Case of ‘El Chapo' son cooperating with U.S. prosecutors roils Mexico
On Tuesday, Sheinbaum said she had filed a defamation complaint in Mexico against Jeffrey Lichtman, the high-profile attorney representing Ovidio Guzmán López, who last week pleaded guilty in federal court in Chicago to fentanyl trafficking and other crimes. He has agreed to cooperate with U.S. prosecutors in a bid to reduce a potential life sentence.
In comments after the court hearing, Lichtman labeled as 'absurd' Sheinbaum's repeated contentions that Washington should coordinate with Mexico on the case — especially if, as is widely expected, Guzmán López spills the beans on alleged ties between Mexican officials and cartels.
In an incendiary post on X, Litchman assailed the Mexican leader's 'corrupt office and government' and charged that Sheinbaum 'acts more as the public relations arm of a drug trafficking organization than as the honest leader that the Mexican people deserve.'
That sparked a flurry of denunciations from allies in Sheinbaum's ruling Morena bloc, which dominates Mexican politics.
Ernestina Godoy Ramos, Sheinbaum's official counsel, labeled Lichtman's comments 'grotesque and unforgivable, breaking the ethical and legal limits of the profession.'
Declared Sheinbaum: 'I'm not going to establish a dialogue with a lawyer for [a] narco-trafficker.'
Lichtman also represented El Chapo — now serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison in Colorado — and is the attorney for Joaquín Guzmán López, another son of the drug lord. Like his brother, he is in U.S. custody and faces drug smuggling and other charges.
El Chapo's sons, known as Los Chapitos, or the 'Little Chapos,' assumed responsibility for cartel dealings after their father's arrest in 2016, prosecutors say. Guzmán López was extradited to the United States in 2023 after being nabbed following a shootout outside Culiacán, the Sinaloa state capital, that left almost two dozen people dead, including 10 Mexican soldiers. Two other sons of El Chapo remain in Mexico directing cartel operations, according to U.S. officials.
Behind the nasty contretemps between the New York barrister and la presidenta is a widespread sense here that Guzmán López is poised to dish a mound of dirt about Mexican politicians on the payroll of the Sinaloa cartel. He may have already done so.
What else, political observers ask, could explain the special treatment that members of El Chapo's family received in the spring?
In May, U.S. authorities escorted 17 members of El Chapo's extended family — including his ex-wife, the mother of Ovidio and Joaquín — into San Diego from Tijuana. Although the U.S. Justice Department declined to comment, Mexico's top law enforcement official said the move was probably part of a cooperation deal between Guzmán López and Washington.
'He [Ovidio] must be singing,' said Guillermo Valdés Castellanos, a former intelligence chief in the administration of former President Felipe Calderón, a political adversary of Sheinbaum. 'I think it's part of a very clear strategy by the government of Donald Trump to pressure Mexico … to take action against the profound links between organized crime and and Mexican politics.'
While frequently praising Sheinbaum, Trump has denounced the 'intolerable alliance' between Mexico's government and organized crime. Trump has imposed punishing tariffs on Mexico in what he calls an effort to shut down fentanyl trafficking.
Though critics have called Trump's characterizations overblown, the narco-government collaboration in Mexico goes back decades.
Calderón's top security official, Genaro García Luna, was convicted of taking millions of dollars in bribes from Sinaloa cartel traffickers and is serving a 38-year U.S. prison sentence.
Sheinbaum and her political mentor, former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, hailed the U.S. prosecution of García Luna — a case that exposed deep corruption among their political rivals. But the tables may now be turning.
There have been no public disclosures about what Guzmán López may be secretly revealing to U.S. prosecutors. But speculation in Mexico has focused on the suspected crookedness of so-called narco-governors serving under the banner of Sheinbaum's dominant Morena political bloc. None have been charged.
But even more explosive, experts say, would be any fresh allegations against López Obrador, Sheinbaum's predecessor and the founder of Morena. During his six-year term, López Obrador repeatedly denied unconfirmed reports of having received political donations from people tied to organized crime.
By all accounts, any public airing of new accusations against López Obrador from U.S. authorities could trigger a political earthquake in Mexico.
'There is total uncertainty and fear in the presidency,' said José Luis Montenegro, a Mexican journalist who wrote a book on Los Chapitos. 'The politicians of Morena must be trembling.'
Sheinbaum has won widespread acclaim for her 'coolheaded' approach to Trump provocations on issues such as tariffs, immigration and drug smuggling. But the Mexican president has sharply rebuked U.S. prosecutors' apparent deal-making intentions with El Chapo's son. She has accused U.S. authorities of hypocrisy — seeking cooperation from Guzmán López at a time when the Trump administration has designated the Sinaloa cartel and other Mexican crime groups as terrorist organizations.
'So where is their position of 'not to negotiate with terrorist groups'?' Sheinbaum asked this month.
Mexican leaders are still outraged about what they call the U.S.-orchestrated kidnapping almost a year ago of Ismael 'El Mayo' Zambada — co-founder of El Chapo's Sinaloa cartel — who is now also in custody in the United States.
Mexican officials suspect that U.S. authorities recruited Joaquín Guzmán López to abduct El Mayo, bundle him into a private plane and fly him to an airfield outside El Paso, where U.S. agents arrested both El Mayo and Joaquín Guzmán López.
Washington has never clarified its role in the sensational case. The apparent betrayal of El Mayo set off a civil war in the cartel — pitting El Mayo loyalists against Los Chapitos — that has cost hundreds of lives in Sinaloa state.
Now, three top accused Sinaloa cartel capos sit in U.S. custody, and at least one, Guzmán López, appears keen to make a deal that could expose a web of official corruption, roiling Mexican politics.
Special correspodent Cecilia Sánchez Vidal contributed to this report.
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