India Delivers Aid to Myanmar Following Earthquake
Israa Farhan
India has delivered hundreds of tons of food aid to Myanmar after a powerful earthquake struck the country, causing widespread devastation.
The Indian Navy transported the relief materials just one day after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Myanmar's military leader, General Min Aung Hlaing.
India was among the first countries to send relief and rescue teams to Myanmar following the 7.7-magnitude earthquake that struck on March 28.
According to Myanmar's state media, the death toll has surpassed 3,300, with thousands more injured or displaced.
Despite the passage of more than a week since the disaster, many survivors remain without adequate food and shelter.
The Indian Embassy in Yangon
reported
that the latest shipment included 442 tons of essential food supplies, such as rice, cooking oil, noodles, and biscuits. The aid was delivered aboard the Indian Navy's INS Gharial, which docked at Thilawa Port.
During the BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok, Prime Minister Modi held a rare direct meeting with General Min Aung Hlaing. A government statement quoted Modi as saying, "India is doing everything possible to support our brothers and sisters in Myanmar during this critical time."
Myanmar's military seized power in 2021, citing alleged widespread fraud in the 2020 elections, which were won by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy.
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As the world undergoes rapid political and economic transformations with escalating conflicts shaking the Middle East, the region has witnessed over a full year of genocide in Gaza – and no clear prospect for an end. The conflict has expanded to southern Lebanon, reverberated in Yemen and Iraq, and reached Iran. The Future of the Middle East series seeks to explore these challenges through interviewing prominent politicians, theorists, intellectuals, and current and former diplomats, providing various regional and international perspectives. Through these discussions and insights, lessons from the past are shared in order to chart a path forward. From the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict to regional interventions and the rise of new non-state actors, this series engages in enlightened discussions regarding what can be learned from history and how it will impact the region's future. It aims to explore visions for the future and highlight the vital role that Arab nations can play if historical alliances are revived, pushing towards sustainable stability while safeguarding their interests. The structure of the series involves two parts – the first being a series of seven fixed questions based on requests from readers on the future of the region. The second part features questions tailored to the interviewees specific background, providing new insights into the overarching vision of the interview. Ultimately, this series aims to explore how the Arab region can craft its own unified independent project – one free of external influence. The Professor of International Relations and Political Economy at the American University in Cairo and Professor Emeritus at the University of Montreal, Canada, and Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, Bahgat Korany, stated that he believes the term 'Middle East' has no scientific basis. He considers it a relative, vague, and ambiguous term that allows international parties to include any country within it. He also asserts that the Israeli occupying state now acts as a superpower in the region, having become an established and undeniable presence. It no longer needs the normalization it sought in past years, and can now act as it pleases, he warned. Korany, the founder and former director of the American University Forum, stated that Israel's brutal practices have made peace difficult at present. He emphasized the necessity of unifying Arab efforts to confront Israel's brutality, deeming it the only way to achieve peace and stability in the region. The professor also stressed the importance of strengthening the internal front of Arab countries, both materially (through education, health, and economy) and morally (through the relationship between the authorities and society). He sees this as the optimal means to prevent the region from slipping into the abyss. Interview: ■The term 'Middle East' is a colonial geographical expression, yet it has become the prevalent term for the region encompassing Arab nations, Iran, Turkey, and other countries. Throughout history, the region has suffered from conflicts rooted in colonial schemes, turning it into a perpetually volatile spot on the world map. In your opinion, how do you see the reality of the region and the impact of history on this matter? The 'Middle East' as a term is an imported expression with absolutely no scientific basis. It is 'middle' from whose perspective? Sometimes the French used the term 'Near East' to refer to the area close to Europe (including Turkey, the Fertile Crescent, and the Levant), and 'Far East' to refer to Asia. Thus, the term merely reflects the perspective of those who coined it, without any scientific foundation. Consequently, the division of the East into Near, Middle, and Far is relative and constrained by the viewpoint of whoever defined the framework. Even in its applications, we find that the French campaign had an influence in establishing the term, as military leaders organized operations in terms of Near, Middle, and Far. Despite this, ambiguity remains regarding the boundaries of the Middle East. Sometimes Pakistan was included within this so-called