Ruiz and Hakimi on target as PSG muzzle Arsenal to reach Champions League final
Ruiz and Hakimi on target as PSG muzzle Arsenal to reach Champions League final
Achraf Hakimi (left) and Fabian Ruiz (right) scored Paris Saint-Germain's goals in the 2-1 win over Arsenal that took the side into the final of the Champions League.
Paris Saint-Germain moved into the 2025 Champions League final against Inter Milan following a 2-1 victory over Arsenal on Wednesday night.
Leading 1-0 from the first leg in north London on 29 April, PSG extended their aggregate advantage to 2-0 after 27 minutes of the second leg at the Parc des Princes.
Spain international Fabian Ruiz thrashed home from the edge of the penalty area to calm the nerves of the hosts.
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Midway through the second-half Vitinha fluffed a penalty that would have given PSG a 3-0 aggregate lead.
But minutes after his weak kick, substitute Ousmane Dembélé set up Achraf Hakimi for the strike that brought an explosion of joy from the PSG faithful.
As the home fans sang about their impending excursion to the final in Munich on 31 May, Mikel Merino outmuscled PSG skipper Marquinhos on the left wing and drove towards the PSG penalty area.
His cross was deflected into the path of Bukayo Saka who rounded the PSG goalkeeper Gigi Donnarumma to halve the deficit on the night after 76 minutes.
Arsenal pushed for the goals to force extra-time but PSG held firm to seal a 3-1 aggregate success and second trip to the final in five years.
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'I said from the first day that our goal was to work hard enough to be in a position to make history and that remains our goal,' said PSG boss Luis Enrique.
Progress
'We believe in our coach and we believe in our talented, young, hungry players," PSG president Nasser al-Khelaifi told CBS Sports.
"PSG have gone through and we're absolutely gutted but this doesn't define us for sure.'
Read more on RFI English
Read also:
PSG signs new Visit Rwanda deal despite backlash over DRC links
PSG boss Enrique hails side's progress since Champions League upset at Arsenal
Champions League: Lille fluff their lines as Villa set up PSG clash
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New York Times
26 minutes ago
- New York Times
Arsenal squad audit: Every player's future explained going into the summer
At Arsenal this summer, most of the focus will be on incoming business — but they will need to get their existing players in order to mount another title charge. While recruitment will be necessary, contract extensions and sales will be equally important to ensure a smooth transition into next season. Advertisement On Wednesday, the club confirmed several players will be leaving either in sales or at the end of loans, including Jorginho, Kieran Tierney, Raheem Sterling and Neto. Here, The Athletic assesses the situation of each member of the Arsenal first team ahead of 2025-26. David Raya, aged 29 (contract expires: 2028) The consistency the Spain international has shown, especially last season, has proven Mikel Arteta right in his pursuit two summers ago. Like others, next summer he will be within two years of his contract expiring, so Arsenal could soon be looking to negotiate an extension. Neto, 35 (loan ends 2025) With just one appearance last season, it was no surprise when the club confirmed yesterday that he would return to Bournemouth when his loan ends. Tommy Setford, 19 (2028) The England Under-20 international was unlucky with injuries in his debut season, but did make his debut in the League Cup. His contract length would see him be a passable third-choice option next season, but recruiting a strong backup for Raya will require attention, especially with Joan Garcia now on Barcelona's radar. Karl Hein, 23 (2026) In his loan spell at Real Valladolid, Hein played more games (32) than in the rest of his senior career combined. The Estonia goalkeeper's deal expires at the end of next season but there is an option for another year. Another loan this year may be suitable before looking to sell next summer. Ben White, 27 (2028) The 2024-25 campaign was an anomaly for White. It was the only season since he joined Arsenal that he had failed to make over 30 league appearances, as he missed four months after undergoing knee surgery. With no contractual issues, the focus will be on getting back to full fitness to provide the consistency of previous years. Jurrien Timber, 23 (2028) Timber turns 24 this month and will look to build on a strong season. Three and a half years White's junior, he may be a bigger priority to extend, but that is not yet an urgent matter. Takehiro Tomiyasu, 26 (2026) Tomiyasu has had horrid luck with injuries. He played just eight minutes of football in 2024-25, and his versatility was sorely missed. There is an option for another year on his deal, and considering he will be injured throughout this summer window, activating that option may be a smart move to hold onto any sale value for future windows. Advertisement William Saliba, 24 (2027) Extending Saliba's contract is a priority for Arsenal, and The Athletic reported on May 9 that the club had opened talks with the centre-back. The Champions League clashes with Real Madrid brought expected rumours about his future, but Madrid have since signed Dean Huijsen from Bournemouth. Gabriel, 27 (2027) Arsenal are unimaginable without Saliba and/or Gabriel at the back. The final-day win at Southampton was the first time in 148 consecutive league games that neither player had started for Arsenal — a run going back to August 2021. Thankfully for Arsenal, Gabriel is close to signing a new long-term contract. Just like in the 2022-23 season, he is expected to be the first of the group of players who have two years left on their deals to commit his future. Jakub Kiwior, 25 (2028) Arsenal could have a dilemma over the centre-back this summer. 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Oleksandr Zinchenko, 28 (2026) The Ukraine international had a transformative effect on Arsenal when he signed in 2022, but now feels a natural time to part ways. Arteta's use of him in midfield late in the season could be a timely reminder to potential clubs of Zinchenko's natural position. Arsenal signed Zinchenko for around £30million, but recouping a fee in that region appears unlikely. Advertisement Kieran Tierney, 27 (2025) The Scot will re-join Celtic on a pre-contractual agreement this summer. It is sad his Arsenal career pivoted from being a potential captain to the exit door, but at least he had a nice farewell moment with his goal at Southampton. Nuno Tavares, 25 (2025) One of a few players who have spent multiple seasons away on loan, Arsenal expect Lazio to activate their option to buy Tavares after he spent 2024-25 on loan at the Serie A club. Martin Odegaard, 26 (2028) Most of Arsenal's 2028 contracts come in midfield, including Odegaard. 