Delhi must talk tough with Beijing over China's construction of a dam on Brahmaputra

Indian Express

17 hours ago

On July 19, Chinese Premier Li Qiang travelled to Nyingchi in Tibet to launch the construction of a 1.2 trillion yuan ($167.8 billion) mega hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River. This massive project is being constructed without prior consultation with lower riparian India, though its likely location in Medog County is barely 30 km from the place the river enters India and becomes the Siang, the main channel of the Brahmaputra River system. The project has several ominous implications for India, but the Government of India has not commented publicly on its construction.
While the project details have not been made public by China, except its cost and that it will involve five cascade hydropower plants, Chinese media reports suggest that it will generate nearly 300 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity annually, more than thrice the designed capacity (88.2 billion kWh) of the Three Gorges Dam in China, currently the largest in the world. It would involve drilling four to six 20-km tunnels and diversion of half of the river's flow.
India ought to be deeply concerned about the downstream impact, which will manifest in many ways. First, a project of this magnitude will inevitably interfere with the flow of waters in the Brahmaputra. The contribution of glacier melt, snow melt and precipitation in Tibet to the waters in the Siang could range from 25 per cent to 35 per cent. There will be significant impact downstream of any diversion or pounding of water in Tibet, particularly in the lean season. The construction of five massive hydropower plants in cascade is likely to involve reservoir-like structures, even though it is claimed to be a run-of-the-river project. Altering natural river flows will harm aquatic ecosystems, fisheries, sedimentation, and biodiversity hotspots.
Second, even more worrying is the risk of flooding. While reservoirs can regulate floods, unannounced or sudden releases of water during heavy rainfall, or in a natural disaster like an earthquake, to protect the structure, can exacerbate downstream flooding, causing immense damage to life and property.
Third, this massive project involving tunnelling through fragile and young mountains is being undertaken in an area classified as Seismic Zone V (very high risk), which has seen major deep and shallow earthquakes in the past. Medog County lies within the Eastern Himalayan Syntaxis, a highly seismic region influenced by the Himalayan Frontal Thrust and local faults like the Medog Fault. Challenges such as reservoir-induced seismicity, tunnelling, geological miscalculations, and previous Chinese lapses in construction quality (for instance, in the Neelum-Jhelum project in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir) leave zero margin for engineering error — post-construction, there will be an ever-present danger of disasters.
Fourth, China has leveraged its advantage as a predominantly upper riparian vis-à-vis its neighbours and has mostly withheld meaningful cooperation with downstream countries. For instance, China's development of a cascade of 12 smaller hydropower projects on the Mekong (called Lancang in China) has led to irregular fluctuations, drying out of areas, and depletion of fish catches and fertile sedimentation in the Lower Mekong Basin, affecting Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. This pattern of behaviour presages foreseen and unforeseen consequences of the proposed dam for India and Bangladesh.
Fifth, China's track record of cooperation under three MoUs with India over the past two decades has been unsatisfactory. China has suspended the supply of wet-season hydrographic data for the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej from time to time. It has not agreed to provide lean-season data, let alone discuss broader cooperation like the sharing of waters of trans-border rivers. Not one collaborative project has been undertaken under the umbrella MOU for cooperation signed in 2013.
Finally, neither China nor India is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997). However, two key principles of the Convention, 'equitable and reasonable utilisation' of shared waters and the 'obligation not to cause significant harm' to downstream states, are a part of customary international law. India has been a responsible co-riparian state, including with Pakistan, even after the Indus Waters Treaty was put in abeyance after the Pahalgam terrorist outrage. The same cannot be said of China.
The present strategy of quiet diplomacy with China is not working. Strangely, none of our readouts on recent high-level conversations with China have even mentioned the Medog project. Looking ahead, there must be strong signalling of our deep concerns about this project to China, both through diplomatic channels and in public comments. If the roles were reversed, there is absolutely no possibility of China being similarly circumspect. It is also worthwhile recalling how forceful Pakistan has been in dealings with India as a lower riparian, even though we had given generous terms under the Indus Waters Treaty.
The scope of the dialogue with China must be expanded beyond the issue of hydrographic data. As an affected party, we have every right to insist on full visibility on the technical specifications of the project, its environmental impact studies and how China proposes to tackle the seismic challenge. We must push for transparent and broader transboundary cooperation, similar to China's engagements with Kazakhstan on rivers like the Ili and Irtysh, to protect our existing and proposed user rights and other interests as a co-riparian. Indeed, we should seek suspension of work on the project until the relevant issues have been addressed. There should be a clear message that China undertaking a massive project like this without taking on board our legitimate concerns will have consequences for bilateral relations.
We must undertake a series of activities on our own. Considering the danger of floods and reduction in lean-season flows, India has no alternative but to create storage structures to moderate the risks in the immediate downstream. India should reassess the quantum of water contributed by major tributaries and local hydrological systems using its remote sensing datasets, geospatial modelling tools and legacy hydrological data to reduce dependency on upstream data from China. We have the means and expertise to monitor the project and make the findings of those studies public.
Finally, it is important to build a sustained narrative about China's unilateral actions in the upstream and escalate the issue bilaterally as also in our broader messaging on India-China relations. Our NGOs should raise this matter in relevant international platforms.
We must appreciate that India's circumspection could be seen by China as a sign of weakness. This wouldn't help in pursuing our larger agenda of rebuilding bilateral relations with our northern neighbour.
The writer is former ambassador to China