Battle Lines: Can the UK afford to defend itself from Russia?
Lord George Robertson, former Nato Secretary General and lead author of the UK's new Strategic Defence Review, talks to Roland about what it will take for Britain to be warfighting ready.
His message is a vital clarion call for the British government and general public to wake up to the very real threat posed by Russia and the scale of change that needs to be undertaken: 'This is not business as usual.'
But with President Donald Trump's call for spending 5 per cent of GDP on defence likely to be adopted by Nato later this month, is a commitment of 2.5 per cent and an ambition of 3 per cent by 2034 enough? And are ordinary British people ready for the sacrifices involved in creating a credible deterrence to protect the UK?
Listen to Battle Lines using the audio player in this article or on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or your favourite podcast app.
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Hegseth says Nato allies ‘very close' to raising defence spending target to 5%
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Russia is at war with Britain and US is no longer a reliable ally, UK adviser says
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'Russia has hardened as an adversary in ways that we probably hadn't fully anticipated,' Hill said, arguing that Putin saw the Ukraine war as a starting point to Moscow becoming 'a dominant military power in all of Europe'. As part of that long-term effort, Russia was already 'menacing the UK in various different ways,' she said, citing 'the poisonings, assassinations, sabotage operations, all kinds of cyber-attacks and influence operations. The sensors that we see that they're putting down around critical pipelines, efforts to butcher undersea cables.' The conclusion, Hill said, was that 'Russia is at war with us'. The foreign policy expert, a longtime Russia watcher, said she had first made a similar warning in 2015, in a revised version of a book she wrote about the Russian president with Clifford Gaddy, reflecting on the invasion and annexation of Crimea. 'We said Putin had declared war on the west,' she said. At the time, other experts disagreed, but Hill said events since had demonstrated 'he obviously had, and we haven't been paying attention to it'. The Russian leader, she argues, sees the fight in Ukraine as 'part of a proxy war with the United States; that's how he has persuaded China, North Korea and Iran to join in'. Putin believed that Ukraine had already been decoupled from the US relationship, Hill said, because 'Trump really wants to have a separate relationship with Putin to do arms control agreements and also business that will probably enrich their entourages further, though Putin doesn't need any more enrichment'. When it came to defence, however, she said the UK could not rely on the military umbrella of the US as during the cold war and in the generation that followed, at least 'not in the way that we did before'. In her description, the UK 'is having to manage its number one ally', though the challenge is not to overreact because 'you don't want to have a rupture'. 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She said simply that the Trump White House 'is not an administration, it is a court' in which a transactional president is driven by his 'own desires and interests, and who listens often to the last person he talks to'. She added that unlike his close circle, Trump had 'a special affinity for the UK' based partly on his own family ties (his mother came from the Hebridean island of Lewis, emigrating to New York aged 18) and an admiration for the royal family, particularly the late queen. 'He talked endlessly about that,' she said. On the other hand, Hill is no fan of the populist right administration in the White House and worries it could come to Britain if 'the same culture wars' are allowed to develop with the encouragement of Republicans from the US. She noted that Reform UK had won a string of council elections last month, including in her native Durham, and that the party's leader, Nigel Farage, wanted to emulate some of the aggressive efforts to restructure government led by Elon Musk's 'department of government efficiency' (Doge) before his falling-out with Trump. 'When Nigel Farage says he wants to do a Doge against the local county council, he should come over here [to the US] and see what kind of impact that has,' she said. 'This is going to be the largest layoffs in US history happening all at once, much bigger than hits to steelworks and coalmines.' Hill's argument is that in a time of profound uncertainty, Britain needs greater internal cohesion if it is to protect itself. 'We can't rely exclusively on anyone any more,' she said, arguing that Britain needed to have 'a different mindset' based as much on traditional defence as on social resilience. 