Paul Biya's presidential candidacy a crisis of democracy in Cameroon
has been in power for four decades. Photo: Marco Longari/AFP
On 14 July 2025, Paul Biya, Cameroon's 91-year-old president,
Failure to confront this moment will also teach Africa's youth that formal politics offers neither accountability nor meaningful change.
Cameroon has not experienced a peaceful transfer of power since independence. Power remains concentrated in the presidency, while opposition parties are
The judiciary is subordinate to the executive and electoral bodies lack credibility. The system has grown accustomed to continuity rather than contestation and, over time, democracy has been reduced to a set of controlled rituals rather than a functioning political culture.
Biya's extended rule is not just a national problem. It reflects a regional weakness. Over the years, organisations such as the African Union and Central African regional bodies have failed to take meaningful action on cases of long-term incumbency, especially where elections proceed without outright violence.
The quiet tolerance of indefinite leadership has allowed authoritarianism to be dressed in the language of legality. The AU's Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance calls for term limits, transparent elections, and citizen participation, but its enforcement has been weak and inconsistent. This failure
Within Cameroon, the consequences of this political stagnation are clear. The conflict in the Anglophone regions remains unresolved, with thousands displaced and ongoing reports of violence. State responses have relied on force and token gestures of engagement. A lasting solution requires a shift towards genuine political dialogue that includes local voices and acknowledges the historical and structural roots of the crisis. Without that, the cycle of
Decentralisation, long promised but never fully delivered, must also be addressed. The country remains one of the most centralised in Africa, with local governments underfunded and politically weak. Meaningful decentralisation would empower communities and signal a commitment to democratic reform. It would reverse the long-standing exclusion of peripheral regions from national decision-making.
Electoral reform is another urgent priority. Public confidence in the electoral process is low, with allegations of fraud, media bias and voter intimidation common in each election cycle. If elections are to serve as more than a legitimising tool for incumbents, they must be grounded in fairness, transparency and institutional independence. This will require a review of the legal framework, the composition of the electoral commission and equal access to campaign platforms.
Biya's continued presence in power highlights a broader generational crisis in African politics. Leadership is dominated by ageing elites, while the continent's youthful majority is sidelined. In Cameroon, many young people have only ever known one president. Their exclusion from governance is not just symbolic; it has practical consequences for political legitimacy, innovation and long-term development.
When young citizens do not see themselves reflected in leadership, they disengage, emigrate or, in some cases, mobilise through informal or radical means. Any vision for democratic renewal must include the deliberate inclusion of youth in decision-making spaces, not as tokens, but as central actors in shaping the country's future.
None of these reforms can succeed in isolation from economic renewal. Cameroon's youth, who make up 60% of the population, face high
Cameroon's crisis cannot be addressed through surface reforms or another tightly controlled election.
If there is to be a turning point, regional actors must take responsibility. The AU and other African leaders should not view Biya's decision as an isolated national matter, but as part of a broader pattern that threatens the continent's commitment to inclusive political governance. Silence in the face of democratic decline is not neutral. It is a form of complicity. African institutions must be prepared to act when those in power no longer serve the people or uphold democratic norms.
Biya's candidacy is not simply a continuation of the past. It is a warning about the future.
Helen C Folefac and Tinashe Sithole are post doctoral research fellows at the SARChI Chair African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Mail & Guardian
a day ago
- Mail & Guardian
Kenny Kunene steps away from Joburg and PA roles
Suspended Patriotic Allianc deputy president Kenny Kunene. (X) Suspended Patriotic Alliance (PA) deputy president Kenny Kunene has resigned from his roles in the City of Johannesburg. His resignation follows his official suspension from the PA pending an investigation into his relationship with murder-accused Katiso 'TK' Molefe, who was this week arrested for allegedly orchestrating Oupa Sefoka (DJ Sumbody's) murder in 2022. Kunene has agreed to 'cooperate with an investigation' and will step aside from his political role in the Patriotic Alliance until he is cleared of the allegations. He will also not act and work in any official capacity in the party while on suspension, its leader Gayton McKenzie said in a statement. Kunene tendered his resignation as Proportional Representation Councillor and transport MMC in the city of Johannesburg with immediate effect. 'I am stepping aside from public life, for a period, while my party satisfies itself to certain allegations that have been raised against me, which are unfounded, but I have nevertheless agreed it would be in the public interest for me to await the clearing of my name before considering a return to public service and duty,' Kunene said in a statement. This week, Kunene, who also owns the online publication African News Global, said the purpose of his visit to Molefe's property was to facilitate an exclusive interview on various topics for one of his journalists. He added that he only knew Molefe from a distance. Molefe was arrested for allegedly orchestrating DJ Sumbody's murder in 2022, and he was also on R100 000 bail for another murder case at the time of his arrest. The Democratic Alliance, which has been critical of the Patriotic Alliance following these recent revelations, said it notes Kunene's resignation, but demands investigations into the projects that Kunene was overseeing. These include a full investigation into all contracts and procurement processes at the Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA), a full investigation into the contractors and procurement of the Lilian Ngoyi street repairs and a full investigation into contracts, appointments and procurement processes at the Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC). 'Should the executive mayor fail to respond to the DA within seven days, the DA will use all avenues at our disposal, including approaching law enforcement with the information available to us, to hold the executive mayor as shareholder representative himself responsible for the alleged irregularities at JRA and MTC,' the party's Johannesburg caucus leader Belinda Kayser-Echeozonjoku said in a statement.