Middle East, and other times Cyprus and Greece, which makes the term both vague and ambiguous. I'd like to share a personal experience here. After completing my doctorate in Switzerland, the University of Montreal asked me to teach international relations theory and assigned me the task of developing and heading a department focused on 'Middle Eastern Studies.' This was in the 1970s. I rejected the proposed name and suggested the department be called 'Studies of the Arab Region.' This name initially met with opposition from the university administration, as it was considered unconventional and unfamiliar. I argued that the Middle East is an area with unclear boundaries, and it would be more appropriate to base the department on a clearly defined entity, namely the Arab Region. I debated with the University of Montreal on the grounds that there is a regional institution for Arab states, the League of Arab States, whereas no international organization exists for the Middle East. This solidified the scientific basis for the concept of the 'Arab Region' rather than the 'Middle East,' which is based on a relative and fluid division and perspective subject to constant change. They eventually accepted the naming, and subsequently established another program called 'Jewish Studies.' After that, I co-authored a book with Dr. Ali al Din Hilal on 'The Foreign Policies of Arab States' to document the Arab reality, given the scarcity of writings on the foreign policies of Middle Eastern countries, specifically Arab ones. The goal of these research endeavors was to scientifically assert the Arab reality on the region, stemming from our understanding of who is within and who is outside the Arab region. ■The term 'Middle East' emerged in American Alfred Mahan's writings in 1902 before Condoleezza Rice spoke of the 'New Middle East.' This concept is now strongly resurfacing amidst the Israeli war and the conflict with Iran. How do you view this plan, especially under the Trump administration and the rise of the right-wing in the US? There is nothing new here. The shift from the 'old' to the 'new' Middle East is fundamentally about integrating Israel into the region. In fact, Shimon Peres was the first to use the term 'New Middle East,' discussing it after the late President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel and even publishing a book titled 'The New Middle East.' The term then gained widespread use. However, the crucial point here is that the word 'new' draws attention to the idea of 'change.' This prompted me and some colleagues to publish a book in 2008 titled 'The Changing Middle East,' which was later translated into Arabic. It refutes the static view that believes the region is unchanging. We finished writing the book in 2010, and right after publishing the Arab Spring wave emerged. Some American media outlets considered the book to have predicted the Arab Spring, but in my interviews, for example, with CNN, I clarified that the book wasn't a prediction but rather a diagnosis of the changes the region was undergoing. Our role was akin to that of a geologist who observes changes and disturbances in the Earth's layers without definitively predicting an earthquake. I believe the region is currently undergoing new transformations, especially after the signing of the Abraham Accords. ■In your opinion, what should the major regional powers in the region, specifically Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as the two largest countries, do regarding these plans? Arab coordination is fundamentally essential. In the era of the late leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and even now, some Nasserists still speak of Egypt as the great nation that should always lead the scene. However, the changes the region is experiencing make individual leadership illogical. The region has changed, and thus individual leadership has become difficult. Coordination with Saudi Arabia has become therefore become essential as Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the two main regional powers most knowledgeable about the area. However, this approach should be seen as a means for Arab mobilization, not for individual leadership. Meaning, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are two fundamental pillars for Arab mobilization and forming a united Arab front, without monopolizing the spotlight and leading a region that is still undergoing change. There's a noticeable absence of a unified Arab project to counter the plans for the region, especially Israel's expansionist goals clearly seen in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and the talk of annexing more Arab territories. This direction was translated by Trump when he spoke of a 'small Israel that must expand.' How can Arabs formulate their project to confront these schemes? I believe in a scientific approach to analysis, and looking at the region, it's clear that Israel is the military superpower. It can now do as it pleases, entering any territory and launching strikes without any losses to its air force carrying out these attacks. The occupation forces entered Syria, reaching even the presidential palace and conducting strikes in its vicinity. They decided to seize Gaza and insist that most of the Strip will be part of Israel, despite initially claiming their war goal was to eliminate Hamas. Now, however, they want Gaza's land. So, the diagnosis of the problem is that we are facing a state acting as a military superpower. Based on this reality, we must seek the reasons that enabled Israel to reach this stage. When we were students after '67, while studying in Switzerland in 1968, we met a