Duterte wins mayoral election despite being jailed in The Hague
Former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte has won a mayoral race in his home city, according to unofficial election results released on Tuesday. The apparent win comes even as he remains in custody at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, facing charges of crimes against humanity.
Duterte, 80, was arrested by Philippine authorities at Manila's international airport in March and flown to The Hague, where he is facing trial over his 'war on drugs' policy. Under Philippine law, candidates facing criminal charges may run for office unless convicted and all appeals have been exhausted.
Preliminary results showed Duterte had secured more than half a million votes in Davao City – nearly eight times more than his nearest rival. He served as the city's mayor for two decades before winning the presidency in 2016. Official results are expected within a week.
'Duterte landslide in Davao!' his youngest daughter Veronica posted on Facebook.
The 'overwhelming' support Duterte received shows the public's 'total rejection' of efforts to 'attempt to stamp out' his legacy, his lawyer said, as quoted by ABS-CBN news agency.
Supporters reportedly chanted his name as early tallies were announced.
The ICC alleges that from 2016 to 2022, Duterte oversaw 'death squads' responsible for killing suspected drug dealers and users. He has denied wrongdoing but admitted the crackdown was violent.
Government records show at least 6,200 people were killed in police operations. Rights groups say the real toll could be far higher.
Some human rights advocates have called Duterte's arrest illegal, noting the Philippines withdrew from the ICC in 2019 on his orders. The court argues it retains jurisdiction over crimes committed while the country was still a member.
His lawyers have filed a petition accusing the Philippine government of 'kidnapping' and say the extradition violated both domestic and international law.
Vice President Sara Duterte, his eldest daughter, told reporters after voting this week that she was in talks with her father's lawyers about how he might take his oath as mayor while in detention. She is widely seen as a leading contender for the 2028 presidential race, despite an impending Senate impeachment trial in July.
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