Five years on, the lessons of Galwan

Hindustan Times

a day ago

No one knew about the Galwan Valley in the Eastern Ladakh region of India until the fateful days of June 15-16, 2020. Something happened on the intervening night that impacted Sino-Indian relations in a big way and forced us to revisit our doctrines on strategic preparedness and border security.
On the fifth anniversary of the Galwan clashes, it's necessary to remember the bloody skirmish that left our borders bleeding. Since 2013, a pattern of border tensions flaring up regularly between China and India has become obvious. In 2017, Chinese soldiers entered disputed areas. India showed alacrity in countering the incursions. Both parties held many rounds of discussions to defuse the tension and agreed to maintain the earlier status quo. Both countries withdrew their soldiers to the positions they held before the incursion.
Meanwhile, China had constructed an observation post in Galwan Valley. Despite Indian soldiers repeatedly protesting and asking the Chinese to vacate the makeshift observation post, the latter refused to oblige within the stipulated time.
When, under the command of Colonel Santosh Babu, close to a hundred Indian soldiers went to remove the encroachment, a large contingent of Chinese soldiers attacked them. According to the treaties signed in 1996 and 2005, both armies don't use lethal weapons in case of a clash. So, what unfolded was shameful and instructive. Those aggressors had long sticks covered with barbed wire, steel rods and other such weapons that were enough to kill anyone. Outmanoeuvred and outnumbered, our soldiers fought bravely, but they didn't arrive at the location with an intent to fight. The unfortunate result was that 20 soldiers, along with Colonel Santosh Babu, laid down their lives in close-quarter hand-to-hand combat.
The news hit the Indian masses like a tonne of bricks. Countrymen started asking if the 58 years that lapsed between 1962 and 2020 weren't enough to prepare for such a contingency. Everyone knew China annexed Tibet under a well-thought-out plan in 1959. Since then, Beijing has been involved in steadily changing the demographics of the land by increasing the number of Han settlers to outnumber the native Tibetans. Since 1980, it has been constructing military cantonments, airfields, and helipads along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at a steady and fast pace.
It's not that India was caught napping or that we weren't doing anything. We were preparing, but our speed was slow. In 2014, after coming to power in the Centre, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made it a priority and diverted his energies and focus to upgrading the military preparedness along the Chinese borders.
Roads were extended to the borders and the existing ones were broadened. Border posts were upgraded. Special focus was given to the Indo-Tibetan border police during this period. It's true that despite our herculean efforts during the last decade, we will still need many more years to match the Chinese preparations. Still, powers that be in Beijing are now becoming jittery.
This was the reason they raked up the Doklam issue before Galwan. Despite an agreement, probably, Galwan was carried out to stop us. But were they successful?
The answer is no. New Delhi didn't lose its nerve. Within no time, 68,000 soldiers, 90 battle tanks, and a large cache of critical equipment were deployed in Eastern Ladakh. New Delhi knew it wasn't enough. China had more than 200,000 soldiers deployed in its Western Theatre Command, and its reserves weren't far behind.
India's border with China is 3,488 kilometres long. However, China insists that it is only 2,000 kilometres. Our strategists were clear that we can't man the entire border, and neither can the Chinese. Exploiting this chink in the armour, our soldiers captured many steep and snow-clad heights including the Thakung Peak. The strategic importance of these heights was immense. Now, the Chinese soldiers deployed in the valley were in our line of fire. The Chinese should have known that we have enough experience to command heights since 1984, the year we captured the Siachen glacier. It broke China's morale and gave us a formidable bargaining chip at the negotiation table. After four years of intense negotiations, soldiers have returned to their bases, but the rancour in the relations remains.
The clash also affected the way diplomacy and international negotiations are conducted. Earlier, dealing with such an impasse was the sole remit of the foreign office. However, after the Galwan clashes, military officers from both sides came to the negotiating table. The process was excruciatingly long, but no one can be more vigilant towards border security than military personnel.
I am sure Indian generals must have made a well-considered decision. How Beijing's ruling elite views us was evident recently during the military conflict with Pakistan last month. China openly sided with Pakistan. After Galwan, not only has it provided deadly weapons to Pakistan, but it has also trained them. Some experts believe that Pakistani military officials have been seen in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) training facilities in Ladakh and the North East areas.
What is the key message from Galwan and the recent clash with Pakistan? We should be prepared to fight both China and Pakistan simultaneously. Age-old military principles insist we should remain alert to the enemy's every move. The world is rapidly changing in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas, and Israel-Iran conflicts, and we must remain prepared for every eventuality. Chinese general Sun Tzu was right when he said, 'Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win'.
Shashi Shekhar is editor-in-chief, Hindustan. The views expressed are personal