French person of Jewish origin who gave us the best description of the Israeli situation: he said it represents settler colonialism. I would now add the word 'expansionist' to this description. The Israeli occupation's primary concern is how to annex new territories, starting with the West Bank and Gaza, then requesting a portion of Sinai from Trump, and then turning its attention towards Saudi Arabia, trying to persuade Trump to pressure them to give Palestinians a part of their land, since they are interested in their cause. Therefore, the expansionist aspect is fundamental to current Israeli thinking. From this perspective, I believe the time is no longer appropriate for any peace with Israel under the current ruling elite in Tel Aviv. Peace will only happen with an internal change that brings calm and provides an opportunity for peace to prevail. The current government, its orientations, and its statements all indicate a desire to control the region. In the past, what concerned Israel was normalization with the Arab region, but now normalization no longer matters to them because they already have everything they want. The solution to this problem can only come through unifying Arab and non-Arab efforts to confront Israel's brutal military force. Only then can we talk about peace. Discussing it with the current ruling class is a form of wasting time. ■Throughout history, Egypt has played key roles in the region. How can it continue to exercise these roles despite the surrounding challenges and the constant targeting it faces? The reality is that the most prominent challenges we currently face are economic and our limited capabilities. However, from a purely scientific perspective, there are significant problems affecting the domestic situation, even if their cause is external, such as the water issue and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Ethiopia has proceeded with building. Hence, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's view on this matter focused on the importance of the Arab region without neglecting relations with Africa, as Egypt's life is linked to openness towards the African continent. This leads us to the challenges of Egyptian foreign policy in Africa and the Arab world. I believe that Egypt's current approach of diversifying international relations is a very good direction, but it shouldn't be limited to a specific capital or region. This also doesn't mean excessive overstretch, where we become unable to control things, as challenges require setting priorities and dealing with them in a manner commensurate with capabilities. Egypt is distinguished by its geographical location, which makes it a focus of interest for everyone who views it as 'too expensive to fail,' meaning the failure of a country like Egypt cannot be accepted. This is what drives the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to deal with Egypt. The aid that comes to the country is not a 'favor,' but rather its purpose is to protect the borders of donor countries against illegal immigration. However, this does not negate the necessity of achieving economic reform and self-sufficiency, away from reliance on aid, which creates dependency and undermines the ability of recipient countries to play an independent role. Some ministers in past decades found it easy to incur debt, considering it a solution to the problem. The unfortunate reality is that these debts affect the budget, especially the interest on these debts. A portion of the money we repay is debt service funds, like interest, not the principal debt itself. Historically, the basis of British colonialism was debt; before 1882, before the British entered Egypt, there was a meeting of the Egyptian government's cabinet attended by experts from Egypt and England, with the aim of approving internal Egyptian policy because the country was indebted at the time. I tell my students that the IMF dictates the economic policies of debtor countries. It is the one that forces governments to adopt a market policy, where all goods and services are at market prices. The reality is that we are in a weak position, and the Fund is sometimes right about the importance of economic reform. But from our side, we must also focus on exports, not just real estate, despite its importance in attracting foreign currency. I have colleagues at the Fund whom I urge to abandon traditional theory, given the new challenges that must be considered, as well as the situation of individuals in debtor countries. Some populations cannot bear the high cost of education. If we don't support education, there will be an ignorant populace. Therefore, we should choose the ordinary Islamic theory which states that one should choose the lesser harm, and it is not always necessary to follow the traditional theory that states raising the cost of everything to reduce consumption. How can people abandon education? Thus, I offer recommendations to the Fund to adapt traditional theory according to the conditions of the people, and for their part, governments, to try to achieve some reforms. ■If you were to paint a picture of the future for this region, given the current conflicts and surrounding risks, how would you detail these scenarios? I'd like to point out something that many Arab colleagues don't often touch upon: external intervention is a significant problem, not to be underestimated. We suffered from colonialism for many years, and colonialism, or external control, still exists in some form. Now, Israel has become a state imposed from outside, existing as one that aids external powers. Tel Aviv justifies its existence to the US by claiming it's doing what