US-funded Radio Free Asia halts Cantonese service in face of Trump's funding cuts
Radio Free Asia has halted its Cantonese-language service after 27 years due to funding cuts by US President Donald Trump's administration.
In a letter posted to its website on Monday, the Cantonese service said it would cease publishing news from Tuesday – the 28th anniversary of Hong Kong's handover from Britain to China.
'Following funding cuts by the US government, the size of Radio Free Asia's team has continued to shrink. Our Cantonese service… will stop updating news from tomorrow,' the Chinese-language letter read.
'The news on our website will become history and stay there indefinitely,' the letter added.
The letter also said there had been plans since last year to rename Radio Free Asia's Cantonese service as 'RFA HK,' following a huge surge in the Hong Kong audience since 2019, when the city was swept by large-scale pro-democracy protests and unrest.
'After Apple Daily, Stand News, and Hong Kong Citizen News disappeared, with self-censorship at mainstream media outlets in Hong Kong becoming increasingly common, the Cantonese service of Radio Free Asia became one of the news outlets that Hongkongers relied on,' the letter said.
But in March, Trump signed an executive order to defund the outlet's parent agency, the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which also funds news organisations such as Voice of America.
Apple Daily and Stand News – both outlets critical of the authorities in Hong Kong – were forced to shut down following government raids in 2021. In January 2022, online outlet Hong Kong Citizen News ceased operations, citing the 'deteriorating environment for the media.'
Last year, two top editors of Stand News were convicted of sedition, while the trial of Apple Daily founder Jimmy Lai on foreign collusion and sedition charges is still ongoing. He faces up to a life sentence if convicted.
The closure of the Cantonese service followed shutdowns of other Radio Free Asia language services last month, including a rare Uyghur news service, as well as those in Tibetan and Burmese. Its Lao service was halted in March following Trump's cuts.
As of this week, production in Mandarin, Korean, Khmer, Vietnamese, and English were still operating.
Ongoing legal disputes
Radio Free Asia has sued the Trump administration over the funding cuts. In April, a federal court issued a preliminary order to the US government to restore funding.
Last month, Radio Free Asia said it would delay layoffs thanks to the preliminary court victory but added that it had yet to receive funding from the USAGM.
Radio Free Asia was established in 1996 by the US Congress to provide reporting to China, North Korea and other countries in Asia with little or no press freedom.
Its Cantonese service began operations in May 1998. But last year, Radio Free Asia closed its Hong Kong office after being labelled 'anti-China' by Beijing-backed newspapers Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao.
Last June, security chief Chris Tang accused Radio Free Asia of endangering national security under the guise of news operations, according to local media reports.
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