Mail & Guardian
a day ago
- Mail & Guardian
Rwanda's security forays buck the trend
Kigali's bilateral agreements with Maputo and Bangui are underpinned by mining ventures. Photo: Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP Amid mounting criticism of United Nations peacekeeping missions and Western military involvement, many African governments have sought alternative security partners — private military companies, local militias and several regional partnerships such as the Alliance of Sahel States and Multinational Joint Task Force around the Lake Chad Basin. In the eyes of many scholars and practitioners, these partnerships challenge long-standing normative preferences for multilateral and regional institutions, namely the African Union and its regional economic communities. These institutions have long been lauded for their mandates to preserve the sovereignty of cooperating states and develop collective legitimacy in African governance. In practice, however, consensus-building has frequently led to slow deployment timelines and gross operational inefficiencies on the ground. While operational successes under multilateral institutions do exist, they are more often exceptions and are vastly outpaced by the decisive responses demanded by Africa's security crises. Against this backdrop, Rwanda's recent forays into bilateral security agreements mark a significant departure from Africa's status quo. Kigali's deployments to the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2020 and Mozambique in 2021 challenge both conventional norms and institutional habits. The relative success of these deployments, especially in contrast with their multilateral equivalents, raises a fundamental question of African security cooperation. As more states pivot toward bilateral partnerships, is it time to recalibrate Africa's security architecture? If so, what normative and legal frameworks must accompany this shift to prevent entrenching patterns of dependency and personalised security politics? Once a recipient of international peacekeeping itself, Rwanda has since become a frequent contributor to peace and security operations in Africa. As a post-genocide state, it carries a unique moral authority on matters of civilian protection. Kigali has sought to amplify this influence through its vocal advocacy for the robust defence of endangered civilians, being one of three countries to co-sponsor a United Nations appeal, known as the Kigali Principles, in 2015. The country's foreign policy took a more assertive turn in late 2020, when Kigali dispatched troops to the CAR to counter an insurgent offensive against the capital. Only a few months later, in mid-2021, Rwandan troops deployed to Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province. Rwanda was engaged through a bilateral agreement and therefore free to operate outside any pre-existing multilateral mandates or rules of engagement. From the onset, Rwandan troops were engaged in offensive operations to reclaim insurgent-held territory, including the port town of Mocímboa da Praia. Subsequent campaigns saw Rwandan forces push deeper into Ahlu Sunna Wa Jama (ASWJ) strongholds, including in an eight-day campaign along the Messalo River to capture a key base in Mbau and later joining the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) for a coordinated assault in Macomia. Despite its emphasis on kinetic, offensive engagements, Rwanda also placed importance on developing a rapport with the local population. This involved taking on various community activities, including static engineering projects and the delivery of healthcare services in remote villages, as well as more dynamic security measures such as accompanying at-risk smallholders to provide protective overwatch while crops were being tilled. These efforts brought troops into close proximity with local populations, who became vital sources of real-time intelligence on insurgent movements. Very few, if any, African interventions have simultaneously managed to secure territorial gains, minimise civilian casualties and sustain their engagement with local populations. (Graphic: John McCann/M&G) In contrast to the operational successes attributed to Rwandan forces, the SAMIM struggled with fragmented command structures, logistical inertia and restrictive rules of engagement. In some instances, troops were confined to their forward operating bases, which severely undermined their effectiveness and all but ruled out any possibility of battlefield gains. In a move that clearly favoured its bilateral partnership with Rwanda, Mozambique did not establish a joint command structure to enable coordination or intelligence sharing among the various security partners. Although the agreements themselves are known only to the countries' top leadership, Rwanda's commercial interests in the CAR and Mozambique hint at potential motives for its involvement. Crystal Ventures, the commercial wing of Rwanda's ruling party, has rapidly expanded its operations in the CAR and Mozambique through its subsidiary companies in recent years. Vogueroc Mining, a firm reportedly backed by Crystal Ventures, received government approval in 2022 to explore mineral licences at five sites in the CAR. In Mozambique, a joint venture between Rwanda's Isco Segurança and a local firm won a contract from TotalEnergies to secure $20 billion in LNG infrastructure. Another Crystal Ventures-linked company, Strofinare Mozambique, began exploring graphite deposits near Ancuabe in 2021, a region strategically close to Rwandan operational bases. This suggests a dual-track strategy that blends security assistance with economic diplomacy, both of which increase Rwanda's leverage with the external financiers of its deployments. While the European Union and France foot most of the