Washington wants done on its behalf. One could say Israel is America's aircraft carrier in the region. So, there's no doubt that external factors influence the region, but we also shouldn't overlook internal factors. The region is fraught with problems, starting from population issues and water scarcity, leading up to political challenges. Some Arab regimes are still primarily concerned with tightening their grip on power while neglecting society. Syria is the prime example of this. In political science, there's an important theory called 'F-States,' short for 'Fragile Failed States.' Some Arab countries suffering from internal problems weaken the Arab world's ability to assert itself. In the 1967 war, Israel controlled the battle within the first hour and a half or two hours, primarily through its air force, by bombing Egyptian aircraft on the ground. Once air superiority was achieved, the battle was over. The truth is, the 1967 defeat wasn't just the problem; it was the level of the defeat, one of the reasons for which was the level of education. Some conscripts didn't even know how to operate tanks, so they would jump out of them. That's why after 1967, conscription focused on university graduates. Initially, they would serve for one year, but then they continued their service for six to seven years. Hence, when Moshe Dayan was asked after the 1973 war about the reasons for their losses compared to their gains in '67 and what had changed in Israel's forces, Dayan said that his forces hadn't changed, but what had changed were the Arabs. Therefore, the internal front is crucial: education, health, and the economic situation. Without supporting these factors, a state falls into the trap of becoming a 'fragile state.' Many, in reality, speak only of external factors, neglecting the internal factors which are of great importance. A state's openness to its society also gives it the strength to resist external factors. Authoritarian states might succeed for a period, but they eventually fade away. Syria, as an Arab power, is now paralyzed and will remain so for some time. Bashar resisted change and imposed himself, which negatively impacted society and led to its deterioration. Israel capitalized on this, dismantling the Syrian army's infrastructure and seizing the Golan Heights. Now, it's conducting strikes near the presidential palace – I believe there's no stronger message than that. I re-emphasize that strengthening the internal front materially (in terms of education, health, and economy) and morally (in terms of the relationship between the authorities and society) is of utmost importance.
Egypt Independent
33 minutes ago
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AUC professor Bahgat Korany continues discussion on Suez Canal, GERD concerns, and global politics (Part 2)
As the world undergoes rapid political and economic transformations with escalating conflicts shaking the Middle East, the region has witnessed over a full year of genocide in Gaza – and no clear prospect for an end. The conflict has expanded to southern Lebanon, reverberated in Yemen and Iraq, and reached Iran. The Future of the Middle East series seeks to explore these challenges through interviewing prominent politicians, theorists, intellectuals, and current and former diplomats, providing various regional and international perspectives. Through these discussions and insights, lessons from the past are shared in order to chart a path forward. From the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict to regional interventions and the rise of new non-state actors, this series engages in enlightened discussions regarding what can be learned from history and how it will impact the region's future. It aims to explore visions for the future and highlight the vital role that Arab nations can play if historical alliances are revived, pushing towards sustainable stability while safeguarding their interests. The structure of the series involves two parts – the first being a series of seven fixed questions based on requests from readers on the future of the region. The second part features questions tailored to the interviewees specific background, providing new insights into the overarching vision of the interview. Ultimately, this series aims to explore how the Arab region can craft its own unified independent project – one free of external influence. In the previous interview of our 'Middle East Dialogues' series, conducted with Professor of International Relations and Political Economy at the American University in Cairo and Professor Emeritus at the University of Montreal, Canada, and Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, Bahgat Korany, asserted that the term 'Middle East' is an imported expression lacking in scientific basis. He argued that 'the Arab Region' is a more appropriate designation, as 'Middle East' is based on a relative, fluid, and constantly changing division and perspective. Korany noted that Israel operates in the region as a military superpower, now seemingly able to act as it pleases, presenting itself to Washington as America's aircraft carrier in the region. In this second interview, Korany stated that there should have been clearer signs of objection from Arab regional states, especially Gulf nations, to curb the excessive practices of the ruling class in Tel Aviv. He expressed his concern about further expansion of the occupation outside Palestinian territories, particularly in the absence of a unified Arab response. Interview: ■As a political science professor, do you believe that history is repeating itself? During the medieval period, there were attempts by the kings of