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Albert Sambi Lokonga, 25 (2026) Arsenal took up an option to give the midfielder an additional year on his contract with the hopes of selling him permanently this summer. Sevilla did not activate their option to buy him, but Lokonga's preference would be to stay in Spain. Fabio Vieira, 25 (2027) The writing was on the wall for Vieira when Nwaneri was starting ahead of him last pre-season. Returning to boyhood club Porto on loan, he made 39 appearances, scoring five and assisting another five goals. This summer, finding a buying club for Vieira should be on Arsenal's agenda. Bukayo Saka, 23 (2027) Integral to Arsenal's progress since he broke into the team, many will be wondering what could have been if Saka had not suffered a hamstring injury that kept him out for three months of last season. The winger hit 10 league assists by November, and ended the campaign with 25 goal involvements. Agreeing fresh terms for him this summer is as much a priority as with Gabriel and Saliba. Kai Havertz, 25 (2028) Another victim of a hamstring injury, Havertz played a key role last season. Like Rice, he improved on the numbers of his debut season by scoring 15 goals in 36 games compared to the 14 in 51 games in 2023-24. Still an important member of the squad, his versatility may be called on more next season with the expected arrival of a new centre-forward. Similar to Merino, however, that does not have to be viewed as a negative. Instead, Arsenal not relying solely on Havertz would show that their squad is improving. He still has three years on his contract, but the impact new signings have on his minutes could lead to a dilemma next summer. Gabriel Jesus, 28 (2027) Jesus will spend this summer recovering from an ACL injury. The Brazil forward can count himself extremely unlucky as he showed flashes of the player who changed the trajectory of the club when he signed in last season's Christmas period. 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Raheem Sterling, 30 (loan ends 2025) After Sterling's disappointing loan at the Emirates, the club confirmed yesterday that he will return to Chelsea. Marquinhos, 22 (2027) The winger joined Cruzeiro on loan in January. The Brazilian club had an option to buy and are now advancing towards making that move permanent.
New York Times
29 minutes ago
- New York Times
Every Premier League club's PSR situation: Who can spend and who should worry
As one Premier League season ends, another begins. The 20 clubs who will do battle in the world's richest league come August were known over 24 hours before the most recent iteration ended, with Sunderland's last-minute Championship play-off final win completing the 2025-26 set. While the fixtures might have finished for a couple of months, the intrigue hasn't. The transfer window is now open as a result of the Club World Cup and, save for a five-day break starting next week, will run through to 7pm BST (2pm ET) on Monday, September 1; the fixtures are out on Wednesday, June 18. Advertisement The nature of how football finance interacts with the actual football can be perplexing at the best of times, and in recent years has given rise to a pseudo-deadline day: June 30 has become an important date for most Premier League clubs. That is the end of the 2024-25 accounting period for 15 of next season's Premier League clubs. The exceptions are Arsenal, Liverpool, West Ham United (whose big day was May 31), Burnley, Sunderland (both July 31). Wolves recently moved theirs from May 31 to June 30, so their 2024-25 accounts span 13 months. That date has become ever more crucial as profit and sustainability rules (PSR), which place limits on clubs' financial losses, have bared their teeth; last June saw several clubs engage in a slew of last-minute deals to avoid breaching the Premier League's regulations. To that end, The Athletic has crunched the numbers across next season's top-flight clubs in an attempt to determine just where each of them stand at the outset of this transfer window and ahead of that June 30 deadline. Other than recently-relegated Ipswich Town, and, to a certain extent, Aston Villa, no clubs in England provide PSR calculations publicly. So the figures which follow are estimates: not unequivocal truth, but sufficiently considered to give a decent idea of everyone's position right now. What the below aren't are estimates of how much a club can spend this summer. Instead, as PSR calculations are based, and focused, upon limiting how much clubs can lose, we've provided a headline estimate of the amount each could lose before tax in 2024-25 while avoiding a PSR breach come that deadline. That estimate draws from figures released for the 2022-23 and 2023-24 campaigns, with the most recent one completing each club's three-year PSR cycle. From there, we've considered whether that level of pre-tax loss is likely or not and, stemming from that, whether we can expect that club to be busy before this month's end. Arsenal's pre-tax loss totalled £69.8million across the past two seasons. Of that, £35.2m in depreciation is deemed an acceptable expense under the Premier League's (and European governing body UEFA's) PSR regime, reducing the club's loss in their calculation to £34.6m before any further allowable costs on youth development, community expenditure and spending on the women's team. Advertisement Set against a £105million loss over three seasons, they'd have substantial headroom, but clubs only enjoy that limit if owners inject equity (of up to £90m) over the relevant PSR cycle. Arsenal's sole equity injection of the 2022-25 period was a £5.4m capital contribution in 2023, so their PSR loss limit is only £20.4m — the £15m lower limit available to all clubs, plus that capital contribution. Even so, we still expect few problems, and project Arsenal could lose around £97million in 2024-25 without breaching PSR. They lost just £17.7m in 2023-24, and while operating losses were £50.3m then, they made over £50m profit on the sales of Emile Smith Rowe and Eddie Nketiah in 2024-25, as well as a decent amount on Aaron Ramsdale. What's more, Champions League revenue was in the £100million region, leaving few worries about compliance this summer. Villa's last-day loss at Manchester United was a blow both on and off the field. Hopes of another run in the Champions League were left in tatters, and Villa will have to make do with eking what they can from the Europa League's much smaller prize pot