Gold and Chinese stocks still have room to rise, CICC says
Investors should adopt overweight positions in gold and Chinese stocks, as the outlook for these assets remains positive despite short-term challenges, according to investment bank China International Capital Corporation (CICC).
Advertisement
While concerns about stretched valuations for gold and Chinese stocks emerged following recent rallies, strategists at CICC's research unit said that both assets offered growth potential and diversification value.
Gold's price has risen more than 10 per cent this year to nearly US$3,000, following a 26 per cent surge in 2024 – the biggest gain in 14 years. Driving the increase were the asset's long-term hedge nature against inflation amid US President Donald Trump's inflation-prone policies and threat of tariffs, said Li Zhao, chief asset allocation strategist at CICC Research.
'Gold can still maintain a long-term upwards trajectory,' Li said. 'There may be two-way fluctuations in the short term, but the mid to long-term bull market remains unchanged.'
He added that gold prices could continue to rise in the next decade.
Advertisement
Global central banks' demand for gold had grown, and Asian central banks in particular still had considerable room to increase their positions compared with their US and European counterparts, Li said.
Gold comprises only single-digit or low double-digit percentages of the foreign exchange reserves of the central banks in Asia-Pacific, such as Japan and India, Li said. Meanwhile, the tally in developed markets in Europe and the US could be more than 70 per cent, he added.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
South China Morning Post
2 hours ago
- South China Morning Post
How China's overlooked financial system enabled its industrial success
China has powered ahead of other nations in terms of industrial and export development, to the point where it is now seen by rivals (not least the US) as a threat that must be countered by trade protectionism. But most analyses of its success overlook the key role played by China's financial system. The mirror image of that success is the failure by many Western economies to nurture savings collections and investment systems that are well attuned to promoting balanced economic growth. Fund management skills, though often highly honed from the point of view of maximising financial returns, do not always equate to the optimum deployment of savings in the national interest. While China has used state funding (supplemented by private finance) to pursue a conscious industrial policy , Western economies have relied predominantly on markets to direct funds, typically to where financial returns are the highest. The former and more dirigiste approach appears to be gaining support now. An article in the Financial Times on May 28, 'The lessons from China's dominance in manufacturing', marked a relatively rare attempt to offer an explanation of why China's national industrial policy, launched a decade ago , has met with defensive reactions from other nations. What the article did not offer, however, was any attempt to compare and contrast the Chinese experience with that of market-oriented approaches in the US and Europe. And yet such analysis is essential if policymakers are to identify and address the causes of the trade wars.
Asia Times
6 hours ago
- Asia Times
Hot race for Pacific's deep sea mineral wealth
The seabed is legally designated as the 'common heritage of mankind,' but in practice, it has become a hotly contested frontier. This is exemplified by the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), a vast expanse of international seabed located between Hawaii and Mexico rich in polymetallic nodules that contain critical minerals such as nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese. These resources are more than mere commodities; they are vital components of national strategies for energy independence, technological leadership and strategic deterrence. Unlike land-based domains, where national borders delineate access, the seabed remains governed by a patchwork of international conventions and non-binding regulatory frameworks. This legal ambiguity, combined with the CCZ's sheer scale (approximately 4.5 million square kilometers), recasts geography as a determinant of power. Here, the terrain imposes its own rules: no nation can claim legal sovereignty, yet every technologically capable actor can exert functional control. The strategic function of the seabed lies not in symbolic possession, requiring engagement with multilateral bodies like the International Seabed Authority (ISA), but in continuous operational oversight enforced through submersibles, dredging platforms and state-backed maritime infrastructure. Through these instruments, nations could transform the legal status of the seabed from a global commons into de facto geopolitical claims, not to share, not to protect, but to secure. No rivalry illustrates the emerging dynamics of seabed geopolitics more vividly than that between the United States and China. These two powers approach deep-sea mining from fundamentally different institutional positions, strategic cultures and timelines. China, with its disciplined alignment of state power and long-term industrial planning, has embedded itself within ISA's multilateral framework. It holds more seabed exploration licenses than any other country and has cultivated influence within ISA rulemaking bodies. Chinese actors do not rely on rhetorical commitments to international law; instead, they utilize procedural participation as a mechanism to steer the outcome of regulatory frameworks. Their objective is clear: to shape the rules before they are finalized, ensuring that China's technological, legal and operational advantages are permanently encoded into the structure of global seabed governance. The US, in contrast, approaches the seabed from a structurally distinct position. Excluded from ISA by virtue of not ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the US has pivoted to a strategy of unilateralism, issuing domestic legal authorizations and executive directives to fast-track seabed mining. This approach reflects a response to structural vulnerability, namely, dependence on adversarial supply chains for critical minerals. Where China exerts slow, cumulative influence through institutional immersion, the US acts with urgency, deploying private capital and regulatory agility to compensate for its formal absence from multilateral governance. This creates a bifurcated architecture: China seeks to control the framework, while the US seeks to operate around it. Yet the underlying motive is the same: strategic insulation from resource dependence and competitive positioning in a rapidly hardening world order. Neither strategy is inherently more subversive, but each perceives the other as destabilizing. Thus, the arena of deep-sea governance becomes not a neutral venue for coordination but a contested space where procedural legitimacy and strategic autonomy collide. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone spans an area nearly equivalent to the contiguous US, lying beneath international waters between Hawaii and Mexico. It is home to the planet's richest known reserves of polymetallic nodules, mineral formations laden with cobalt, nickel, and manganese. What makes this zone strategic is not its legal status but its vast, flat and sediment-stable characteristics. It is ideally suited for industrial-scale extraction. The CCZ is administered by ISA, which has parceled the zone into discrete license blocks awarded to sponsoring states and corporate entities. On paper, this fragmentation allows for coordination and environmental oversight. In reality, it institutionalizes competition. Each block becomes a fiefdom of strategic value where companies and their state sponsors conduct exploration, environmental assessments and, soon, large-scale extraction. States and corporations with deep technological capabilities, including China, Canada (via The Metals Company), Belgium (GSR), and Norway (Loke), have already deployed robotic vehicles, data-gathering systems and prototype harvesting equipment in the CCZ. These activities are not speculative; they are strategic acts of presence. By maintaining operational continuity and exclusive data on their contract areas, these actors secure a level of control that resembles territorial influence, even in the absence of sovereignty. States with territorial assets proximate to the CCZ, such as France's Clipperton Island, gain further leverage by using these holdings as logistical hubs or jurisdictional springboards. Thus, the geography of deep-sea mining is simultaneously physical, institutional and infrastructural. It maps the extension of national strategy into an unbounded, submerged arena. Pacific Island nations occupy a pivotal yet precarious position in the geopolitical structure of deep-sea mining. These states are not themselves extractive powers, but their legal status as coastal states and ISA members renders them indispensable intermediaries in the resource acquisition strategies of others. Countries like the Cook Islands, Nauru and Tonga act as sponsor states for foreign companies, enabling exploration contracts under ISA rules. In exchange, they receive royalties, infrastructure aid, and diplomatic engagement. Yet the leverage they wield, rooted in legal procedure rather than material capacity, is increasingly fragile. As major powers deepen their technological reach and begin to act outside ISA frameworks, the value of these sponsorships diminishes. The internal divisions within the Pacific region, between those pursuing economic opportunity and those advocating environmental caution, further fracture the negotiating position of these states. Their collective influence diminishes as they are drawn into opposing alignments. This allows external actors to extract favorable terms while offering minimal safeguards in return, rendering the Pacific not just a zone of opportunity but a laboratory for strategic experimentation by larger powers. These microstates thus find themselves navigating between alignment and autonomy. While they have used their position to secure economic rents and international attention, their ability to influence outcomes is limited by their institutional capacity and the asymmetry of power in these relationships. As multilateral governance erodes, their role risks shifting from active intermediaries to passive theaters of external ambition. Environmental damage from seabed mining is not only likely, but, under current practices and regulatory frameworks, virtually inevitable. The ecological consequences (destruction of benthic habitats, disruption of deep-ocean food chains, and disturbance of carbon sequestration processes) are well-documented yet remain politically unpriced. These effects unfold on spatial and temporal scales that transcend immediate accountability. Damage incurred in the hadal depths will not register in electoral cycles or quarterly earnings. This externalization of environmental costs is structurally embedded. States and corporations reap concentrated benefits (strategic minerals, technological primacy, economic gain), while the ecological liabilities are diffused across a global commons and deferred into an indeterminate future. The legal framework that will govern these activities, particularly ISA's provisional mining code, lacks both clarity and enforceability. In this vacuum, environmental safeguards function less as constraints than as negotiable instruments. Where conservation discourse exists, it is often instrumental. Calls for moratoriums or environmental safeguards serve as tools of diplomatic leverage or political differentiation rather than as expressions of systemic restraint. The logic of extraction, once engaged, prioritizes continuity; regulatory caution is outpaced by technological momentum. This is a structurally induced outcome of a system where access is governed less by rules than by capabilities. Control over seabed minerals is increasingly a function of who can act first, remain longest and extract most efficiently. Precedent supplants principle. The seabed will be shaped through deployments, licenses and machinery already descending into the depths. For states seeking mineral security and strategic autonomy, the calculus is clear: defer the ecological reckoning and secure the resource base now. Paulo Aguiar earned a master's degree in International Relations from NOVA University Lisbon, specializing in Realism, Classical Geopolitics and Strategy. As a professional in geopolitical risk analysis and strategic foresight, Paulo regularly shares his insights through various publications and on his own Substack.
RTHK
9 hours ago
- RTHK
'Progress made' in Japan-US tariff talks
'Progress made' in Japan-US tariff talks Ryosei Akazawa says some progress has been made in tariff talks ahead of the G7 summit later this month. File photo: Reuters Japan has made some progress in a fifth round of trade talks with US officials aimed at ending tariffs that are hurting Japan's economy, according to Tokyo's chief tariff negotiator. "Tariffs have already been imposed on autos, auto parts, steel and aluminum, and some of them have doubled to 50 percent along with 10 percent general tariff. These are causing daily losses to Japan's economy," Ryosei Akazawa, said in Washington on Friday after talks with officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. Akazawa declined to say what progress they had made. The latest round of talks may be the last in-person meeting between senior Japanese and US officials before the Group of Seven (G7) leaders summit that starts on June 15, where US President Donald Trump is expected to meet Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Japan also faces a 24 percent tariff rate starting in July unless it can negotiate a deal with Washington. "We want an agreement as soon as possible. The G7 summit is on our radar, and if our leaders meet, we want to show what progress has been made," Akazawa said. "Still we must balance urgency with a need to guard our national interests," he added. Last month Japan's trade negotiator said US defence equipment purchases, shipbuilding technology collaboration, a revision of automobile import standards and an increase in agricultural imports could be bargaining chips in tariff talks. In a bid to reach an agreement with the US, Japan is also proposing a mechanism to reduce the auto tariff rate based on how much countries contribute to the US auto industry, the Asahi newspaper reported on Friday. Akazawa said Japan's position has not changed and that the tariffs are not acceptable. (Reuters)