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In July 2022, Tashkent hosted a conference on Afghanistan, attended by representatives of 30 countries. It was an opportunity for the international community to take the measure of Taliban officials and for the Taliban to encourage investment in Afghanistan and seek the release of Afghan assets seized by the West after the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The tone of the event was forward-looking, but Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev, '…reiterated the international community's conditions for formal diplomatic recognition, namely 'forming a broad representation of all layers of the Afghan society in state governance, ensuring basic human rights and freedoms, especially of women and all ethnic and confessional groups.'' Tashkent has consistently called for engaging with Taliban-run Afghanistan, including unfreezing the $9 billion in state assets that were seized by American and European authorities after the ouster of the Kabul government in August 2021 Central Asia is a water-stressed region and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are in the 'severe water stress' category. The construction of the Qosh Tepa canal in Afghanistan threatened to increase tensions between the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan by reducing the water flow of the Amu Darya River by 15-20% - a disaster for Central Asia agriculture. (In Uzbekistan, agriculture accounts for 25% of GDP and about 26% of the labor force.) In April 2025, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan agreed to cooperate in sharing the water resources in the Amu Darya River Basin. The republics are concerned as 'a significant reduction in the Amu Darya's flow could lead to ecosystem degradation, increased soil salinity, and deteriorating living conditions for populations downstream…[and] could hinder efforts to restore the Aral Sea and further exacerbate the region's environmental challenges.' Though Uzbekistan has not recognized the government of Taliban-run Afghanistan, the agreement on transboundary water resources demonstrates bilateral relations are becoming 'increasingly institutionalized.' Tashkent prioritizes its interests to address not just water resources but the threat of terrorist groups, 20 of which may be sheltering in Afghanistan. This effort will require serious diplomacy by all parties and is an opportunity for Uzbekistan (and the U.S.) to provide technical assistance to ensure the canal is built to minimize excessive water loss and soil salinization. Uzbekistan should take the opportunity to substitute crops less thirsty than cotton for the country's growing textile sector which plans to grow textile exports to $10 billion, and continue to import cotton from Turkey, China, and Bangladesh. (Uzbekistan also imports cotton from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan but should take the opportunity to lead the region away from crops that deplete its water supply.) One step to peacefully resolve the water problem is to make Afghanistan a party to the 1992 Almaty Agreement which regulates water allocations based on the Soviet-era shares of water among the then-Soviet Central Asia republics. The agreement is implemented by the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC) and making Afghanistan a member of the ICWC is a way to make it part of the solution and not the problem. It will teach the Taliban the 'rules of the road' in Central Asia and ensure the republics' officials have a clear understanding of Taliban personalities, motivations, and priorities. Other connectivity initiatives are: The Termez free economic zone which offers a 2-week visa for Afghan visitors and features a customs office, a hotel, storage facilities, and capacity to handle 100,000 trucks and 900,000 tons of goods a year. Trans-Afghan railway, a $7 billion, 765-kilometer link to Pakistan's ports that is expected to cut transport costs by 30–40%. And Uzbekistan may soon conduct preliminary studies on extending the railway from Hairatan to Herat, a jumping-off point for trade with Iran and Turkmenistan. Surkhan–Puli-Khumri Power Line, a 1,000 MW line to support electrification of Afghan transport, and that may potentially link to the CASA-1000 power project, a joint venture between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. (Uzbekistan is already the leading exporter of electricity to Afghanistan, supplying nearly 60% of Afghanistan's electricity imports.) Once operational, the line will increase Uzbekistan's electricity exports to Afghanistan by 70%, delivering up to 24 million kWh daily or 6 billion kWh annually. The project spans 245.6 kilometers, with 45 kilometers on Uzbek territory—already completed—and 200.6 kilometers in Afghanistan. The capacity of this line will not only enhance power availability but also facilitate the electrification of the Hairatan–Mazar-i-Sharif railroad, reducing transportation costs by replacing diesel-powered trains with cleaner electric locomotives. Uzbekistan sees many opportunities in Afghanistan and in 2024 trade climbed to $1.1 billion, most of that exports from Uzbekistan. There are commercial opportunities to be sure, but Tashkent does not want to contain Afghanistan, but to use it as a regional bridge, and not just for trade. There are concerns Afghanistan is a potential source of future transnational terrorism, though that may be stymied by intelligence sharing between the Taliban and the U.S., who share concerns about the Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K) presence in Afghanistan. More trade will not necessarily make Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State change their policies but more economic opportunity may make it harder for them to find recruits, and efforts like funding madrassas in Afghanistan may help detoxify the educational system. And the Taliban can build legitimacy if they are seen to be putting the peoples' welfare first by encouraging trade and business. That won't be favored by the U.S., but after two decades of mayhem in the Hindu Kush, much instigated by America, Washington should encourage action – by anyone - that allows Afghanistan to build infrastructure and make money by means other than poppy cultivation. Outside meddling in Afghanistan usually leads to tears, but if Tashkent can work with the moderate, outward-looking Taliban based in Kabul that want to improve the economy, it may subtly tip the balance against the hard-liners in Kandahar. (Yes, Siraj Haqqani and Mullah Omar are the 'moderates' but