next season. Problematically for Unai Emery's men, UEFA's financial rules don't change dependent on which of its three competitions you play in. Villa will therefore have to comply with its squad cost ratio rule even as they generate less in European income; this rule is one Villa are already believed to have breached in 2023-24, when they were in the Conference League, and are in ongoing discussions with UEFA over a financial settlement. UEFA also imposes lower loss limits on competing clubs, as well as requiring adjustments for any quirky player-swap deals between clubs like several Villa partook in last June, ostensibly to ensure domestic PSR compliance. Advertisement If there's trouble abroad, then there's plenty at home again, too. Villa have lost £206.2million pre-tax in the past two seasons, the highest deficit in the Premier League in that time. Helpfully, they actually disclose PSR-related costs in their accounts (albeit not the actual calculation), so we're able to get a better idea for them than most clubs on how much they can deduct in terms of what football's governing bodies deem 'good' costs. Even with some chunky deductions in their PSR calculation, we project Villa can only lose £15million in 2024-25 and remain in line with Premier League rules. Big sales of Moussa Diaby and Jhon Duran have helped, as has the £70million in Champions League prize money alongside whatever other income uplifts Villa saw from last season's run to the quarter-finals, but their position still looks on a knife-edge, not least as they continued to spend in 2024-25 and committed hefty wages to January loanees including Marcus Rashford and Marco Asensio. Villa will need to be active sellers this month once again. Bournemouth's recent transfer spending was only made possible by them being allowed to retain a £71.4million loan write-off within their PSR calculation, without which they'd have been in breach of Premier League rules. That write-off enabled the club to post a £44.5m profit in 2022-23, a figure which will drop from their PSR calculation in the 2025-26 season. Bournemouth then lost £66.2million in 2023-24 as a result of hefty spending, with little in the way of player sales to bring losses down. The club's allowable costs for PSR purposes are minimal too, so their PSR loss won't have been much lower than the pre-tax figure. Continuing that trend would have put them at risk of breaching this year, but considerable progress on the selling side has eased those worries. Bournemouth had already banked £35.1million in player sale profits even before Real Madrid buying Dean Huijsen, officially completed on Sunday, generated just shy of another £40m in profit for the club's bottom line. Advertisement Add increased Premier League prize money — we project they earned £16million more that way in 2024-25 than a year earlier, as their final placing improved from 12th to ninth — and they'll be comfortably better off than the £35m pre-tax loss we believe they could make while staying within league rules. After two years of profitability, Brentford slipped back into the red in 2023-24 — but only marginally so. The west London outfit have little to worry about from a PSR perspective; going into 2024-25, their net pre-tax result was a £1.3million profit over the prior two. Brentford's wider operations include lower allowable costs than many of their Premier League peers — their academy, for example, is only Category 2, which costs less to run than a Category 1 equivalent — and they've received no recent equity funding to bump their loss limit up, but on depreciation alone in the past two seasons they had £14.1million of costs they could drop from their PSR calculation. Extrapolating that and making reasonable estimates on other allowables paints a pretty clear picture: Brentford have no PSR troubles. After a stellar improvement in Premier League prize money last season, alongside the £40million sale of Ivan Toney in August, they may well have returned to the profitability they enjoyed in their first two years in the Premier League. Wherever the bottom line lands at the end of June, they'll be a fair distance from the £58million we project they could lose and still avoid a PSR breach. Behind Chelsea, Brighton were the second-highest transfer spenders in Europe last summer, parting with just under £200million on new players. Despite that, they had, and have, little to fear when it comes to PSR. Such has been the impressive running of Brighton, their combined pre-tax profit over the past two seasons was a whopping £208.4m. That is before any deductions that can be made for PSR purposes. With depreciation costs alone running at around £8million per year, and a Category 1 academy in tow, we project Brighton could lose £295m in 2024-25 before running afoul of Premier League financial rules. That's with a lower loss limit of just £15million, too. Advertisement Brighton have received no explicit equity funding from owner Tony Bloom in recent years, though he did restructure £200million of debt owed to him such that it can be converted to equity at his discretion. That boosted the equity element of Brighton's balance sheet by £156.1m; if we took that as 'secure funding' under its PSR meaning, the club would enjoy the maximum loss limit and we project they could lose a whopping £385m in 2024-25 and still comply — by far the highest such figure in the division. For a while one of England's most consistently profitable clubs, Burnley have become loss-making since their December 2020 takeover, recording a combined deficit of £64.4million in the past two accounting years. Their PSR position is subject to a couple of quirks; not only does their accounting year finish at the end of July, but their recent bouncing between leagues (two relegations and two promotions in four seasons) means their allowable loss limit for 2024-25 sits at a maximum of £61m. Or it would do, but Burnley have received no equity funding in recent years. As a result, their loss limit over the three-year PSR cycle to the end of next month is £15million and, at initial glance, that looks a difficult mark for them to hit. Not only do the club have those £64.4m losses to include, but the size of expenditure they can deduct for PSR purposes is minimal compared to many. Burnley's depreciation bill in 2023-24 was just £2.6m, and they only this month achieved Category 1 academy status; lower-ranked academies cost less to run. We project Burnley need to turn a profit in their 2024-25 accounting year, putting the required sum at around £20million. That's around a £48m swing from 2023-24, and would need to be achieved in a season where their broadcast income was slashed on the back of relegation. Fortunately, Burnley