Not so easy: The perils and pitfalls in providing Ukraine with security guarantees

CNN

9 hours ago

Russia
War in Ukraine
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Security guarantees have become a central focus in discussions about a peace deal for Ukraine, with the country's President Volodymyr Zelensky saying at the White House Monday that they are the 'key issue, a starting point for ending the war.'
Zelensky knows that in the long run, Russia's superior numbers and weaponry will grind down Ukrainian resistance. So he has long insisted that any agreement must provide Ukraine with promises that the US and Europe will prevent the Russians from resuming their assault in a year or two.
Here's what to know about this crucial part of any deal to end the war in Ukraine.
First, this is uncharted territory: the 'Coalition of the Willing,' a group of key Ukrainian allies, is still working out what it can realistically offer.
The purpose is clear enough: to deter the Russians from fresh attacks on Ukraine in years to come. The shape is less clear, but there will likely be a plan to put forces on the ground and support Ukraine from the sea and in the air. There would also be help in rebuilding the Ukrainian military, now exhausted by more than three years of war.
Indeed, Zelensky has argued that a strong Ukrainian military is itself one security guarantee. French President Emmanuel Macron stressed the allies' support for 'a robust Ukrainian army, one that can resist any attempted attack and deter it, and therefore no limitations in numbers, capabilities, weapons.'
Earlier this year, the UK and France came up with the concept of a multinational force that UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer said would 'deploy following a ceasefire to deter Russian aggression for years to come.'
Initially, there was talk of the two countries leading a contingent of some 30,000 troops that would be deployed in Ukraine. That has given way to discussions about a smaller deterrent force on the ground and more of a 'security umbrella' provided by its allies, that would include sea, air and training elements.
Some 30 countries have signed up to the coalition. But what they would each be prepared to contribute is as yet unclear. Countries like Germany and Italy are reluctant to commit ground troops; Australia and Canada may be more willing.
The coalition would provide 'reassurance forces at sea, in the air, and on land that the allies are ready to provide to Ukraine,' Macron said on Monday. He added: 'We're going to need to help Ukraine with boots on the ground, to make sure that there is no intrusion from Russia in the future.'
However, there is no chance of this prospective force being deployed in and around Ukraine before hostilities cease, and that gives the Kremlin what some analysts call a powerful veto.
Zelensky said Tuesday: 'We are already working on the concrete content of the security guarantees,' a process that will continue at a high temp in the coming weeks.
But here's the problem. A fully-fledged assurance force fanning out across a 1,000- kilometer (600-mile) front line would require far more than 100,000 troops, a huge stretch for European armies which have shrunk since the end of the Cold War.
In the 1990s, for example, a 60,000-strong NATO corps was deployed on a much smaller front line in the Bosnian war.
Now add logistics, rotations and a command structure to what must be figured out. And rules of engagement in the event of ceasefire violations, which would have to be agreed by all governments with troops on the ground.
'The force deployed would need to be credible to Moscow and the coalition resolved to act decisively in the event of a breach of the ceasefire,' according to a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
More feasible, according to military analysts, might be a deterrent force of some 10,000 troops, a sort of warning to Russia that any resumption of attacks would come with a price tag. This force would be in Ukraine but not necessarily close to the front lines.
'Its deterrence effect on Russian forces would mostly be achieved by its very presence since its capability for high-intensity combat operations would be limited,' IISS says of this option.
Not really. There's been a weapons pipeline – from both Europe and the US – throughout the war, as well as considerable intelligence sharing. And during the Biden administration there was plenty of talk about Ukraine's pathway to either full NATO membership or some affiliated status. But that prospect vanished when Trump returned to office.
Over the weekend Trump reiterated that Ukraine would not be allowed to join the US-led security alliance – in line with a key Russian demand.
Before Russia's full invasion, there was a civilian monitoring mission run by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe that tracked violations along the frontline in eastern Ukraine. But it was in no way equipped to offer security assurances and was often ignored by both sides.
That's the elephant in the room.
It's only in the last few days that US President Donald Trump has come round to the idea of the US being involved in offering Ukraine security guarantees. Previously he and other members of the administration had said bluntly that it was the Europeans' responsibility.
Trump was vague about the nature of the commitment in the White House talks Monday. He suggested in a post on Truth Social that guarantees 'would be provided by the various European Countries, with a co-ordination with the United States of America.'
But Trump on Tuesday rejected the prospect of US troops being deployed to Ukrainian soil.
'What it will exactly mean – US involvement – that will be discussed in the coming days,' said NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in an interview with Fox News.
But Rutte described any U.S. involvement as a 'breakthrough,' which it is – because the Russians were never going to take seriously the idea of a European assurance force without the US underwriting it.
The US has important capabilities the Europeans don't – its intelligence gathering and the ability to suppress enemy air defenses at scale are just two examples. But the Trump administration is going to be wary of any US role that might lead to an escalation.
In a word, no. On Monday, it repeated its insistence there could be no troops from any NATO country on Ukrainian soil. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova rejected 'any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries.'
Moscow has also insisted that any peace settlement include limits on the numbers and capabilities of Ukraine's military. It says it too deserves security guarantees and has always claimed that NATO's eastward expansion is one of the the root causes of the conflict.
That's at odds with Trump's insistence that at the Alaska summit that 'Putin agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine. And this is one of the key points that we need to consider.'
The question is whether Putin can be persuaded to allow Ukraine to have any sort of security guarantees in exchange for locking in Russian battlefield gains and – for example – recognition of Russian sovereignty of Crimea.
There's another risk. Russia might be tempted to test the resolve of any assurance force by devising some pretext for renewed military action. In turn this could play into Putin's greatest ambition: splitting the transatlantic alliance, with the US unwilling to follow through on security guarantees to which the Europeans have committed themselves.
There is more discussion now about part of the security guarantee coming in the form of air cover for Ukraine, a little like the no-fly zones over Iraq back in the 1990s that were designed to prevent attacks by Saddam Hussein's forces on minorities.
'The greatest deterrent effect would be achieved by placing not only ground but also combat air elements within Ukraine,' says IISS. More airpower could be stationed in Poland and Romania.
Such a presence would provide surveillance and reconnaissance but would struggle to maintain air superiority if challenged by the Russians. And there would be a risk of rapid escalation if, for example, fighter jets engaged in aerial combat.
What's more, says one observer, airpower and ground troops are like eggs and bacon – the chicken is involved, the pig is committed.
And the Ukrainians want commitment, not involvement.