Abyssinia and their European allies to divert the course of the Nile, aiming to undermine the Mamluk state. Also during the Mamluk era, the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope rerouted shipping away from Egyptian coasts. Do you see us facing a similar historical scenario today, as embodied by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the search for alternatives to the Suez Canal? Regarding the Cape of Good Hope, that's not the primary concern. The real threat now is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), for which a memorandum of understanding has been signed. This route connects Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, bypassing the Suez Canal by running from India through Eilat and the Middle East to Europe. We must coordinate with the UAE to prevent their participation in this project, as it would weaken the Suez Canal's position. As for the Nile and the GERD, we first need to understand just how Ethiopia is presenting this project. Addis Ababa claims that the current water distribution is based on colonial-era agreements and that Egypt's share under these agreements is excessive, while Ethiopia needs the water for development. So, on the one hand, Ethiopia promotes a populist idea appealing to many African nations, asserting that the current situation is a product of colonial agreements that should be rejected. On the other hand, they claim a need for water for development, which is also a populist notion. This overall argument is flawed for two reasons: First, some colonial agreements, such as border treaties, cannot be approached or altered currently. The entire world adheres to these agreements, and we cannot simply reject every colonial agreement, as this would open the door to unforeseen disasters. Second, Ethiopia can certainly achieve development, but with enough water for both parties—Cairo and Addis Ababa. Ethiopia must consider that there are lost water flows and another portion that evaporates. Therefore, the water must be sufficient for both sides. This issue is existential for Egypt and non-negotiable, as Egypt relies on Nile water for 94 percent of its resources. Consequently, there is no intention to relinquish its right. In my opinion, Egypt should have acted preemptively and engaged with international bodies and parties. This would have involved convincing donors, including the World Bank, to condition their funding to Ethiopia on not impacting Egypt's share of the Nile or the Egyptian presence, since the lives of Egyptians are tied to the Nile River. We don't oppose development or funding, but it must be done in a way that preserves everyone's rights. Here, I believe, there was a shortcoming in Egyptian diplomacy. ■About 10 years ago, most of the region's conflicts were civil wars, not international ones. I highlighted this issue in an article where I noted that the number of civil wars increased from 62 in 2016 to 82 in 2017. Do you believe the use of this pattern of warfare was merely a precursor to the wars Israel wages, aimed at exhausting rival military capabilities before engaging them directly, as it does now? In my view, external conspiracies are a given. Every nation, especially one that's coveted, faces external plots designed to maximize gains. However, the crucial aspect is strengthening the internal front to prevent any vulnerabilities that would allow outside penetration. I emphasize the necessity of rejecting any internal conflicts, be they ethnic, tribal, or even economic. Inequality within a society makes external temptations strong and weakens national belonging. Therefore, the strength of the internal front is the greatest defense against external forces. A significant portion of the war in Syria was orchestrated by Israel, which was preparing for the collapse of the Syrian state and army. With the army virtually non-existent, Bashar al-Assad imposed himself by force, transforming protests into a civil war that outside powers—Iran and Russia on one side, Turkey and Israel on the other—then exploited. ■The Huthi group recently targeted Tel Aviv with a hypersonic missile. It's known that only a very limited number of countries, fewer than the fingers on one hand, possess this type of missile, and Iran is not among them. From your perspective, who supplied the Huthis with this kind of missile? And are we seeing a new backer for the Huthis, replacing Tehran, which has recently distanced itself from the Huthis for the sake of its negotiations with Washington? In international relations, there are Private Military Companies (PMCs). Americans sometimes rely on these companies instead of their military to limit casualties, just as the Russians relied on the Wagner Group in Africa. It's possible the Huthis have dealings with some of these companies, and they could be the ones who supplied them with this missile. ■In one of your articles published in 2012, you discussed Sadat's initiative to visit Tel Aviv and stated that we were facing a 'New Middle East' where Israel was an integral part of its cooperative and military interactions. Meanwhile, the conflict intensified between Morocco and Algeria. Given current events and Israel's forceful expansion in the region, how do you see the map of this 'New Middle East,' and how do you assess the relations of some Gulf states with Israel?' I wrote an article about two months ago that garnered significant reactions, both domestically and internationally, from prominent figures whom I won't name. The article was titled 'The Question from Foreign Friends I Couldn't Answer.' I was in a discussion with a number of foreigners, and we were talking about Israel's unprecedented