Industrial giant Copec posts Q4 profit up 15%
Feb 27 (Reuters) - Chilean industrial conglomerate Empresas Copec (COPEC.SN), opens new tab on Thursday posted a profit for the last three months of 2024 that rose 15% to $191 million, while revenues dipped 6.4%.
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Reuters
an hour ago
- Reuters
Rising Asia temperatures bode well for US LNG export prospects
LITTLETON, Colorado, June 11 (Reuters) - U.S. exports of LNG are already at record highs so far in 2025, but forecasts for above-average temperatures across key Asian import markets could lift them even higher this summer. Average temperatures for Japan, South Korea and China are all forecast to hold above normal through the end of August, likely boosting use of power-hungry air conditioners. That higher demand load will in turn spur utilities to lift generation from all available sources, including from natural gas plants fed mainly by imported liquefied natural gas (LNG). That upbeat demand outlook is good news for U.S. LNG exporters, who are riding a wave of strong demand from Europe but face a potential slowdown in European buying this summer. Temperatures across East Asia are already hovering above long-term averages, and are expected to continue trending higher over the next two months. Average temperatures in Japan - the second largest LNG importer after China in 2024 - are expected to register around 6% above the long-term average from now through the end of August, data from LSEG shows. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and several cities in China are forecast to register similar readings. As the northern hemisphere summer coincides with the rainy season across much of Asia, the forecasted hot temperatures are likely to be mixed with high humidity levels. That in turn will likely spur heavy use of air conditioning systems, which can push power demand levels sharply higher during heatwaves and strain regional power grids. Asia's electricity producers are used to the summer climb in electricity demand and adjust output levels accordingly. In 2024, average electricity demand during June, July and August - the hottest months of the year - was around 9% above the monthly average for the year as a whole. To accommodate that higher load, utilities lifted output from all power sources, but especially from fossil fuel plants which supply power that can be dispatched on command when output from renewable sources drops off. Both gas-fired and coal-fired generation across Asia during June, July and August last year averaged around 5% more than the 2024 monthly average, Ember data shows. To feed the higher demand for power anticipated during June, July and August, Asian LNG importers tend to book higher LNG volumes during May, June and July than during other months. Between 2021 and 2024, U.S. LNG exports to Asia during May, June and July averaged around 7.8 million metric tons a month, according to data from commodity intelligence firm Kpler. That compares to an average of 2.23 million tons a month to Asia overall for the 2021 to 2024 period, and underscores how important LNG is as a power fuel during the Asian summer. A key driver of potential Asian purchases will be the price of LNG, which needs to compete with coal in power generation and has recently proved too dear for many Asian consumers. U.S. LNG export prices have averaged around $8.54 per thousand cubic feet so far in 2025, up 35% from the 2024 average, according to data from LSEG. That said, any rise in Asian LNG purchases would likely come just as LNG orders by Europe tend to retreat to their annual lows, which could apply downward pressure to prices. Over the first half of 2025, European markets accounted for 70% of all U.S. LNG exports, Kpler data shows, while Asian markets accounted for just under 20%. Average monthly volumes of U.S. LNG dispatched to Europe during January to June were around 6 million tons, compared to around 1.6 million tons a month to Asia. A key caveat that will govern Europe's LNG appetite going forward is how quickly gas storage operators there want to replenish inventories, which were depleted over the past winter and must be restocked ahead of next winter. Currently, Europe's gas stockpiles are around half full, which compares to around 70% full at this time of year in 2023 and 2024, according to LSEG. If gas storage operators opt to restock as quickly as possible, then Europe's imports of LNG could remain quite strong over the coming months. But if Europe's storage firms opt instead to wait until the autumn to replenish stocks, or refill tanks from pipelined supplies, then Europe's LNG purchase volumes could drop sharply. Such a sudden wilt in European orders would likely trigger an aggressive markdown in prices, however, and in turn lure fresh buying interest in Asia where power firms are already primed to boost output. That suggests that overall U.S. LNG export volumes should remain fairly robust for the near term at least, regardless of where the buyers reside. The opinions expressed here are those of the author, a columnist for Reuters. Enjoying this column? Check out Reuters Open Interest (ROI), your essential new source for global financial commentary. ROI delivers thought-provoking, data-driven analysis of everything from swap rates to soybeans. Markets are moving faster than ever. ROI can help you keep up. Follow ROI on LinkedIn, opens new tab and X, opens new tab.