were active sellers last summer, generating post-July 2024 proceeds on player sales of £87.7million. That should, we expect, prove just about enough to get them to the profitability they need to be at. They'll also benefit from being able to exclude the extra costs incurred by promotion in their 2024-25 PSR calculation. Section 6, Appendix B of the EFL's rules allows clubs to recognise promotion bonuses in the season after they go up. That rule is missing from the Premier League's regulations, and The Athletic has confirmed no exclusion will be allowed under its PSR next season (the costs will remain in the 2024-25 accounting period for any PSR calculations submitted to the Premier League). For EFL PSR, which Burnley are governed by to the end of July, the bonuses are pushed into the 2025-26 season. PSR-busting tactics at Stamford Bridge have gained plenty of headlines in recent seasons, and for good reason. Through the intra-group sales of hotels, car parks and even their own women's team, Chelsea have turned a rather tricky PSR position into one whereby they enjoy mammoth headroom — at least domestically. Advertisement Chelsea's pre-tax result across 2022-23 and 2023-24 was profitable at £38.3million, even before any costs are deducted from their PSR calculation — and the deductions they can make are chunky. That sale of the women's team means they won't benefit from any cost deductions in that respect in 2024-25, but they're hardly necessary in terms of current compliance. Based on our projections, Chelsea could lose £300m and comply with Premier League PSR. They'll lose a lot, but nowhere close to that much. The picture is rather different in Europe, where UEFA strips out intra-group sales. Chelsea are already in talks over a financial settlement for a breach based on their accounts for 2023-24, and another hefty loss in the last one won't smooth their position there. The club's return to the Champions League next season will at least help for 2025-26. The newest name on the FA Cup have endured a half-decade of losses since 2020, and Palace entered the 2024-25 season with two-year combined pre-tax losses of £65.3million. The south London side have received plenty of equity funding in recent years, so their PSR loss limit is the maximum £105m allowed, and they're unlikely to hit that level of three-year loss even before we deduct allowable expenditure on the likes of infrastructure, youth and community development and their women's team. While the club strengthened last summer, the fees on new players were outweighed by sums received from selling Michael Olise, Joachim Andersen and Sam Johnstone. Per Palace's latest accounts, their net incomings from transfers after June 2024 were £38.7million. Given they've always stayed well within their PSR limits in years where they haven't sold players for much, it's clear Palace will come nowhere close to the £90m loss we believe they could make and still remain PSR-compliant for 2024-25. Everton's issues with PSR compliance have been legion in recent years — including points deducted — and despite improvements off the field, not least the club finally being taken over by The Friedkin Group in late 2024, they're not fully out of the woods yet. That's despite them completing a deal to buy loanee Carlos Alcaraz before May's end; that date would have seen his transfer fee jump up, and, from a PSR perspective, signing him so late in the current accounting period won't have too great an effect on the bottom line. Advertisement In the prior two seasons, the club lost a combined £142.3million before tax, and we know from previous disclosures that 2022-23's PSR loss was £62.7m, against a pre-tax loss of £89.1m. That left them needing a PSR loss of below £38m in 2023-24, which they managed, but not with a great deal of headroom. Accordingly, with those figures still part of their calculation, we estimate Everton need to keep 2024-25's pre-tax loss below £39m. The operating loss pre-player sales for 2023-24 was £82.3m, so even the big sale of Amadou Onana to Aston Villa last July mightn't have been enough on its own to bring them to where they need to be. Prize money from the Premier League likely only ticked up a small amount, and while the lack of legal battles has saved money, Everton's PSR compliance looks to be a close-run thing again, at least to the end of June, albeit one we believe they'll be just about OK on. After this month, that £62.7m PSR deficit from 2022-23 will disappear from view. Fulham were close to a PSR breach in 2022-23, the first season of their current stint in the Premier League, ultimately avoiding one via some Covid-19-related deductions as well as costs incurred on the redevelopment of Craven Cottage's Riverside Stand. Since then, the club have sailed away from both the lower reaches of the table and regulatory trouble, and with 2024-25 being the first year in which they benefit from the full £105million PSR loss limit (as all three of the seasons in their 2022-25 PSR calculation were spent in the Premier League), Fulham should have few worries this time around. Combined pre-tax losses in the previous two seasons total £58.5million, and we estimate that, after removing allowable costs, Fulham could lose up to £77m for 2024-25 and remain compliant. That looks unlikely, even with underlying operating losses as high as £64.9m a season ago. Advertisement This time around, Fulham have enjoyed greater Premier League prize money (we reckon they've seen an over £10million increase), higher player-sale profits (another £10m or so) and, crucially for a club with a history of low gate receipts in a ground that holds less than 30,000 people, the benefits of more premium offerings for matchday attendees. Leeds United's return to the top tier at the second time of asking brought thousands onto the city's streets and, you suspect, relief in the boardroom. The Yorkshire club spent heavily on trying to avoid relegation and, when that failed, on getting back to the Premier League as quickly as possible. In the previous two seasons, Leeds' pre-tax loss totalled £94.5million, which isn't great when we consider the 2022-25 PSR cycle will include two years of EFL loss limits. In all, they can only lose £61m over the three-year period and remain compliant. A £2.5m 'Cost of Living Allowance', introduced by the EFL for the 2024-25 season as a deduction in clubs' PSR calculations, will help towards meeting that sum (fellow promoted sides Burnley and Sunderland will benefit from it too). From a PSR perspective, after taking into account the relevant deductions, including the one above, we estimate Leeds could lose around £42million for 2024-25 and stay within financial rules. Usefully, as detailed