Wild word games between Iran, US about what is nuke 'enrichment'

Yahoo

a day ago

Of course, allowing and blocking uranium enrichment are polar opposites, so the two by definition cannot coexist – or can't they?
On April 12, the US and Iran held their first round of nuclear talks under the Trump administration and the first serious negotiations between Washington and Tehran since September 2023.
Since then both US President Donald Trump and Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have been desperately searching for a formula which would allow a deal that both sides could live with.
Many issues have been resolved, but one key dispute which the sides are dancing around and inventing new terms and phrases to try to solve is, to both allow but also block, low level Iranian uranium enrichment.
Of course, allowing and blocking uranium enrichment are polar opposites, so the two by definition cannot coexist – or can't they?
The first wild formula talked about the Islamic Republic giving up all uranium enrichment for one to three years – a symbolic period- followed by being allowed to enrich uranium at the 3.67% low levels – similar to the 2015 Obama administration JCPOA nuclear deal.
This might still be the "winning" formula for the sides, but so far Tehran has bridled at even such a relatively short symbolic uranium enrichment freeze, demanding to be allowed to enrich at the 3.67% low level.
Next, the latest wacky formula being discussed is a consortium of Middle East nuclear cooperation between Iran, the Saudis, the UAE, Turkey, and maybe others, with the US managing the joint venture.
Somehow this would either lead to Iranians enriching uranium with their own centrifuges but not on their territory, or Iranians enriching uranium on their territory but along with other countries to somehow dilute their actions, or some mix of these arrangements on an island which Iran and other countries also have disputed claims to.
There are also some potential points about improved inspector access to nuclear facilities and possibly some underground facilities being shut off (but not destroyed.)
What all of these creative arrangements have in common is they are focused on symbolic victories for both Trump and Khamenei without seriously getting into the essence of what most endangers Israel about Iran's nuclear program.
In truth, what is most dangerous about the Islamic Republic's nuclear program is its fleet of advanced centrifuges.
It is not irrelevant whether these centrifuges are operating or in storage – it is certainly better to have them not operating.
But as long as they are not destroyed, Khamenei, at any moment, can order them out of storage and these machines are so efficient that they could get Iran back to where it is now in terms of nuclear enrichment in a matter of months.
This point was so aptly illustrated by the IAEA's report on Tehran's nuclear enrichment progress this past weekend which most of the world completely misunderstood.
In public, Israel, like most of the world, wrongly focused on the fact that the quantity of the Islamic Republic's enriched uranium at the high 60% level was now, according to the IAEA, enough for around 10 potential nuclear weapons.
But that was not the real danger illustrated by the report.
When the last report was published three months ago, Iran had enough uranium for at least a potential six or so nuclear weapons in conservative estimates, and according to some hawks, already had enough for close to 10 nuclear weapons.
Yet, Israel's problem is not six versus 10 nuclear weapons, but if Iran has even one.
Preventing Khamenei from obtaining even one nuclear weapon is the reason why a record number of top Israeli defense officials want a green light to strike Tehran's nuclear facilities while they are the most vulnerable they have been in decades due to the success of Jerusalem's October 26, 2024 strike which destroyed Iran's best air defenses.
So what was most disturbing was that the IAEA report showed Iran could enrich enough 60% uranium for three to four nuclear weapons in only three months using its advanced centrifuges.
No one can say that warnings about what these advanced centrifuges could do if taken out of storage in the future is theoretical – they just did exactly what the worst-case scenario would be – confirmed by the apolitical IAEA.
As long as Khamenei's advanced centrifuges are not destroyed, any wild or wacky words which he and Trump use to nail down a tightrope formula for a deal on Iran enriching uranium, will be more about each of those leaders saving face than about protecting Israel over any lengthy period of time.