that is where we are right now.) Uzbekistan may have a role in the future exploitation of critical minerals in Central Asia and can help the U.S. build a secure critical mineral supply chain. According to Visual Capitalist, 'Out of the 50 minerals deemed critical by the U.S. government, the U.S. is 100% reliant on imports for 12 of them, and over 50% reliant for another 321 critical minerals.' Central Asia and Afghanistan are endowed with critical minerals but their isolated location presents a difficult transport problem. Also, mining and processing rare earths requires a lot of water which is in short supply in the region, though a new Chinese technology may triple production speed and reduce pollution, but will put China in a key position, something the U.S. will probably oppose. Andrew Korybko notes that partial completion of the Trans-Afghan railway may still benefit the republics if they can backhaul Afghanistan's minerals for processing in the republics or in Russia or China. The republics will need to secure investment for local, sustainable processing of the minerals (with off-take agreements), but Washington and Brussels must make serious offers to keep the stuff out of Russian and Chinese hands. (Exhortations by Washington to 'do the right thing' and not sell to China and Russia, backed by the hint of sanctions, are a tax on Central Asia and only diminish America's standing in the region.) Uzbekistan, a double-landlocked country, faces hurdles accessing global markets. Connectivity with Afghanistan offers a pathway to South Asia, particularly through Pakistan's seaports Karachi and Gwadar, though Uzbekistan is improving trade relations with Iran as its ports Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, and access to the North-South Transport Corridor, are 'Plan B' if the trans-Afghan route is untenable. Over the past decade, Tashkent has sought to make Central Asia a 'safe neighborhood,' and many of Uzbekistan's priorities, such as peacefully settling border disputes with the neighboring republics and encouraging a broad-based government in Kabul, are shared by Washington, but the Central Asia republics have a broader definition of the regional security, one that is grounded in diplomacy human development, and trade, and that includes trade and normal political relations with Russia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan. Central Asian is no longer a platform for the NATO campaign against the Taliban, but will it become a platform to engage the Taliban, who probably aren't going anywhere despite Washington's ongoing economic warfare. In April, Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced he is ready to work with the European Union (EU) and other international partners to support Afghanistan's development 'to overcome the current crises,' a policy that was welcomed by the Taliban. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa, President of the European Council, visited Uzbekistan in April with the intent, in von der Leyen's words, 'to take our partnership with Central Asia to the next level.' Aside from the standard fare of promoting European foreign direct investment to the region, securing access to critical minerals, and promoting educational exchanges, Central Asia's putative European partners should move smartly to work with the republics to ensure Afghanistan a productive member of the region and no longer a source of terrorism and narcotics. The failed NATO mission in Afghanistan, though it included European troops, is seen as an American loss, giving Europe more post-war maneuver room in Central Asia. And Europe will rely more than America on East-West trade from Asia via the Belt and Road and the Middle Corridor, so it may be the right partner right now for Central Asia. But the Central Asian republics aren't waiting for the EU and international partners to get to work. In May 2025, shortly after Mirziyoyev's announcement, Tashkent commissioned the Termez Dialogue on Connectivity Between Central and South Asia as a permanent platform for regional connectivity. Uzbekistan and Afghanistan both favor an 'economy first' policy with their neighbors, which the republics call "acceptance of reality" in the wake of the West's failed nation-building project in Afghanistan. The same week the republics' delegates convened in Termez, Uzbekistan to plan to boost Central and South Asian connectivity, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan agreed to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. CPEC has fallen short of the partners' expectations, so it remains to be seen if including Afghanistan is a smart move or will just burn more of China's money. And on the heels of the Termez meeting, Iran and China launched a railway route from Xian in western China to the Aprin dry port near Iran's capital, Tehran. The route will reportedly cut travel time from 30 days via sea to 15 days and will avoid the Strait of Malacca and the Hormuz Strait, chokepoints the U.S. Navy hoped to exploit in future conflicts. The route will not pass through Afghanistan but is Beijing's vote of confidence in the region as a connectivity space. Uzbekistan and the other Central Asia republics helped NATO in Afghanistan but it was all for naught, so now it's time for get back to basics - economic and social development - via initiatives like the Uzbekistan 2030 Strategy, and promoting good governance and increasing civic engagement through initiatives like the Center for Progressive Reforms. Washington should focus on how it can assist these sorts of efforts by the republics and not be distracted and agitated by their commonsense wish to not isolate neighboring Afghanistan. By James Durso for More Top Reads From this article on