in our Burnley section, promotion bonuses (totalling £19.2m, per Leeds' accounts) won't be included in their current PSR calculation. As well, the sales of Georginio Rutter, Crysencio Summerville and Glen Kamara generated around £70m in sales proceeds (the profit figure is lower). The recent sale of Rasmus Kristensen to Eintracht Frankfurt provided further profit. Their 2023-24 operating loss before player sales was £76.3m, and broadcast income fell last season by around £8m due to a reduced parachute payment. Getting the pre-tax loss down to the £42m mark we've estimated looks a bit of a squeeze, but The Athletic understands Leeds aren't in the position of needing to sell before the end of June. If they do, it will be because the deal makes sense, regardless of its timing. Chairman Paraag Marathe has previously stated his hope that Leeds have 'a PSR issue every year, because everything we do is going to be about maximising our ability to be as competitive as we can be'. They will be close to the limit this month, but should be just about fine. Despite breaking even since Fenway Sports Group bought the club in October 2010, Liverpool's pre-tax result for 2023-24 was their worst ever — £57.1m was shipped, which on top of a £9m deficit a year earlier put the club's combined loss at £66.1m for the first two years of the current PSR cycle. Liverpool haven't been funded by equity recently, so their losses are limited to £15million over three seasons. They do, however, have chunky allowable costs. The club's infrastructure accounts for around £16m in annual depreciation charges, while they also run one of the more expensive youth setups in England. Advertisement We estimate Liverpool could have lost £75million in their 2024-25 accounting period (which ended on Saturday) and still have been compliant with Premier League rules. In reality, with booming revenues and player sale profits of £41.9m (around double the size of 2023-24), Liverpool were considerably more likely to have been profitable last season than to have strayed anywhere close to their loss limit. City's January transfer splurge added over £20million in transfer fee amortisation — and unknown amounts in wages — to their 2024-25 costs, in the same season their earnings from Europe dropped significantly after they exited the Champions League in the first knockout round. Not that there's any cause for concern in a PSR sense. City have booked significant pre-tax profits in recent years, and lost prize money from last season at home and in Europe will be, at least in part, offset by monies from this summer's Club World Cup. City's profits over the previous two seasons total £154.1million, and that's before allowable costs are deducted. So profitable have the club been that ownership has had little need to inject equity. That means City's PSR loss limit for the current cycle is just £15m, but no matter. We project they could lose close to £300million for the season just ended and be fine, PSR-wise. As detailed by The Athletic, Manchester United's PSR position is calculated using the accounts of Red Football Limited (RFL), rather than Manchester United plc (RFL is a subsidiary of the plc entity). That's a pretty big factor, as in recent years the pre-tax result of those companies has diverged significantly. In 2023-24, Manchester United plc lost £130.7million before tax; for RFL, the deficit was just £36.2m. Per UEFA's most recent European Club Finance and Investment Landscape report, pre-tax loss figures for United were €22m (£19m at the exchange rate used in the report) in 2022-23 and €42m (£36m) in 2023-24 — an exact mirror of the pre-tax results in RFL's accounts. The difference stems partly from RFL including none of the costs borne by the plc as part of Sir Jim Ratcliffe's share purchase in February 2024, but also from the structure of loans within the wider Manchester United group. RFL's bottom line benefited from booking interest income on intra-group loans owed to RFL by entities further up the corporate chain, as well as recharging staff time to elsewhere in the business (sources have told The Athletic this time comprised plc-related business undertaken by executives, such as investor relations, rather than football-related activities). Foreign exchange differences in RFL were more favourable than at the plc level, too. Based on RFL's loss figures, it's a struggle to see how there were ever any PSR worries at the club — though that's only true once Ratcliffe's arrival was accompanied by equity investment, which raised United's three-year PSR loss limit from £15m to £105m. There is also the complication whereby we do not know exactly which costs United were required to add back into their PSR calculation. Both the Premier League and UEFA use a 'reporting perimeter' that requires you to include all costs 'in respect of (that club's) football activities', including any amounts that occur under the auspice of other legal entities. According to Old Trafford sources, for the purposes of their PSR calculation, United are required to strip out any foreign exchange differences and the impact of intra-group loan interest. That means United's pre-tax loss in its PSR calculation is larger than that shown in RFL's accounts, though still below the loss in the plc entity. RFL's pre-tax loss across the 2022-23 and 2023-24 seasons was £55.1million, and United's loss limit across the three-year PSR cycle is £105m following Ratcliffe's injections of equity in 2024. After taking into account allowable costs, and adjusting for exchange differences and the intra-group interest, we reckon United could lose around £141m in 2024-25 and still comply with Premier League rules. In other words, they'll be fine this summer, however surprising that may seem. Newcastle's PSR troubles this time a year ago were well documented, and led to the sales of Elliot Anderson and Yankuba Minteh for roughly £60million in profit, without which the club would have breached financial rules in 2023-24. The club's position is rather less squeezed this summer; indeed, coach Eddie Howe has already stated '(PSR) issues aren't there for the coming window'. That's certainly true looking ahead to next season, when 2022-23's £71.8million pre-tax loss will drop out of Newcastle's PSR calculation. Up to the end of this month, that sum remains in there, alongside the £11.1m lost the previous season. We estimate Newcastle can lose up to £83m in 2024-25 and remain compliant. Before player sales, Newcastle have lost just shy of £70million in each of the prior two seasons, so doing that again in the latest one would run them pretty close to their limit again. Continued commercial income improvements will help, though a curious potential