional democracy, the principles and values espoused in the founding document.
Nonetheless, our efforts as the opposition to conduct oversight over the elected executive are increasingly thwarted.
The growing barriers to effective and meaningful conduct oversight are deliberate withholding and denial of crucial information, procedural delays and protracted legal battles that severely undermine our oversight role.
The affected areas are irregular procurement and contract management, unlawful appointments, and the lack of consequence management due to not enforcing recommendations from disciplinary action.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa explicitly highlights the separation of powers among the legislature, executive and judiciary, establishing much-needed mechanisms for effective oversight, a fundamental pillar of good governance.
In a healthy democracy, transparency and accountability are important principles. Laws regulating access to information are put in place to ensure that the public has access to the decision-making processes of those in power to hold them accountable for their actions.
There has been a growing reluctance or outright refusal by the governing party and those in leadership to provide vital information to enable effective scrutiny.
Effective legislative oversight relies heavily on access to accurate, timely and complete information. The legislature's ability to scrutinise government actions, expenditure, and hold public officials accountable centres on this access.
When the executive withholds information, be it through vague, sub-par or incomplete responses to questions in the house, dismissing Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) requests, or invoking the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) to shield data, our capacity as opposition to fulfil this oversight mandate diminishes. This casts a shadow on the executive promise of good governance and fulfilling their mandate.
This increase in information withholding has profound implications. Without transparency, there is no way to verify whether departments are acting in the best interests of the public or if resources are being misappropriated. This lack of transparency and accountability becomes a breeding ground for corrupt and unethical conduct, financial mismanagement and misconduct, which ultimately leads to poor service delivery.
Through the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), the DA has since October last year demanded full access to 177 forensic reports dating from 2016 to the present.
The Gauteng Premier, Panyaza Lesufi, refused the request for access to the records requested. However, the refusal did not provide adequate reasons based on the provisions of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) that the Office of the Premier relied on.
The DA Gauteng appealed the decision to refuse access to the reports internally in November, but the appeal was dismissed the following month. In January, we approached the Information Regulator, where the pre-investigation report found that 'there is a prima facie case that the complainant met the minimum requirements prescribed in PAIA, in that the request form was duly submitted to the public body.'
According to the Information Regulator, the alleged refusal by Lesufi's office to grant access and failure to state adequate reasons for the refusal, including the provisions of PAIA relied on, necessitates an investigation of the complaint to ascertain whether the requester (DA) must be given access to the records.
The use of legal provisions such as POPIA to justify withholding information raises concerns about the misuse of privacy laws as shields rather than safeguards. While protecting personal data is essential, these laws must not be weaponised to conceal misconduct and prevent public scrutiny. There must be a balanced approach that respects individual rights without compromising the public's right to know when such disclosure is both lawful and justifiable.
Furthermore, any reliance on privacy concerns must be weighed against the public interest in disclosure, particularly in cases where the public interest outweighs any purported confidentiality claims.
While POPIA is designed to regulate the lawful processing of personal information, it balances the right to privacy with the right to access information. The Act explicitly provides for instances where disclosure is necessary and lawful.
The ruling, therefore, emphasises how difficult it is for the public and government to balance between privacy, transparency, and due process. This is not the first time that our PAIA applications have been unsuccessful in what we increasingly view as the shielding of corrupt officials, politicians, and activities within the Gauteng Provincial Government (GPG).
The biennial report of the Gauteng Ethics Advisory Council (GEAC) for 2025 has restated what the DA Gauteng has been exposing about corruption, maladministration, non-compliance with relevant legislation and regulations and ethical violations severely affecting the delivery of services to residents of Gauteng.

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The Unintended Consequences of US Refugee Policy for South African Minorities
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Most South African farmers are black: why Trump got it so wrong
Most South African farmers are black: why Trump got it so wrong

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Gauteng High Court's mediation directive faces legal action from accident victim
Gauteng High Court's mediation directive faces legal action from accident victim

IOL News

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A car accident victim is challenging a directive by the Gauteng high court which makes mediation mandatory before civil trials are heard. She demands her day in court and says she cannot afford mediation. Image: Jacques Naude / Independent Newspapers WHILE the Constitutional Court has declined leave to a law firm to directly approach the apex court in an urgent bid to overturn a directive introducing mandatory mediation in the Gauteng Division of the High Court, a vehicle accident victim who is also objecting to the directives will take her plight to court. The Durban-based woman, who is left a paraplegic following the accident, will turn to the Gauteng High Court, Pretoria later in June to ultimately have the directives issued by the head of the court overturned. She said her accident occurred six years ago and she eventually obtained a court date issued in 2023 for her hearing. Her matter is scheduled to be heard in August this year, but her case is now first subject to arbitration in terms of the directive. This follows a directive issued by Judge President Dunstan Mlambo earlier this year that the Johannesburg and Pretoria high courts no longer allocate trial dates for civil cases (cases where evidence is being led, such as damages claims). Litigants, who in these cases want a judge to determine their issues, must first prove that they have tried to resolve their issues via mediation. A trial date will be allocated only if mediation does not resolve the issues, and they can prove via a certificate that they did try it. The Office of the Chief Justice earlier explained that there are no alternatives as the Gauteng Divisions simply cannot cope with the heavy workload. Judge Mlambo also commented in his directive that the bulk of these cases are, in any event, settled on the day of the trial. Thus, the mediation route is the practical solution so that judges can be freed to adjudicate over other matters. The woman will meanwhile bring her application in two parts - the first is that she and others may retain the court dates they have secured before the new directive came into force in April. The second part in which she is contesting the legality of the directive, will be heard at a later stage. The accident victim in this new legal challenge explained that it is expected of her (and others) to first pay the mediation fees before a mediator can adjudicate her case. She explained that before the accident she was a hairdresser. As she is now wheelchair-bound, her only income is a social grant. She is also HIV-positive and struggles with health issues. She said in an affidavit that this application is to ensure that she has her day in court. The applicant stated that the directive differentiates between plaintiff litigants and the RAF regarding the amount payable for mediation and when it's payable. The RAF, she claims, is only liable for R15,000 per mediation, which only becomes payable 30 days after the receipt of the mediation report. A plaintiff, on the other hand, must pay the balance of the mediation fee upfront. 'If a plaintiff litigant does not pay, no mediation can be conducted and no trial date can be obtained,' she stated. According to the plaintiff, she cannot pay for mediation and this will result in her being denied justice. She also questioned the constitutional validity of the directive. Gert Nel Inc Attorneys, through its director Gert Nel, in his now failed bid to the ConCourt, questioned whether this move for mandatory mediation is constitutionally sound. In an affidavit accompanying his urgent application, Nel said there are constitutional limits on judicial power.

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