New rules to curb illegal ship-to-ship oil transfers in Malaysian waters
Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Mohamad Hasan said the decision aimed to strengthen enforcement and address concerns over illicit activities within the country's maritime zones.
He said the long-standing issue of STS operations had been a "thorn in the side" for Malaysia, with the country often accused by certain parties of facilitating questionable oil transfers, including those involving sanctioned entities.
"We have been accused by some quarters of enabling such activities, particularly involving oil, and operating in contested waters.
"While we maintain these areas fall under our jurisdiction, the perception differs.
"That's why we are going to start enforcing the rules.
"In the past, any attempt to do so was met with criticism, but now we have no choice," he said at a press conference following the 58th Asean Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) here today.
He said that once the regulations are in place, strict enforcement will follow, including fines or the detention of vessels found in breach.
"If anyone is caught conducting unauthorised STS transfers, we will detain the vessel and take legal action.
"Fines will be imposed, or the ships will be impounded."
Malaysia has been under scrutiny over allegations that its waters have been used as a convenient zone for transferring oil between vessels, often involving unclear origins or destinations, and sometimes linked to sanctions evasion.
"We no longer want to be accused of allowing or facilitating such activities.
"It's frustrating when we request proper coordinates from foreign parties and they turn out to be outside our jurisdiction."
Mohamad said Malaysia would increase surveillance and maritime enforcement to ensure all STS activity is monitored and controlled.
"If we detect any suspicious STS operations, we will act.
"Enforcement will begin in July, a Cabinet decision has already been made.
"Yes, some may be unhappy, but we cannot allow Malaysia to be painted as a safe haven for illegal oil transfers."
On May 9 last year, the United States expressed concern that waters off Malaysia and elsewhere in the region were being used as transit points for Iranian oil sales aimed at evading US sanctions.
US Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson said Washington had been closely monitoring STS transfers in Malaysian waters, particularly those suspected to be linked to sanctioned Iranian entities.
On Feb 24, a Labuan-based company was hit with US sanctions under Executive Order 13846.
The company, which operates in sea and coastal freight transport, was believed to be involved in STS transfers of Iranian oil.
It was among more than 30 entities worldwide targeted in the same round of sanctions.
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