Thai court suspends PM Paetongtarn from duty
The court said it had accepted a petition from 36 senators accusing Paetongtarn of violating ethical standards stipulated in the constitution over the call. Her premiership is suspended pending the final ruling and a deputy prime minister is expected to step in as caretaker.
Paetongtarn has been facing backlash after her phone conversation with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen was leaked. During their talk about border disputes, she seemed to disparage a Thai Army commander.
The court order adds to political turmoil over the government's handling of the border issues with Cambodia and the phone call.
Thousands of protesters gathered over the weekend, demanding that Paetongtarn step down. The latest survey shows that fewer than 10 percent of respondents thought she was suitable as a leader.
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Thai court weighs removing PM Paetongtarn
The Thai government is being plunged deeper into uncertainty as the county's Constitutional Court weighs whether to remove Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra after suspending her from her duties. Paetongtarn was suspended on Tuesday after the court decided to proceed with a petition demanding her resignation. It came amid a controversy over a leaked phone call with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen. Deputy Prime Minister Suriya Jungrungreangkit stepped in as acting prime minister. He is also the transport minister and a member of Paetongtarn's Pheu Thai Party. The party leads the coalition government with a thin majority. Thai media report that it's expected to take around a month or longer for a verdict to be handed down. Analysts believe the outcome could bring more political turmoil. Protest leaders who demanded Paetongtarn's resignation have welcomed the suspension. They plan to hold a major demonstration in August.
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Decoding ASEAN's Measured Engagement with BRICS
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