Trump tariffs give US consumers, Chinese manufacturers a Halloween fright
Advertisement
The 'reciprocal tariffs' were introduced in early April, as American retailers were preparing to stock their shelves for festival celebrations later in the year. Buyers are now working day and night to try to minimise their impact.
Industry insiders said the best-available solutions are to either absorb the additional costs of Chinese imports or source the products from places less affected by tariffs, an approach that could come at the expense of product quality.
New Jersey's Halloween & Costume Association, a business lobby group representing 45 American companies that provide festive products, said last month that Halloween costumes that previously sold for US$19.99 could now retail for US$39.99, while simple masks formerly priced at US$4.99 could jump to US$9.99.
Its executive director, Michele Boylstein, said US tariffs of 145 per cent or higher had seen the market for new imports from China grind to a halt.
Advertisement
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
RTHK
an hour ago
- RTHK
Property plays help Hang Seng Index end higher
Property plays help Hang Seng Index end higher The Hang Seng Index has ended the day up 149 points, or 0.62 percent, at 24,221. File photo: RTHK Mainland Chinese stocks were flat on Wednesday as investors weighed persistent global trade tensions and refrained from placing massive bets, while Hong Kong shares closed higher. The Hang Seng Index ended the day at 24,221, up 149 points or 0.62 percent, while the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index, which tracks Chinese H-shares listed in the city, gained 0.5 percent. The local property sub-index added two percent, helping to boost the markets. Cash-strapped property giant New World Development surged nearly 10 percent after closing a HK$88.2 billion refinancing deal. On the mainland, the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index closed down 0.09 percent at 3,454 while the Shenzhen Component Index closed 0.61 percent lower at 10,412. Their combined turnover was 1.38 trillion yuan, down from 1.47 trillion yuan on the previous trading day. Shares in the papermaking and cement industries led the gains, while those in aircraft manufacturing and electronic information sectors suffered the most. The ChiNext Index, tracking China's Nasdaq-style board of growth enterprises, lost 1.13 percent to close at 2,123. Defensive sectors helped lift the markets onshore, with the banking sector sub-index up 0.8 percent while liquor distiller sector advanced 0.6 percent. Tech shares weighed on the markets, with the semiconductor sector and AI-related shares losing around two percent each. Caution prevailed across the region as investors await developments in trade talks, after US President Donald Trump said he was not considering extending the July 9 deadline for countries to negotiate trade deals with the United States. (Reuters/Xinhua)
AllAfrica
2 hours ago
- AllAfrica
S. Korea's role in a Taiwan crisis on which North might piggyback
This article was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished here with permission. The new president of South Korea remains cautious in articulating a position on a potential Taiwan contingency. Still, public and policy discourse within Korea has been active, often gravitating toward a stance of deliberate restraint, arguing that the North Korean threat justifies non-involvement in a different crisis. Yet this position is riddled with strategic confusion. First, it conflates strategic goals with bargaining positions. Minimizing involvement may be a negotiation tactic, but it should not define a nation's strategy. Second, it lacks coherence in managing strategic signaling – when to conceal and when to reveal intentions and capabilities. Third, it ignores the risks of strategic miscommunication: warnings meant for adversaries can inadvertently unsettle allies, and domestic political messages can embolden external challengers. Passive posturing and abstract principles will not suffice. Instead, South Korea must carefully assess the realities it would face during a contingency and map out its strategic options accordingly. This paper explores how South Korea can move from being a silent observer to a strategic enabler in the event of a Taiwan conflict, and what choices and preparations this role would entail. US planners now treat a dual-front crisis – China over Taiwan, plus North Korea on the peninsula – as a central assumption, not a remote risk. Washington's 2022 National Defense Strategy elevated 'integrated deterrence,' pressing allies to link multiple theaters. For Seoul this means moving beyond a North-Korea-only lens and preparing forces, laws, and public opinion for wider regional contingencies. Yet, substance lags behind rhetoric. A recent Korea Economic Institute study finds the allies still lack agreed-upon roles, thresholds and command relationships for a Taiwan scenario. The problem is qualitative as much as temporal: Pyongyang leans toward vertical nuclear escalation, while Beijing wields cyber, space and precision-strike tools. Managing both simultaneously therefore requires new concepts, interoperable C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and flexible logistics networks – not just more forces. The stakes are immediate. In the Guardian Tiger simulation, Chinese strikes on Taiwan coincided with North Korean provocations, forcing US Forces Korea to split attention across two theaters – untenable under current planning. Because Korean semiconductors, batteries and shipping lanes hinge on cross-Strait stability, neutrality offers no shelter: Bloomberg Economics ranks Korea the world's second-hardest-hit economy in a blockade scenario. If Seoul is serious about being a 'Global Pivotal State,' it must treat strategic simultaneity not as an added burden but as the price of safeguarding its own prosperity and alliance credibility in an interconnected Indo-Pacific. South Korea cannot afford