issue is one they'll benefit from next year: Champions League qualification means booming revenue in 2025-26, but staff bonuses likely crystallise in 2024-25. Even so, we expect Newcastle should indeed be OK at the end of June. The sales of Miguel Almiron and Lloyd Kelly to suitors abroad should bring the bottom line below £83million. Had Newcastle been subject to UEFA's lower loss limits it would have been a tighter squeeze — not least because Europe's governing body requires adjustments to the profits recognised on the 2023-24 sales of Anderson and Allan Saint-Maximin — but that PSR regime won't be a consideration until next season. Forest's PSR troubles were played out rather publicly in 2023-24, as the club copped a four-point deduction for overspending following their 2022 promotion. In the end, it made no difference to their league position that year, but some of the signings which contributed to that punishment have repaid the hassle to Forest several times over — their 10-spot jump up to finish seventh last season has, by our reckoning, generated an extra £34.2million in Premier League prize money. Forest actually booked a £10.1million pre-tax profit last season, the byproduct of recording over £100m in profit on player sales. That swung a chunky £75.3m operating loss into the black, though with little in the way of big departures in 2024-25 we can expect them to fall back into loss-making territory. Still, the significant improvement in domestic prize money should ensure they fall a decent way short of the £85million we project they could lose for the season without breaching PSR. Sunderland spending the past eight years out of the Premier League means they're the only club in the 2025-26 competition who won't have the opportunity to benefit from at least one PSR year with an upper loss limit of £35million; instead, each of the three years within their PSR calculation are capped at an upper limit of £13m, or £39m in total. In fact, Sunderland's PSR limit is even lower than that, as they've received no equity from ownership in recent years. To that end, their limit across the 2022-25 cycle is just £15million. For many Championship clubs that would be troublesome, but Sunderland have managed to get out of the second tier within three seasons of their 2022 promotion back to it — so before losses racked up too heavily. The club's pre-tax loss across 2022-23 and 2023-24 was a combined £17.6million and after even some pretty stingy deductions — the club operate a Category 1 academy, and we've likely underestimated the cost of doing so — we reckon Sunderland's PSR result over those seasons was actually £5m in the black. For the season just ended, we estimate Sunderland could lose up to £33million and remain PSR compliant. They will, therefore, be fine. They sold Jack Clarke for a sizeable profit last summer and then their play-off final hero Tommy Watson for a further £10million in a deal announced in April, and had generally been at the low end of Championship operating losses in recent years. Promotion bonuses would worsen the bottom line, but, as detailed above, Sunderland won't need to include those in their 2024-25 PSR submissions to the EFL. At first glance, Tottenham might appear ripe for PSR trouble. Once routinely profitable, they've booked five consecutive pre-tax losses — £120.7m in the previous two years which will therefore be included in their 2024-25 PSR calculation. Yet all of those worries are swept away in an instant when we consider that, in those same two seasons, Spurs incurred £141.6m in depreciation and non-player amortisation costs, principally on their state-of-the-art new stadium. Removing those costs puts them into the black from a PSR perspective, even before any further deductions. Once those are included, and we again account for the near-£70million annual depreciation cost, we estimate Tottenham could lose over £250m in 2024-25, probably around £277m, and still remain PSR-compliant. Even as their Premier League prize money has tumbled by virtue of a 17th-place finish in the 20-team division, the loss will be nowhere near that sort of figure. Spurs' bigger issue this summer was finding the actual cash to spend, though qualification for the 2025-26 Champions League as winners of the Europa League has eased some of those worries. West Ham generated an impressive £57.2million pre-tax profit in 2023-24, driven by the near-£100m profit recognised on the sale of Declan Rice to Arsenal in the early stages of that financial year. Their two-year pre-tax result leading into last season was therefore profitable, to the tune of £38.9m. West Ham's allowable PSR loss dwindled over the intervening months, as their last equity injection came during 2021-22, a period which drops off this next three-year calculation. That means they can only lose up to £15million in the three seasons spanning 2022-25, once allowable costs are removed. Even so, they are in little danger — and, with their accounting year-end falling on May 31, their lack of activity recently is reflective of as much. We estimate West Ham could have lost £95m in 2024-25 and remained PSR-compliant. In February, Wolves took the step of shifting their accounting year-end date from May 31 to June 30. That's a move which previously might have been seen as a club bringing their accounting dates into line with peers; now, rightly or wrongly, it comes with the added connotation of being seen as required in order to ensure a PSR breach is avoided. Wolves lost £81.5million across 2022-23 and 2023-24 and, while the latter figures were improved (the loss reduced from £67.2m to £14.3m) they still carried an operating loss, before player sales, of £73.3m. They also don't appear to have full use of the maximum £105m three-year loss limit. The club's only known equity injection across this and the previous two seasons was a £79.7m capital contribution from owner Fosun in 2023-24 — which would mean their maximum PSR loss is pegged at £94.7m. The club required the sale of Ruben Neves this month two years ago to ease PSR concerns then, but the recent departure of Matheus Cunha doesn't look to have been a regulatory necessity. We estimate Wolves could lose £56million in 2024-25 and stay within Premier League rules. Set against £70million-plus operating losses, that would be problematic, but the club banked £65.3m in player profits last summer, primarily on the sales of Maximilian Kilman and Pedro Neto. Cunha's departure tips that figure over the £100m mark, and there's little need for them to look to sell anyone else this month. (Top photos: Getty Images)
New York Times
36 minutes ago
- New York Times
How will Barcelona's financial situation affect their transfers this summer?
