Witkoff says US cutting short Gaza ceasefire talks over Hamas's ‘lack of desire'
'We will now consider alternative options to bring the hostages home and try to create a more stable environment for the people of Gaza.'
He said it was 'a shame that Hamas has acted in this selfish way' and that the US is 'resolute' in seeking an end to the conflict in Gaza.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recalled hi negotiating team (Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP)
It was unclear what 'alternative options' the US was considering. The White House had no immediate comment, and the State Department did not immediately respond to messages.
A breakthrough in talks on a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas has eluded the Trump administration for months as conditions worsen in Gaza.
The sides have held weeks of talks in Qatar, reporting small signs of progress but no major breakthroughs. Officials have said a main sticking point is the redeployment of Israeli troops after any ceasefire takes place.
Earlier on Thursday, Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu's office recalled his country's negotiating team back to Israel in light of Hamas's response.
In a brief statement, the prime minister's office expressed its appreciation for the efforts of Mr Witkoff and mediators Qatar and Egypt, but it gave no further details.
The deal under discussion is expected to include a 60-day ceasefire in which Hamas would release 10 living hostages and the remains of 18 others in phases in exchange for Palestinians imprisoned by Israel.
Aid supplies would be ramped up and the two sides would hold negotiations on a lasting truce.
An Israeli soldier stands beside humanitarian aid packages on the Palestinian side of the Kerem Shalom crossing in Gaza (Ohad Zwigenberg/AP)
The talks have been bogged down over competing demands for ending the war. Hamas says it will release all hostages only in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal and end to the war. Israel says it will not agree to end the war until Hamas gives up power and disarms, a condition the militant group rejects.
The State Department said earlier in the week that Mr Witkoff would be travelling to the Middle East for talks, but US officials later said Mr Witkoff would instead travel to Europe.
It was unclear if he was holding meetings there on Thursday.
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