the illusion of neutrality in a Taiwan contingency. Seoul should adopt a phased response that ranges from diplomatic backing and intel-sharing to calibrated base access and limited deployments. It must also practice strategic signaling, blending public restraint with quiet contingency planning; Guardian Tiger I showed that displaying autonomous strike options while keeping official rhetoric muted can deter Beijing and steady partners. Finally, Seoul can make a decisive contribution short of direct combat: KEI's analysis highlights how military bases in Korea would be indispensable for base access and support for coalition ISR, air and maritime protection and logistics even without ROK troops on the front line. Building on its phased-response plan, Seoul must also prepare for the requests Washington will make if a Taiwan crisis erupts. The United States will seek broad strategic alignment across military, diplomatic, economic and informational fronts – not just battlefield aid. South Korea can meet this need by setting flexible red lines: internal thresholds that dictate when and how it will step up support, keeping Beijing uncertain while showing domestic audiences that Seoul, not Washington, controls the pace. Category Likely Request Policy Considerations Diplomatic Support Public statements and joint declarations with the UN, G7, or others Calibrate language; use backchannel messaging to manage escalation risks Intelligence and Surveillance Cooperation Enhanced trilateral intelligence sharing (ROK-US-Japan); emergency intel exchanges during crisis Requires integrated platforms and information-sharing protocols Cyber and Space Operations Joint cyber defense and offensive coordination; satellite data sharing and space asset cooperation Institutionalize coordination between cyber commands; establish a joint cyber ops center Humanitarian and Non-Combat Support Disaster relief, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); provision of non-military supplies High public support and low legal constraints; caution needed to prevent mission creep Air and Maritime Protection Securing key air and sea lines; naval escort or air interdiction missions Emphasize a posture of protection and deterrence Base Access Forward deployment of USAF; support for carrier strike group deployment Establish conditional use principles MRO Support MRO for US military; civilian-military tech sharing pre-negotiated civilian cooperation Logistics Support Ammunition, fuel, transport, and maintenance support Develop a civilian-military logistics network; coordinate dispersed support with Japan/Philippines/Australia Redeployment of USFK Assets Redeploying ISR and missile defense assets; diversion of USAF squadrons; emergency redeployment of ground forces Assess trade-offs with North Korea deterrence posture and political constraints Forward Deployment of Strike Assets Hosting long-range strike platforms and surveillance radar Risk of Chinese retaliation; cost of infrastructure and domestic consensus in peacetime Participation in Multinational Operations Naval escort missions, mine clearing, joint fire support; limited participation in multinational operation Reduces political risk; requires legal authorization Deployment of Combat Forces Overseas deployment of Korean troops and weapon systems High political and public burden; UN resolutions or firm alliance agreements Washington's most plausible request will be access to South Korea's bases. Osan and Gunsan offer hardened runways and fuel; Busan and Jeju can move war stocks and aid at scale, signaling allied resolve and reinforcing integrated deterrence without ROK boots on the ground. Folding this demand into Seoul's phased-response playbook and flexible red lines lets Korea meet US needs while retaining political control. Hosting such operations, however, brings real risks – North Korean opportunism or Chinese retaliation – so Seoul should adopt a 'conditional access' principle, for example, barring strikes on the Chinese mainland. Clear boundaries would deter Beijing, reassure allies and keep escalation with Pyongyang in check, allowing South Korea to contribute decisively without strategic overextension. In the climactic scene of the movie 'Battleship,' the world comes together to confront an alien threat. It presents a neat narrative: one enemy, one front, one unified response. Reality, however, is far messier. Threats are multifaceted, solidarity is never automatic, and national responses are shaped by diverging interests and internal constraints. A Taiwan contingency will be the ultimate test of such complexity. South Korea cannot reduce the Taiwan crisis to a simple 'intervene or abstain' choice. The peninsula and the strait are tied not just by proximity but by interwoven political, economic, and strategic interests, so turbulence in one will inevitably reverberate in the other. Seoul should recall that its very survival in 1950 hinged on the costly intervention of the United Nations Command – proof that international solidarity can be decisive. What the ROK-US alliance now needs is detailed internal planning: As the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines shape responses to their own interests, Seoul must shed a North Korea-only mindset. Even without combat troops, enabling allied operations through intelligence, logistics and base access can signal resolve as powerfully as direct intervention. In periods of strategic flux, commitment is measured less by force size than by reliability. Silent observation is no longer viable; strategic enabling is. Hanbyeol Sohn PhD ( serves as a professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU), also embracing a role as the director of the Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA). His research areas include nuclear strategy, deterrence and the ROK-US alliance. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Korea National Defense University, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea or any other affiliated institutions.