Barcelona's 2024-25 campaign was thrilling on the pitch — but there were equally dramatic twists and turns off it. Hansi Flick's team won a domestic treble of La Liga, Copa del Rey and Supercopa de Espana titles while falling agonisingly short in the Champions League semi-finals against Inter. At the same time, we saw the club once again scramble to deal with their deep financial problems and La Liga's strict salary cap rules. Advertisement The most dramatic situation came during the January transfer window, when Spanish government intervention was required for Barca to field attacking midfielder Dani Olmo and back-up forward Pau Victor for the second half of last season. Further drama appears very likely this summer, with Barca president Joan Laporta insisting the team should be able to sign players as normal, while his La Liga counterpart Javier Tebas says the Catalans still have big financial issues to resolve. Ahead of the end of the club's financial year on June 30, The Athletic sums up the current nature of Barca's situation and attempts to predict what may happen between now and the end of the transfer window in late August… as well as explaining why a set of VIP seats at the Camp Nou could be key. On May 19, Laporta told Catalan TV3 show 'La Nit dels Campions' that Barca's total income for the 2024-25 season would be 'around €950million' ($1billion or £802m at current exchange rates) and predicted that their budget for 2025-26 would be 'more than €1bn'. Asked whether new signings would be arriving, Laporta was coy but suggested the squad would be strengthened. 'First we have to assess what we have, and then we'll reinforce some positions,' Laporta replied. Sporting director Deco and Flick have both spoken about adding more attacking players to the squad, while Laporta told TV3 that goalkeeper was a position they were looking at. Espanyol 'keeper Joan Garcia is Barca's top target, as The Athletic reported in Barca's Transfer DealSheet on Tuesday. For some years now, the problem for Barca has not been finding significant money to buy players, but registering many of these signings with La Liga. The problem for Barca is that they have yet to really resolve the club's past financial problems — including at least €1.3bn of debt from when Laporta returned as president in 2021. Another issue is that the short-term solutions — often called levers — previously deployed to raise money to spend on transfers have not always been accepted by La Liga, who want the club to be run in a more sustainable way. Barca have regularly viewed this as unfair limitation on their activities, and looked to find creative ways to register players — such as when Olmo and Victor were registered for the first half of the 2024-25 campaign using a rule that allows for the temporary replacement of players ruled out through long-term injuries (in that case defender Andreas Christensen). Advertisement Last April, the Spanish government's High Council of Sports (CSD) sports court forced La Liga to register Olmo and Victor to play for Barca for the remainder of 2024-25. That CSD ruling did not question Spanish football's financial controls, but stated the joint committee formed by La Liga and the Spanish football federation (RFEF) did not have the power to revoke Olmo and Victor's licenses in early January. La Liga has confirmed to The Athletic this means the pair are now registered to play for Barca in La Liga until the end of their contracts in 2030 (Olmo) and 2029 (Victor) — although a La Liga appeal of that CSD decision to a different court has yet to be heard. Meanwhile, La Liga maintains Barca did not have space in their current salary limit to register Olmo and Victor back in January. Adding the 'cost' of these two players to their squad means that Barca exceeded their permitted salary limit. So their room for manoeuvre this summer will be limited unless they can raise more money — either through selling players or growing the club's income. Through autumn 2024, Barca's club hierarchy tried various ways to raise money required to register Olmo and Victor permanently with La Liga. A new kit deal with Nike helped, but was not enough. Barca even took a legal case against the regulations to a Catalan court but were unsuccessful. In December, Barca's board decided to sell future revenues from 475 VIP seats at the revamped Camp Nou, which remains under construction, as another new 'lever'. Few details of what the club called a new Personal Seat License (PSL) business model were made public, but Laporta said in mid-January that this raised €100m from two different investors. This includes €70m from the UAE-based New Era Visionary Group (NEVG) owned by Moldovan businessman Ruslan Birladeanu, and €30m from the Qatari-backed, UK-based investment fund Forta Advisors Limited. Nuevas fotos del Spotify Camp Nou 🏟️ — FC Barcelona (@FCBarcelona_es) June 3, 2025 Barca had already received the entire €30m sum from the Qatari investors and 40 per cent of the remainder (€28m), Laporta said in the mid January press conference. Barca said when announcing the deal that both sets of investor groups had been subject to a mandatory review before the deal, and received positive reports from the club's Compliance Department and Economic Commission. In early April, La Liga questioned the financing of these deals, saying they had been certified by an unnamed auditor back in January. La Liga also said Barca's previous auditors, Grant Thornton, did not mention the €100m in its financial update on the club filed in December, nor did the new auditors, Crowe Global, mention the new income in its report to the league in early April. Barca responded with 'surprise and indignation', claiming that making public such information was 'inappropriate' and that Tebas' public comments on the matter were aimed at 