Turkey's Planned Syria Military Deployment Echoes Russia's A Decade Ago

Forbes

02-04-2025

Turkey is reportedly making preparations to take control over a strategic airbase in central Syria. The planned deployment, coordinated with the new caretaker government in Damascus, has some noteworthy parallels with Russia's deployment at the invitation of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which began just under a decade ago.
Turkey is preparing to deploy domestically-made air defense systems in Syria's T-4, Tiyas air base in the country's central Homs region, Middle East Eye reported on Tuesday.
According to sources cited by the outlet, Turkey plans to deploy a 'Hisar-type air defense system' at the base 'to provide air cover' before beginning reconstruction and expansion and deploying drones, including ones 'with extended strike capabilities.'
The Hisar is an indigenous Turkish-made family of air defense systems built to intercept threats at different altitudes. The Hisar-A is a low-altitude system, while the Hisar-O is medium-altitude. Incidentally, Turkey previously planned to deploy those systems in Syria's northwestern Idlib province in 2020, shortly after deadly clashes with the former Assad regime.
The Middle East Eye report also revealed that Ankara has long-term plans to establish a layered air defense around T-4 to defend against and deter numerous threats, including fighter jets. Such moves are undoubtedly unwelcome in Israel, which would view the deployment of air defenses in particular as an obstacle to its air supremacy over Syria.
The Jerusalem Post also reported on Tuesday that Turkey seeks to provide Syria with air defense and transform T-4 into a base for drones. The Israeli Air Force destroyed the remnants of Assad's former Russian-supplied air defenses during an extensive campaign of airstrikes shortly after that regime's collapse in December 2024. Russia has also withdrawn its strategic air defenses from its airbase on the Syrian coast.
There are some notable parallels between Turkey's purported planned deployment at T-4 and the Russian military's September 2015 intervention in Syria during the bloody years of the civil war.
Among the early signs of a buildup that month was Russia setting up a medium-range Pantsir-S1, or SA-22, at Hmeimim before the arrival of the broader expeditionary force, which included Sukhoi fighter-bomber jets. Built to provide point defense, the Pantsir-S1 was perfect for defending the base against aerial threats at close ranges.
The Pantsir-S1's deployment was the first step in Russia establishing a multilayered air defense centered on Hmeimim, with long-range, strategic S-400 Triumf missile systems arriving not long later. The latter system could theoretically engage targets as far as 250 miles away. However, its actual ability to do so was long in question and never demonstrated throughout its deployment in Syria.
There are also some striking similarities between the justifications for the initial Russian deployment in Syria and Turkey's planned one. Both were welcomed by the central government in Damascus, Russia by Assad and Turkey by his replacement, incumbent interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Both framed their respective interventions as necessary for combating the Islamic State, ISIS, group. Sources cited by Middle East Eye say that the upcoming Turkish deployment will support Ankara's campaign against ISIS remnants in the Syrian desert.
Russia's claims about fighting ISIS were debunked not long after it began its air campaign in support of Assad. Those early airstrikes overwhelmingly focused on other opponents of Assad elsewhere in the war-torn country. Regarding the Pantsir-S1 deployment, NATO's supreme allied commander in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, remarked, 'These very sophisticated air defense capabilities are not about ISIS.'
Nevertheless, Hmeimim would come under attack later in the war by crude but potentially deadly homemade drones launched by militias. The threat of militia drones is undoubtedly one reason behind Turkey's planned deployment of a Hisar system at T-4. At the same time, that upcoming deployment is also likely an attempt to deter or at least limit Israeli incursions into Syrian airspace, something Turkey will have a hard time doing in light of Israel's more advanced air force.
Turkey's justification for deploying military forces in central Syria primarily to fight ISIS may also prove as dubious as Russia's. T-4 is not far from active ISIS remnants in the Syria Desert, who have waged a deadly insurgency for years and killed everyone from soldiers of the former Assad regime to truffle hunters. That threat does necessitate some base defenses, including short-range air defenses like the Hisar-A or even the 35 mm Korkut anti-aircraft gun.
However, as Russia focused primarily on bombing Assad's opponents in the civil war, Turkey's past interventions have, for the most part, focused on targeting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, the main U.S. ally in Syria against ISIS. While it has battled ISIS in Syria before, most notably in Al-Bab in 2016-17, Turkey's cross-border operations in January 2018 and October 2019 exclusively focused on the Kurdish-led forces.
In more recent years, air and drone strikes have repeatedly destroyed civilian infrastructure across Syria's northeastern Kurdish regions, often leaving millions of civilians without electricity and water. In recent weeks, cross-border Turkish strikes have supported recent attacks by the self-styled Syrian National Army militia against the SDF along the Euphrates River, attacks that have killed and maimed scores of civilians.
These campaigns were not nearly as destructive in terms of lives lost as, say, the Russian-backed destruction of East Aleppo in 2016. Nevertheless, they do indicate that Turkey's military presence in Syria probably won't focus primarily on combating ISIS, especially if the SDF is not disbanded and integrated into the Syrian security forces in the near future.
Of course, there are also some salient contrasts between the Russian intervention of a decade ago and Turkey's upcoming one. T-4 will most likely primarily host drones and maybe some helicopters rather than F-16s. Throughout the Russian deployment, Hmeimim primarily hosted crewed fighters and tactical bombers, like the Soviet-era Su-24, the newer Su-34, and the Su-35. Russia occasionally flew strategic bombers directly from Russia, taking the opportunity to test them in combat. Turkish F-16s would have little trouble flying anywhere in Syria directly from airbases on Turkish soil. The same goes for many Turkish drones.
Furthermore, any Turkish deployment into Syria will not be in the form of an expeditionary force like the Russian one – Moscow's ability to support its Syrian bases became even more challenging after Ankara closed the Turkish Straits to Russian warships following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Resupplying T-4 from Turkey will also prove much less logistically challenging than Hmeimim or the Tartus naval base was for Russia.
Another difference involves Israel. While Israel was wary of Russia cooperating with Iran and its militia proxies in Syria, it promptly established a de-confliction mechanism with the Russian military shortly after Moscow's intervention. Throughout the intervening decade, Russia posed little to no obstacles to Israel attacking Iran-linked targets throughout the country, aside from instances in which airstrikes impacted near Russian positions. Israel repeatedly cited this successful cooperation as an excuse not to supply Ukraine with arms after the 2022 invasion.
Things may not go so smoothly between Israel and Turkey. Israel is already wary of Turkish intentions in Syria and Ankara's warm ties with the new Islamist-rooted government in Damascus, so much so that it's encouraging the United States not to pressure Russia to withdraw its forces from Syria. Therefore, Israel is unlikely to tolerate any attempt by Turkey to use T-4 to limit its unrestricted access to Syrian skies.