AllAfrica
3 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Marcos-Duterte clash upending Philippine economy, too
As the Philippines cuts this year's growth target from the 8% to the 6% range, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. can't point the finger at Donald Trump's trade war or Chinese deflation. The real culprit is chaotic local politics. Events from Washington and Beijing are surely taking a toll. But mostly it's the 'Game of Thrones' dynamic between the Marcos and Duterte dynasties that is distracting the government from taking steps to support growth today and increase competitiveness for the future. Prosecutors working on behalf of the House of Representatives want the Senate to hold a trial to remove Sara Duterte from the vice presidency. She was impeached in February on allegations of plotting to have Marcos assassinated and misusing public funds. Her father, former President Rodrigo Duterte, is in detention in The Hague for alleged crimes against humanity over his bloody war on drugs. Needless to say, these dramas and others aren't leaving the Marcos administration much bandwidth to stabilize an already unbalanced economy as the international scene goes haywire. Uncertainty over US President Trump's tariffs is damaging business and consumer sentiment everywhere. The specter of war in the Middle East and intensification of the US-China trade clash are making Manila's earlier 6% to 8% target unreachable. It's since been lowered to 5% to 6.5% for 2025. Looking at the state of global affairs, the Philippines' contention that it can grow between 6% and 7% in 2026 seems beyond fanciful. Not because of the inflationary fallout from tariffs and the Iran-Israel standoff, but because of extreme distraction at home. Three years in, the Marcos presidency has been steadier and more competent than many economists feared. The son of the dictator who ran the Philippine economy into the ground from 1965 to 1986 named a group of capable technocrats to key government posts. The Marcos Jr. administration has indeed restored some accountability to Manila and cheered the global business community. For investors, it was a welcome pivot back toward stability following the chaotic 2016-2022 Duterte presidency. A self-described strongman, Duterte was more interested in waging a war on drugs and cozying up to China than in economic reform. He restored much of the opacity and dysfunction that his predecessor, the late Benigno Aquino, had spent six years eradicating. From 2010 to 2026, Aquino, himself the scion of a family dynasty, ushered in a we're-open-for-business-once-again era. Aquino hit the ground running to restore trust in government and repair a long-neglected economy. Aquino strengthened the national balance sheet, curbed graft, increased accountability and transparency, went after tax cheats and took on the Catholic Church's meddling in politics to stymie population control efforts. In just six years, Aquino transformed the 'sick man of Asia' into an economic growth and investment star. All major credit rating companies raised Manila to investment-grade status for the very first time. To be sure, Aquino left much undone. He didn't create enough good-paying jobs. But then, reversing decades of neglect dating back to the days of dictator Ferdinand Marcos isn't a six-year job. Enter Duterte, who was elected to turbocharge Aquino's Big Bang reforms. Duterte rose to national folk hero status after two decades of running the southern city of Davao. On his watch, the city developed a reputation for efficient governance with faster growth rates and better infrastructure than the national average. The hope was that Duterte would do the same nationally, taking the economy Aquino bequeathed him to new heights. Instead, Duterte largely rested on Aquino's economic laurels. When Duterte arrived in the presidential palace on June 30, 2016, the Philippines was enjoying its fastest growth since the 1970s. It helped that, at the time, the global economy was enjoying a rare, synchronized growth spurt, one that even saw Japan producing solid growth. Rather than take the Philippine economy to a higher level of innovation and productivity, Duterte benched Manila's reform program. Where he should have empowered technocrats to curb graft, reduce bureaucracy and ensure infrastructure projects were being done sustainably, Duterte deployed legions of trigger-happy gunmen – landing Manila in the global headlines