Economist
2 hours ago
- Economist
Tariffs on the table: how trade wars threaten the resilience of global food systems
People sometimes assume their breakfast is locally sourced. The eggs may come from a nearby farm, but the animal feed was probably imported. The fruit might be Chilean, the coffee Ethiopian and the wheat in the toast from Kansas or Ukraine. Like smartphones, the food we eat is a global product. Agriculture accounted for 8% of global merchandise trade in 2023, and it continues to play a central role in food access, affordability and stability. With trade wars and protectionist policies on the rise, the delicate balance of global food systems is increasingly at risk. Global trade is a key driver of a secure food system Global trade is fundamental to ensuring food reaches those who need it most. About 80% of the world's population live in countries that import more food than they export, relying on trade to supply basic staples, stabilise prices and provide year-round access. In times of crisis—whether due to conflict, climate events or economic shocks—this interconnected system plays a vital role in preventing shortages and curbing price spikes. For food-importing countries, the volatility of trade flows can mean the difference between stable prices and empty shelves. Global trade doesn't just move goods; it builds resilience, acts as a buffer against droughts and fills in seasonal gaps. When a bad harvest hits one part of the world, another can often pick up the slack—if the system is working. Consider the example of Ukraine. Before Russia's invasion in March 2022, Ukraine and Russia were together responsible for nearly 30% of global wheat and barley exports. The war halted shipments overnight, creating ripple effects in import-reliant countries like Egypt, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Lebanon. These countries, which are heavily dependent on wheat imports due to limited domestic supply, saw bread prices soar and protests follow. But a total food crisis was averted, because alternative suppliers such as Australia, Brazil, the EU, India and the United States were able to step in and fill the gap. That's what makes trade such a powerful stabiliser. It's not just about efficiency—it's about accessibility and resilience. Trade helps countries absorb shocks and maintain food supply when crises hit. Trade wars can create ripples far beyond their borders The United States is the world's largest agricultural exporter. In 2023, its agricultural exports accounted for nearly 7% of its total exports. It shipped $27bn-worth of soyabeans, $13bn of corn and $7bn of wheat around the world. China buys US soya to feed livestock, Mexico depends on US corn for tortillas and animal feed, and the EU and Japan rely on American grains for staples. However, export strength does not guarantee stability. During the 2018-20 US-China trade war, retaliatory tariffs on American soyabeans led to a sharp drop in exports. The resulting losses for the agriculture sector were estimated at $27bn and many farmers faced severe financial strain. Critically, the impact of trade disruptions between the United States and China didn't remain confined to these two markets. They rippled outward, impacting countries that are large exporters and those that rely on consistent imports. Many countries in Africa and Asia, such as South Africa and the Philippines, struggled to adapt due to limited diversification and weaker global integration, with their exports to both the United States and the rest of the world declining following the tariff increases. In Rwanda, soyabean prices rose by 25%—from $520 to $650 per tonne—after China imposed retaliatory tariffs on US soyabeans and turned to African suppliers, creating regional shortages. In 2025, similar patterns are emerging elsewhere: shrimp farmers in Mexico are facing rising feed costs, driven in part by the new US tariffs, forcing producers to seek alternatives as they grapple with falling shrimp prices and tight profit margins. Given the importance of US-China trade to global food systems, a good number of farm goods are likely to be affected. The most significant are shown in Table 1 below. Rethinking trade to strengthen food systems Whether it is geopolitical tensions or climate challenges, the risks facing our food system are only increasing. We need to make our food systems more resilient so they can adapt to external shocks without breaking. A good place to start is trade. Rethinking trade rules to safeguard food flows would help. Exempting critical farm goods from tariffs and export bans could steady supplies when tensions rise. Multilateral bodies such as the World Trade Organisation and the World Food Programme should defend these exemptions and mediate disputes, to stop food becoming collateral damage in trade wars. But shielding trade is not enough. Many countries—especially in the developing world—need to diversify their suppliers. Doing so would reduce their exposure to disruption and improve their bargaining position. Regional trade blocs can help. The EU, for instance, has shown that shorter supply chains and cross-border co-operation can support food security when global markets stumble. However, trade comes with costs. Shipping food across the world adds to greenhouse-gas emissions. Perishables require cold chains that consume energy. Transport accounts for almost a fifth of emissions from food systems. But that does not mean shutting borders. Smarter trade is the answer: shorten supply routes where possible, invest in greener logistics and grow more food closer to where it will be eaten, while keeping trade open where it matters most. Such changes depend on better infrastructure. Modern cold chains are essential to preserve food quality during delays or detours. Countries should invest in decentralised storage, efficient refrigeration and digital monitoring to keep food moving, fresh and safe, even when global trade falters. This isn't just about economics: it's about resilience History demonstrates that food insecurity breeds unrest. The 2007-08 global food-price crisis led to protests in many countries, while rising food costs fuelled protests during the Arab spring. As climate change, conflict and economic shocks increase, we are likely to see more of the same, unless we act now. Fundamentally, the world cannot afford to allow food to become collateral damage in trade wars. We need a food system that is resilient, inclusive and built to withstand 21st-century shocks. That means keeping trade going, but making it smarter, greener and fairer.