genocide in Gaza, its brutality and war crimes. My foreign friends then posed a question that I couldn't answer: 'What are the stakeholders doing?' Here, I'm not referring to Egypt, but to the Gulf states and other Arab nations. Where is their role in this war? Within international relations, there's an option which involves recalling the ambassador for consultation, as a form of protest. This is a step before withdrawing the ambassador, which is then followed by severing diplomatic relations. We don't wish to reach the point of severing diplomatic relations, but at the very least, resorting to the simplest means of protest and suspending commercial deals. There are specific initiatives to demonstrate objection to a particular political behavior concerning the ruling class in Tel Aviv, especially after the International Criminal Court designated Netanyahu and his defense minister as war criminals, necessitating their arrest and extradition for trial. Furthermore, the Human Rights Council in Geneva condemned the unprecedented starvation of Gaza's population. Therefore, there should have been clearer signs of objection to curb the excesses of the ruling class in Tel Aviv, whose actions have even faced protests from within Israel itself. The reality is, I am very pessimistic about the group currently governing Israel. They are planning to annex the West Bank and Gaza, and I fear further expansion beyond the occupied Palestinian territories, especially given the absence of a unified response from Arab states. ■As a political science professor, you received a unique honor from the International Studies Association in the US, the first of its kind for a Middle Eastern political science scholar. The Director of the Governance Program presented your award as a welcome to 'the Other.' In your opinion, why does American hegemony extend even to intellectual and theoretical fields, causing international relations theories to revolve around the American perspective? First, let's start with a simple observation: despite some who oppose the US and speak of America's 'ugly side,' their main interests is often to send their children to American universities because of their excellence. However, I believe the Trump administration's handling of universities will harm the US. He began cutting funds for research teams conducting studies on cancer and other fields. This scientific dominance is one of America's greatest strengths, surpassing even Europe, China, and Russia. This educational and research aspect is one of the most prominent tools of American soft power, and what he's doing to Harvard and other universities will harm scientific research, including for cancer. The funds allocated by US administrations to scientific research and America's openness to the world in this regard have given the US a significant lead over other nations. From this perspective, I'd like to reference what Stanley Hoffmann, an Austrian-born professor at Harvard University, wrote in a 1977 article titled 'International Relations: An American Social Science.' This title reflects American intellectual dominance, which no one, not even England or France, can rival. From here, we as researchers from the Global South began to question: Does this serve the interest of international relations as a science and a practice? All sciences aim to be open and universal, especially international relations. I cannot establish a science of international relations with a perspective confined solely to American society. This, of course, is not in the best interest of the US itself, as the perspectives of its researchers are often limited to an American internal view, and most are not familiar with other regions outside the US borders, such as the Far East and Middle East. Therefore, we agreed on the necessity of collaborating with others from those regions to produce a universal science. However, there are some obstacles preventing this, such limited resources in third-world countries. American universities, for instance, provide opportunities for international travel to attend conferences and so forth, while local universities lack the financial means to offer such opportunities. These resources are also necessary to produce strong research that promotes the thinking of the Global South. This is why the International Studies Association resorted to organizing grants for researchers to overcome this obstacle. There's also the language barrier, which the association has tried to overcome so that research from the region can be published. ■What hinders the Global South from reaching this same level of development? Years ago, I was selected as a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, the first non-Canadian to be granted this membership. After that, I worked with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which publishes the Arab Human Development Report. This report is incredibly important for anyone interested in development issues. It's an outstanding report, and the team responsible for it began its publication in 2002. The head of that team was Nader Fergany, an Egyptian statistics professor, who always produced an exceptional version of the report that I frequently refer to. In 2009, the UNDP assigned me the task of preparing a new edition of the report. I tackled the issue of political empowerment and titled the report 'The Importance of Empowerment'. Through it, I highlighted the idea that while economic development is crucial, the political aspect is even more important. Resources matter, but it's the politician or policymaker who decides how those resources are used. For example, Japan has limited economic resources