bill, Mozambique pays only a small amount directly to Kigali in exchange for its security services. The deficit, it seems, is made up with commercial concessions. Rwanda is not the only African state engaging in such dual-track diplomacy, but it is quickly becoming one of the most effective. While various explanations have been offered for Rwanda's successes in the CAR and Mozambique, its interventions signify more than just operational efficiency. They coincide with a growing trend among African states to act through bilateral agreements, bypassing the AU and its regional blocs. This reflects a global shift from multilateralism to ad hoc, interest-driven solutions. These agreements have advantages but often lack the clear mandates or oversight mechanisms expected of multilateral agreements. Human rights abuses can go unchecked without such rules of engagement and legal accountability, perhaps even more than has happened under multilateral missions. In Mozambique, the SAMIM forces were credibly accused of burning insurgent remains, although the subsequent investigation is still said to be ongoing. While multilateral oversight does not guarantee accountability, by sidelining regional frameworks altogether, it is unclear where the burden of oversight resides. This greatly weakens external scrutiny, particularly as missions overrun their original timelines or mandates. Missions exceeding initial timelines also risk dependency. Mozambique's reliance on Rwandan troops has grown significantly since 2021, with little sign of a coherent exit strategy or meaningful local security capacity being developed in parallel. When foreign forces play such a central role in stabilisation missions, the host state may come to defer their governance responsibilities rather than develop them. Rwanda's role of peacekeeper, counterinsurgent and stabiliser has blurred traditional categories of external intervention in an already neglected province of Mozambique. At the risk of entrenching a model prioritising stability over sustainability, it needs to be asked whether bilateral agreements are enough to deliver security gains or if local capacity building and governance reform should also be on the agenda. A reconfiguration of Africa's security governance, where bilateral deployments and coalitions of the willing are increasingly being perceived as more capable and credible than multilateral interventions, suggests that other capable states may seek to emulate these results, especially when lucrative commercial opportunities form part of the agreement. Although Rwanda's successes in Cabo Delgado have garnered a fair amount of attention, its model may not be easily replicable. Few African militaries possess the combination of professionalism, logistical capability and reputational capital that Kigali has cultivated to market itself as a security partner. Rwanda's playbook may very well be an outlier and not a trendsetter, although the possibility of other states seeking out similar strategies cannot be ruled out. As more states consider bilateral partners, Africa could enter an era of hybrid security governance, where formal regional mechanisms coexist with bilateral agreements. These agreements will probably exist between states with capable militaries and receptive host states and carry not only the risk of fragmentation but also of entrenching personalised security politics and dependency. If hybrid security agreements are to become the new normal, Africa must urgently debate the norms, rules and red lines that will govern their use. Erika van der Merwe is a research intern with the peace and security programme at Good Governance Africa. She is pursuing a master's in international relations at the University of Cape Town, specialising in security studies.
The Herald
2 days ago
- The Herald
'I'm a new chief whip': MK Party's Makhubele plays down 'yes' vote blunder in Appropriation Bill
MK Party chief whip Colleen Makhubele has played down confusion about the Appropriation Bill in parliament where she mistakenly voted 'yes' for the bill the party maintained it would reject. During the budget vote on Wednesday, Makhubele announced the party was voting in favour of the bill, claiming 49 votes in support. However, after the house chair asked her to verify, she did a swift U-turn, declaring they were voting against the bill. Makhubele said she thought they were voting for the ad hoc committee to investigate the allegations by KwaZulu-Natal police commissioner Lt-Gen Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi. 'We are rejecting this. We are changing our vote. I thought we were dealing with the ad hoc committee. We will support it when it comes, that was the confusion,' Makhubele said. 'I'm just a new chief whip, I will make errors, so relax. We are voting against the bill.' Makhubele, who was appointed chief whip last month replacing Mzwanele Manyi, faced severe backlash from other MPs who mocked her in parliament. EFF leader Julius Malema criticised Makhubele's blunder during a media briefing on Thursday. 'It was a mess, a mess in action,' Malema said. 'That's what you elected South Africa. You are asked twice and you're saying, 'I'm voting in support'. That MK Party caucus almost collapsed yesterday [Wednesday]. You elect people who do not understand. The chairperson allows that. It's not principled. Once the voting is closed it's done. He undermined the decorum and the integrity of that process. MK Party will never reduce us in numbers anywhere else including in thinking.' The National Assembly approved the Appropriation Bill by 262 votes to 90. All 10 parties in the government of national unity voted in favour, while the MK Party, EFF, African Transformation Movement, United Africans Transformation and National Coloured Congress opposed the bill. TimesLIVE