Reuters
3 hours ago
- Reuters
BOJ to postpone rate hike to Q1 next year, tiny majority of economists say: Reuters poll
TOKYO, June 11 (Reuters) - The Bank of Japan will forego another interest rate hike this year due to uncertainty over U.S. tariff policy, according to a slight majority of economists in a Reuters poll who expect the next 25-basis-point increase in early 2026. Japan's central bank will slow the pace of tapering its government bond purchases from next fiscal year, a majority also said, while three in four surveyed expect the government to cut down on issuance of super-long bonds. The latest results reflect policymakers' apprehension at a time when U.S. President Donald Trump's erratic tariff policies are threatening the economic outlook and as investors are increasingly concerned about Japan's public finances. The BOJ is still pushing for tighter monetary conditions, contrasting with its peers tilting for rate cuts, with its governor Kazuo Ueda stressing the central bank's readiness to keep raising interest rates if underlying inflation approaches its 2% target. "If trade negotiations between the United States and other countries progress, global economic activity is likely to pick up," said Takumi Tsunoda, senior economist at Shinkin Central Bank Research Institute. "The timing of policy interest rate hikes is now more likely to be delayed compared to previous projections, but the BOJ is expected to implement an additional rate hike in the first quarter of 2026." None of the 60 economists in the June 2-10 survey expected the BOJ to raise rates at its upcoming policy meeting on June 16-17. Specifically, 52% of economists, 30 of 58, expected borrowing costs to stay at 0.50% at year-end, the reverse of a poll in May when 52% expected rates at 0.75% by end-2025. Interest rate futures are only pricing in about 17 basis points more of tightening from the BOJ by year-end. More than three-quarters of respondents, 40 of 51, now expect at least one 25-basis-point increase by end-March, the poll showed. Of 35 economists who specified a month for when the BOJ will next hike rates, January 2025 was the top choice at 37%, followed by 23% for October this year and 9% saying March 2025. The BOJ exited a massive stimulus programme in March last year and pushed up short-term interest rates to 0.25% in July and 0.50% in January. Just over half of respondents, 17 of 31, said the BOJ would decelerate its pace of tapering JGB purchases from the current roughly 400 billion yen per quarter beyond April next year. Of those respondents the quarterly taper size prediction ranged from 200 billion yen to 370 billion yen. The BOJ began tapering its huge bond buying last year to wean the economy off decades of massive stimulus even though it still owns roughly half of outstanding JGBs. Three-quarters of economists, 21 of 28, said the government would trim issuance of super-long bonds while the rest said the amount would not change. Yields on super-long JGBs rose to record levels last month due to dwindling demand from traditional buyers like life insurers and concern over steadily rising debt levels. Reuters reported on Monday the government is considering buying back some super-long bonds it issued at low interest rates on top of an expected government plan to trim issuance of super-long bonds in the wake of sharp rises in yields. Seventeen said the issuance of 30-year JGBs would be reduced, followed by 16 selecting 40-year and 10 choosing 20-year bonds. Survey respondents were allowed to give multiple responses. "With the auction results consistently weak, the finance ministry is facing strong pressure to reduce the amount of super-long JGBs issued from July onwards," said Kazutaka Maeda, economist at Meiji Yasuda Research Institute. (Other stories from the June Reuters global economic poll)