'destabilising' Barca. Reports in the Catalan media have said that the 475 VIP seats (a small part of the 9,400 VIP seats the Camp Nou will have when complete) must be built for the current auditors to count this money within the club's 2024-25 accounts. Advertisement Barca did not reply when asked for details on this, but Laporta told Jijantes in mid-May, 'The (VIP seats) are done. Probably, they can be taken into account starting this month. We need to remember that La Liga fixes the salary limit when they receive our budgets.' In early June, La Liga said it had not received any details about the money coming from the sale of the VIP seats and so have not been able to include it yet within salary limit calculations for the coming season. Barca have previously experienced issues trying to register new contracts given to their best youngsters when they were struggling with La Liga's salary cap. The bumper new contract recently signed with Lamine Yamal, which runs until 2031 and makes the 17-year-old one of the club's top earners will not be endangered by any issues over the salary limit. Key here is a change made to La Liga's rules last November, which allows clubs to improve the contracts of young players whose performances at senior level mean their value has substantially increased. The idea is to ensure emerging stars at clubs in financial difficulties are not immediately tempted away by the offer of pay rises elsewhere. The amount paid 'above' the current club's salary limit to this young player is then subtracted from the total available for wages and transfers in future years. So no matter what happens with the VIP seats or anything else this summer, Barca fans can be assured Yamal is tied to the Camp Nou long term. Although adding his bumper new salary — at potentially €40m a year — now means even less wiggle room in coming seasons. The first 'levers' pulled by Laporta's board were the sale of 25 per cent of Barca's future La Liga TV rights in 2022 for a total of €400m. That means Barca make season-on-season payments of around €40m a season to U.S. investors Sixth Street. More complex is the Barca Studios/Barca Vision project, which Laporta's board had previously viewed as an asset that strengthened the club's financial situation. In August 2023, it was ambitiously valued at $1billion. Advertisement Last October, with money counted on from past investors in the project not having arrived, Barca's previous auditors mandated the value of the Barca Studios/Barca Vision asset be partly written down. This meant that instead of a €12m profit, the club's 2023-24 loss accounts actually showed an overall net loss of €91m. Unless new investors are found for the project — now known as Barca Media — the current auditors will have to decide whether another write-down is required for the 2024-25 accounts. Should this happen, La Liga's rules mean the salary limit for 2025-26 would likely need to be lowered. Asked about this issue, Barca told The Athletic that any new partners for Barca Media would be communicated using the club's official channels. Another unknown is a new Barca Mobile arm of the club's commercial activities, a virtual mobile operator where users pay for roaming data plans via Barca's website, which was launched in April 2025. Laporta predicted it would be a 'goldmine' for the club. The club's main partner in Barca Mobile is NEVG, the same group owned by Moldovan businessman Birladeanu which bought a chunk of the VIP seats at the new Camp Nou. NEVG's only business activities, per its website, are the contracts it has with Barca. Predicting Barca transfer windows is generally difficult, and even many of those involved behind the scenes have been surprised by events during previous summers. About €42m of the money being paid by NEVG for its share of future VIP revenues has yet to be received by Barcelona. Catalan media reports have suggested Birladeanu will facilitate another payment by June 30, so it can be included in the 2024-25 final accounts, but it remains to be seen whether this will actually happen. Asked about this possibility by The Athletic, Barca declined to comment, and NEVG did not reply. Barca will also be looking to raise money and open space in their salary limit by moving on unwanted players — including Ansu Fati, Clement Lenglet and Inaki Pena. Other more important squad members could potentially be sold, with defender Ronald Araujo and goalkeeper Marc-Andre ter Stegen the subject of transfer speculation over their futures. Barca will want to bring in enough money to bring themselves below their squad salary limit. That would mean they can spend any funds raised, rather than being forced by La Liga's rules to put a significant percentage (around half) towards paying off past debts. This is known as the 1:1 rule in Spain, given clubs can spend a euro for every euro they raise. Advertisement 'I believe we'll be able to sign players, we'll be at '1:1', and I hope we stay like that for many years,' Laporta told Jijantes. 'It's true we were pretty tight, so what we have to do is keep working. It's always difficult, as the 'fair play' rules are, let's say, 'sui generis' (unique). The regulations are open to interpretation. We'll have to keep fighting. It won't be easy, but that way it'll be even sweeter when we do it.' More 'fighting' over the interpretation of the salary limit rules looks likely. That will not be easy, given relations with La Liga were strained even before the Olmo/Victor saga. 'I hope Barca can be 1:1 next window, but you'd have to ask them if they can do that,' Tebas told The Athletic in April. 'They know what they have to do, and we hope it does not happen 48 hours before the window closes in August. We hope not to have any more surprises.' (Top image: Flick and Laporta. Javier Borrego/Europa Press via Getty Images)