but is highly developed, whereas Congo has abundant minerals and pearls yet remains embroiled in continuous wars, leading to the absence of state authority. This underscores the importance of the political apparatus. I recall now the tragedy of Syria, which wasn't caused by the Arab Spring as much as by the incompetence in confronting political challenges. The difference between Mubarak's Egypt and Bashar's Syria is that the latter imposed himself on his people for about 11 years, during which Israel funded and fueled the civil war, while Mubarak chose to relinquish power. This demonstrates the critical importance of political decisions and how a state is directed. In reality, economic reform is important, but political reform is paramount and takes precedence, even if it takes time. I focus on three main pillars: transparency and data availability, openness to others (especially experts who provide modern scientific insights), and tolerance, which is also a crucial foundation. ■The American President, during his election campaign, claimed he could end wars with a single phone call, yet these wars have not ceased. Do you believe what he said was mere election propaganda, or has Israel become so influential that Washington can no longer affect it, or is the matter ultimately a calculation of profit and loss? Politics, in general, is a calculation of profit and loss. However, Trump arranges his political affairs in a crude, direct, and immediate manner, without considering the long-term nature of relationships. He is fundamentally a liar, whether this stems from ignorance, malice, or even limited thinking. When he participated in the debate with former President Joe Biden, American journalists found that 67 percent of his statements were falsehoods, and some journalists recorded nearly 17,000 lies during his first term. His pronouncements are sometimes pure propaganda, and sometimes they are the result of insufficient information. This, of course, poses a danger to the international community: for the president of the world's most powerful nation to have such a shortsighted perspective. When he cuts the Department of Education, curtails scientific research, and approaches matters based on immediate results without foresight, this naturally raises concerns. ■For a period, before the era of Richard Nixon, the US treated Taiwan as if it were China. While Biden has supported the island's independence, Trump, true to form, has used it as a bargaining chip, promising protection in exchange for specific demands, such as reclaiming the electronic chip industry currently dominated by Taiwan. How do you foresee the future of the China-Taiwan crisis, given China's insistence on annexing the island? Taiwan is one of the most prominent global issues right now. It could trigger a war far more difficult than the one in Ukraine, fundamentally because China views Taiwan as an integral part of its territory, just as we view Hala'ib and Shalateen as inseparable parts of Egyptian land. The relationship between US and China used to baffle us as political science researchers. How could the world's largest country not be represented in the United Nations? When communism triumphed in China, America took a stance, declaring that the true representative of China was not the mainland as we know it today, but rather the small island of Taiwan. This continued until 1972, with Taiwan holding a seat and veto power in the Security Council, a small island that separated from China after its defeat in the civil war, until Nixon visited China in 1972. What's striking is that throughout this period of non-recognition by Washington, China remained consistent with its 'One China' policy, which Washington eventually accepted. To this day, China considers Taiwan part of its territory, and if it decides to invade it at any point, it will. Thus, the reality confirms that the Taiwan crisis is not like the Russia-Ukraine situation; the latter are two independent states. Taiwan, however, is not represented in the United Nations, and therefore, the world does not view it as a state. I believe Trump will not intervene in this crisis, nor will he fight China for Taiwan. He might resort to sanctions, and perhaps some European countries might exert pressure to prevent an invasion, but the matter will not escalate to the point of armed conflict with China over Taiwan. Trump, as an individual, is unpredictable, save for one indicator that helps us discern his stances: he acts like a real estate magnate, adopting a transactional approach. His entire mindset is focused on deals, just as he did with Ukraine, when he demanded minerals in exchange for defense, even though Kyiv was his biggest ally in Europe and, along with the US, formed what was known as the Atlantic Front. Trump operates in a crude and direct quid pro quo manner. ■Setting aside Trump's unpredictability, does the Jewish lobby also influence American decision-making regarding Israel? The lobby indeed has significant influence, but I believe its impact is often exaggerated. External actors, in many instances, indirectly contribute to inflating the lobby's perceived power. Some mistakenly believe that reaching the US administration is solely achievable through the Jewish lobby, and they approach it as a means of gaining proximity to Washington. This, ironically, grants the lobby even greater power, even within the administration itself. The US Congress sometimes intimidates non-Jewish members or those not loyal to Israel, which ensures the lobby maintains a loyal bloc within Congress. Therefore, I believe it's crucial to focus studies on Congress as well, not just the White House.
