Dalai Lama: Politics of reincarnation
The Dalai Lama's plan to name his reincarnation has sparked controversy with China, as reincarnation holds political power in Tibetan Buddhism. Historically, Buddhism and Islam influenced China, with Tibetan Buddhism gaining prominence through Mongol patronage. The concept of reincarnation was later used to solidify ties between Tibet, Mongolia, and China, leading to Chinese control over Tibetan reincarnations.
Reuters Tibetan spiritual leader, the 14th Dalai Lama, is served food on his 90th birthday celebration at the Tsuglagkhang, also known as the Dalai Lama Temple complex, in the northern town of Dharamshala, India, July 6, 2025. The Dalai Lama plans to declare where he will be reincarnated in his next life. In other words, where his successor will be born. To the rational mind, this may sound like a bizarre proposition, but it has annoyed the Communist authorities in China. This is because reincarnation in the Tibetan world is not about the occult or mysticism-it is about real political power. Wealth and weapons can control the bodies of people. Stories are needed to control the mind.The Chinese, whose core civilisational area has primarily been the river valleys of Yangtze and Hwang-ho, have long sought control of the dry western regions through whose mountain passes, Chinese got access to horses, in exchange for bolts of silk. From there came Buddhism, after 300 AD and Islam after 700 AD. These forces forced the isolationist China to become a major global player in medieval times, even before the arrival of Europeans arrived in ships after 1600 AD via the eastern seas.Ideas of rebirth spread via Buddhism. Rebirth is not very prominent in the Vedas, but it emerges as a major theme in South Asia following the rise of the Buddhist and Jain monastic orders 2,500 years ago. The Buddhist Jataka tales speak of the previous lives of the Buddha. Jain chronicles also speak of the rebirths of Ravana and Krishna who will become Tirthankara of the future. In Hindu tales, boons and curses of previous lives shape fortune and misfortune in present lives.Buddhist tales of rebirth became popular in China during the Tang dynasty around 800 AD when Chinese kings sponsored the building of Buddhist caves, Buddhist monasteries, Buddhist art and relic shrines. In Tibet, Buddhism made its early inroads around 800 AD. It became a major and powerful force by 1200 AD, roughly when Buddhist monks were migrating out of India, in search of new patrons, facing Brahmin hostility as well as Islamic persecution. The story of Padmasambhava who came from Oddiyana (Odisha) and tamed local Tibetan demons became the dominant story of how Tantric Buddhism reached the Himalayan plateau.
After Buddhism had declined in India, it found refuge in China (seen as the home of the Bodhisattva Manjushri) and in Tibet (seen as the home of the primal Buddha Vairocana). Southeast Asia retained the older models of Buddhism based on the teachings of Gautama Buddha. The Mahayana school flourished in China; the Tantric school flourished in Tibet. These had grander and highly innovative mythologies. The popularity of Tibetan Buddhism has much to do with the rise of the Mongols.
The Mongols, a fierce horse-breeding nomadic tribe, became conquerors under Genghis Khan in 1200 AD. The great Khan and his sons saw the Tibetan Vajrayana priests as magicians who could serve their war missions. Buddhist Tantric magic involving fierce "Heruka" beings could change weather conditions and strike fear in the hearts of enemies. In fact, the worship of Mahakala, a Tantrik Buddhist deity, played a significant role in the Mongol conquest of China as well as the sacking of Baghdad -a fact that is rarely discussed by 'rational' historians.Kublai Khan invited the Tibetan Phags-pa Lama to be his spiritual guide. This happened around 1300 AD. It was a major moment in world history, when relations between China and Tibet was established via a Mongolian king.Two hundred years later, the descendants of the Mongols and the descendants of the Tibetan lamas were seeking a way to reconnect and gain legitimacy. This is when the idea of reincarnation was invoked: a Mongol chief, Altan Khan, claimed that he was the reincarnation of Kublai Khan, and a minor lama of the Gelug monastery claimed that he was the reincarnation of Phags-pa Lama. In doing so, they were reasserting the links between Tibet, Mongolia and their shared claim over China. Altan Khan designated Sonam Gyatso as "Dalai" (a translation into Mongolian of the name Gyatso, meaning "ocean") in 1578.In subsequent decades, Tibetan lamas broke free of the shackles of the Mongol Khans and came to see themselves as both spiritual and military leaders of Tibet, perhaps inspired by the concept of the Caliph in the Islamic world. Fearing the rising autonomy and power of the Tibetan lamas, during the Qing (Manchu) era, the Chinese emperor declared that all reincarnations in Tibet must be ratified by the Chinese court. They implemented the "Golden Urn" system in 1793 which involved drawing lots from an urn to select candidates, ostensibly to ensure fairness and transparency.Few remember the war sorcery that Tibetan monks were once famous for. The Dalai Lama prefers to talk of the wise and compassionate Buddha rather than the fierce skull-bedecked "Heruka" beings that impressed the Mongols and terrified the Chinese. These images plaster the walls of Tibetan monasteries. Today, professors prefer calling them creative visualisations and metaphors of loving kindness. By ignoring the role of these myths in human history, historians and journalists fail to understand the complexity of the Dalai Lama's story in modern times.
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