China's top prosecutor vows crackdown on torture in rare admission
China's top prosecutor has issued a rare admission that torture and unlawful detention takes place in the country's justice system, vowing to crack down on illegal practices by law enforcement officials.
China's opaque justice system has long been criticised over the disappearance of defendants, the targeting of dissidents and regularly forcing confessions through torture.
The country's top prosecutorial body the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) has occasionally called out abuses while President Xi Jinping has vowed to reduce corruption and improve transparency in the legal system.
The SPP announced Tuesday the creation of a new investigation department to target judicial officers who 'infringe on citizens' rights' through unlawful detention, illegal searches and torture to extract confessions.
Its establishment 'reflects the high importance… attached to safeguarding judicial fairness, and a clear stance on severely punishing judicial corruption', the SPP said in a statement.
China has frequently denied allegations of torture levelled at it by the United Nations and rights bodies, particularly accusations of ill-treatment of political dissidents and minorities.
But several recent cases involving the mistreatment of suspects have drawn public ire despite China's strictly controlled media.
A senior executive at a mobile gaming company in Beijing died in custody in April 2024, allegedly taking his own life, after public security officials detained him for more than four months in the northern region of Inner Mongolia.
The man had been held under the residential surveillance at a designated location (RSDL) system, where suspects are detained incognito for long stretches without charge, access to lawyers and sometimes any contact with the outside world.
Several public security officials were accused in court this month of torturing a suspect to death in 2022, including by using electric shocks and plastic pipes, while he was held under RSDL.
The SPP also released details last year of a 2019 case in which several police officers were jailed for using starvation and sleep deprivation on a suspect and restricting his access to medical treatment.
The suspect was eventually left in a 'vegetative state', the SPP said.
Chinese law states that torture and using violence to force confessions are punishable by up to three years in prison, with more serious punishment if the torture causes injuries or the death of the victim.
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HKFP
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China's top prosecutor vows crackdown on torture in rare admission
China's top prosecutor has issued a rare admission that torture and unlawful detention takes place in the country's justice system, vowing to crack down on illegal practices by law enforcement officials. China's opaque justice system has long been criticised over the disappearance of defendants, the targeting of dissidents and regularly forcing confessions through torture. The country's top prosecutorial body the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) has occasionally called out abuses while President Xi Jinping has vowed to reduce corruption and improve transparency in the legal system. The SPP announced Tuesday the creation of a new investigation department to target judicial officers who 'infringe on citizens' rights' through unlawful detention, illegal searches and torture to extract confessions. Its establishment 'reflects the high importance… attached to safeguarding judicial fairness, and a clear stance on severely punishing judicial corruption', the SPP said in a statement. China has frequently denied allegations of torture levelled at it by the United Nations and rights bodies, particularly accusations of ill-treatment of political dissidents and minorities. But several recent cases involving the mistreatment of suspects have drawn public ire despite China's strictly controlled media. A senior executive at a mobile gaming company in Beijing died in custody in April 2024, allegedly taking his own life, after public security officials detained him for more than four months in the northern region of Inner Mongolia. The man had been held under the residential surveillance at a designated location (RSDL) system, where suspects are detained incognito for long stretches without charge, access to lawyers and sometimes any contact with the outside world. Several public security officials were accused in court this month of torturing a suspect to death in 2022, including by using electric shocks and plastic pipes, while he was held under RSDL. The SPP also released details last year of a 2019 case in which several police officers were jailed for using starvation and sleep deprivation on a suspect and restricting his access to medical treatment. The suspect was eventually left in a 'vegetative state', the SPP said. Chinese law states that torture and using violence to force confessions are punishable by up to three years in prison, with more serious punishment if the torture causes injuries or the death of the victim.
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