for all the wrong reasons. Duterte pivoted away from Aquino's public-private partnership model that reduced large-scale graft in infrastructure projects. By the time Duterte left, Manila's Transparency International ranking had worsened to 116th. In 2010, the Philippines ranked 134th, trailing Nigeria. When Aquino left office, Manila was 95th. The Marcos-Duterte alliance was always a precarious one. Whereas the Dutertes were close to China, Team Marcos quickly pivoted back toward the US alliance. Yet, now as the Marcos and Duterte dynasties clash, there's little bandwidth left to ensure economic reform efforts get back on track. Or, at the very least, that economic backsliding is limited. As the second half of 2025 unfolds, says Fitch Ratings analyst Krisjanis Krustins, 'domestic political uncertainty could affect investment' at a moment when 'global trade tensions will likely drag on growth, in particular indirectly through weaker global demand.' The good news, Krustins says, is that We continue to view the central bank's inflation-targeting framework and flexible exchange-rate regime as credible. Monetary financing of the fiscal deficit during the pandemic was limited and reversed more quickly than in some peers. The government's response to the commodity-price shock was measured, for example, in resisting calls for widespread fuel subsidies. The bad news is what Krustins calls 'charged domestic politics.' One saving grace is that among Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN) members, the Philippines is less dependent on exports. As economist Priyanka Kishore at Asia Decoded points out, even if US tariffs remain unchanged, 'exports will likely slow as businesses and consumers fully absorb and adjust to the higher costs imposed by tariffs.' The impact on ASEAN economies, she adds, 'will be primarily felt through four main channels: a slowdown in goods and services exports, a lull in 'China plus' investments, knock-on impact of external slowdown on domestic demand and a pick-up in Chinese trade and investment inflows into ASEAN.' The resulting disinflationary impulse, Kishore notes, 'should create space for more monetary easing. Nevertheless, ASEAN's growth in 2025 is likely to be one percentage point lower than in 2024, with Singapore and Vietnam bearing the brunt of the slowdown and Indonesia and the Philippines least impacted.' Yet the fallout from the political brawl in Manila means elected officials are less focused on spreading the benefits of Philippine growth to reduce inequality. That's marring Marcos's economic legacy. 'From then until now, poverty and hunger have remained emblems of Marcos's brand of leadership,' says Danilo Ramos, chairperson of the Peasant Movement of the Philippines. The Social Weather Stations research group reports a significant increase in hunger among self-rated poor families. The number of households experiencing involuntary hunger rose to 20% in April. At the same time, a distracted Philippine government has consumers, businesses and investors alike worried about the economy's prospects. 'Uncertainty alone can prevent foreign direct investments,' says Aris Dacanay, ASEAN economist at HSBC. 'For the Philippines, foreign direct investment is important; around 10%of capital formation is FDI-funded. When investors hold back, that weighs on overall investment activities.' At present, Dacanay notes, many Philippine firms are delaying investments in capacity expansion. Also, demand from major trading partners like the US is weakening in real time. In a note to clients, economists at ANZ Research paint an even more cautious picture. 'Private investment and exports have been hindered by a lack of productivity growth, while real wage growth has been insufficient to drive a strong rebound in household spending,' ANZ argues. Looking forward, few economies are at greater risk from the artificial intelligence revolution to come than the Philippines. Citing the International Monetary Fund's numbers, Julius Cainglet, president of labor group Federation of Free Workers,warns that 14% of the country's workforce is at risk of being replaced by AI. This is largely due to the economy's reliance on the business process outsourcing industry. It would be grand if the Marcos administration were linearly focused on these challenges. The narrative needs to be more about economic upgrades and future prosperity and less about a 'Game of Thrones' sequel playing out in Manila.
